NATIONAL ASSOC OF CREDIT MTG V DELOITTE & TOUCHE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT
MANAGEMENT, INC., as Trust Mortgagee of the
Trust Estate of Central Builders Supplies Co., Inc., and
as Assignee of Members of Central Builders Supplies
Co., Inc., CERTAINTEED CORPORATION,
DESIGN HOUSE, GEORGIA-PACIFIC
CORPORATION, MAKITA, U.S.A. INC.,
MARQUETTE GAYLORD WAREHOUSE, INC.,
d/b/a HAGER DISTRIBUTION, GAYLORD, CO.,
HAGER DISTRIBUTION, INDIANAPOLIS, CO.,
HAGER DISTRIBUTION, JOLIET, CO., and
HAGER DISTRIBUTION, SPRINGFIELD, CO.,
MARQUETTE LUMBERMENS WAREHOUSE,
INC., d/b/a HAGER DISTRIBUTION, GRAND
RAPIDS, CO., MARQUETTE SAGINAW
WAREHOUSE, INC., d/b/a HAGER
DISTRIBUTION, SAGINAW, CO., MORGAN
PRODUCTS LTD., d/b/a MORGAN
DISTRIBUTION, OWENS CORNING
FIBERGLASS, SCHULTZ, SNYDER & STEELE
LUMBER COMPANY, and UNITED STATES
GYPSUM COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 30, 1998
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 191754
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 93-000539 NM
DELOITTE & TOUCHE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Cavanagh and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
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Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this accountant malpractice case. We affirm.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition based on its finding that
defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiffs. The parties agreed that there are essentially three tests for
determining when an accountant owes a duty to a third party who used the accountant’s audit report
and accompanying financial statements: (1) the direct contact/privity test; (2) the test based on
Restatement Torts, 2d, § 552, and (3) the foreseeability test. This Court adopted the Restatement test
in Law Offices of Lawrence J Stockler, PC v Rose, 174 Mich App 14, 36; 436 NW2d 70 (1989).
Plaintiffs first argue that in determining an accountant’s liability to third parties, Michigan should
adopt a foreseeability approach, as set forth in H Rosenblum, Inc v Adler, 93 NJ 324; 461 A2d 138;
35 ALR4th 199 (1983). Plaintiffs argue that “the movement in Michigan is toward the Foreseeability
Standard.” In support of this assertion, plaintiffs first note that in Stockler, supra, this Court did not
reject the foreseeability standard, but rather concluded under the facts of that case, it was unnecessary
to address whether a broader standard of foreseeability should be adopted. See Stockler, supra at
36-37. Plaintiffs also rely on In re DeLorean Motor Co, 56 BR 936, 944 (Bankr ED Mich, 1986), in
which the court concluded that “reliance by foreseeable third-parties [is] an appropriate factor to
consider in deciding if an accountant or other professional owes a duty of care to another.” Next,
plaintiffs point out that Michigan courts have held other professionals liable to third parties where the
professional’s negligence would foreseeably injure that third party. Finally, plaintiffs claim that other
states have adopted the foreseeability doctrine.
We disagree with plaintiffs’ assertion that Michigan has been moving toward the foreseeability
standard in accountant liability. On the question of an accountant’s duty to third parties, the
Restatement standard was adopted by a panel of this Court, which declined to address whether the
foreseeability standard was applicable. The Restatement standard was subsequently codified by the
Legislature. See MCL 600.2962; MSA 27A.2962. Plaintiffs’ reliance on a single case from federal
bankruptcy court is therefore unpersuasive. Likewise, the cases cited by plaintiffs involving
psychiatrists,1 doctors,2 and abstracters3 do not provide a cogent basis for applying a foreseeability
standard in cases of accountant malpractice. Furthermore, plaintiffs essentially concede in their reply
brief that the foreseeability rule is not widely followed.
Plaintiffs recognize that the Legislature has adopted the Restatement standard. Plaintiffs note,
however, that their cause of action accrued before MCL 600.2962; MSA 27A.2962 took effect.
Plaintiffs argue that the fact that the Legislature saw fit to address the issue supports their argument that
the judicial trend was toward the adoption of a foreseeability standard. Plaintiffs offer no evidence of
this legislative intent, however, and in light of the fact that no Michigan court ever actually approved the
foreseeability doctrine, we do not believe that plaintiffs have articulated a compelling reason to apply the
foreseeability standard in causes of action that accrued prior to the effective date of MCL 600.2962;
MSA 27A.2962.
Applying the Restatement standard, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that
defendant did not owe a duty to plaintiffs. Under the Restatement test, plaintiffs must establish that
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(1) defendant supplied its report to plaintiffs or that it knew that CBS would give the report to them, and
(2) defendant intended or knew that CBS intended the information to influence plaintiffs’ transactions.
See Raritan River Steel Co v Cherry, Bakaert & Holland, 322 NC 200, 215; 367 SE2d 609
(1988). Plaintiffs have satisfied neither condition.
Only two plaintiffs, Owens Corning Corporation and Georgia-Pacific Corporation, actually
received copies of the 1990 audited financial statement. However, defendant did not supply its report
to these plaintiffs, and they have produced no evidence that defendant knew that its client would give the
report to them. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not shown that defendant intended, or knew that the client
intended, the information to influence these plaintiffs’ transactions.
Plaintiffs argue that a question of fact remains under the Restatement test because Peter Ruma, a
Deloitte partner, testified that he was aware of both how CBS operated and that creditors and vendors
use financial statements. We disagree. A general awareness that creditors and vendors use financial
statements does not constitute evidence that defendant knew that any particular creditor would use its
reports and the financial statements. Accordingly, under the Restatement test, plaintiffs have not
established that defendant owed a duty to them.
With regard to the remaining plaintiffs, they cite no authority for the proposition that an
accountant may be held liable to a third party who did not receive both the audited financial statements
and the auditor’s report. Even the Rosenblum court limited the applicability of the foreseeability test to
third parties that received the entire audited financial statement. See Rosenblum, supra at 352-353.
We decline plaintiffs’ invitation to extend accountant liability to third parties who did not receive both the
audited financial statements and the auditor’s report.4
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have allowed them to amend their complaint to
include allegations of gross negligence and intentional misrepresentation. This Court will not reverse a
trial court's decision on a motion to amend a complaint absent an abuse of discretion that results in
injustice. Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 393; 541 NW2d 566 (1995).
Amendment is generally a matter of right rather than grace. Patillo v Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States, 199 Mich App 450, 456; 502 NW2d 696 (1992). A trial
court should freely grant leave to amend if justice so requires. MCR 2.118(A)(2). Leave to amend
should be denied only for particularized reasons, such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on
the movant's part, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, or where amendment would be futile. Phinney v Verbrugge, 222
Mich App 513, 523; 564 NW2d 532 (1997).
The trial court held that a motion to amend plaintiffs’ complaint to add an allegation of gross
negligence would be futile because plaintiffs had not cited any case law that held that the scope of an
auditor’s duty to third parties varies depending on whether negligence or gross negligence is alleged.
Although on appeal plaintiffs cite “Ultramares [Corp v Touche, Niven & Co, 255 NY 170, 182-183;
174 NE 441; 74 ALR 1139 (1931)] and its progeny,” the Ultramares court held that an accountant
must be in privity of contract with the person seeking to impose
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liability or there must be a bond “so close as to approach that of privity.” Ultramares, supra at 182
183. Thus, Ultramares provides no support for plaintiffs’ claim, and the trial court correctly found that
a motion to amend plaintiffs’ complaint would be futile.
The trial court also found that a motion to amend plaintiffs’ complaint to add a claim of fraud
would be futile. We agree. In order to state a claim for fraud or misrepresentation, plaintiff must prove
(1) that defendant made a material representation; (2) that the representation was false; (3) when
defendant made the representation, defendant knew it was false, or made it recklessly without
knowledge of its truth or falsity; (4) that defendant made it with the intent that plaintiff would act upon it;
(5) that plaintiff acted in reliance upon it; and (6) that plaintiff suffered injury. James v City of Burton,
221 Mich App 130, 134-135; 560 NW2d 668 (1997). The trial court found that plaintiffs were unable
to establish that defendant made a representation to them or that defendant made a misrepresentation
with the intention that it would be acted on by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not point to any evidence in the
record that suggests that these factual findings were erroneous. Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
Affirmed. Defendant being the prevailing party, it may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
1
Davis v Lhim, 124 Mich App 291; 335 NW2d 481 (1983), remanded 422 Mich 875 (1985). In
1989, the Michigan Legislature codified mental health professionals’ duty to warn third parties of danger
from their patients. See MCL 330.1946; MSA 14.800(946).
2
Duvall v Golden, 139 Mich App 342; 362 NW2d 275 (1984).
3
Williams v Polgar, 391 Mich 6; 215 NW2d 149 (1974).
4
As another court explained:
Our holding that reliance on the audited financial statements is required in these kinds of
cases stems in part from an understanding of the audit report. An audit report
represents the auditor’s opinion of the accuracy of the client’s financial statement at a
given period of time. The financial statements themselves are the representation of
management, not the auditor. Isolated statements in the report particularly the net worth
figure, do not meaningfully stand alone; rather, they are interdependent and can be fully
understood and justifiably relied on only when considered in the context of the entire
report, including any qualifications of the auditor’s opinion and any explanatory
footnotes included in the statements. [Raritan River Steel Co, supra at 207 (citations
omitted).]
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