PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 16, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
ANTHONY JOHNSON, a/k/a MARK JOHNSON,
a/k/a ROBERT ANTHONY JOHNSON,
No. 188681
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 91-106749 FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., McDonald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us for consideration as on leave granted pursuant to a remand order from the
Michigan Supreme Court. People v Johnson, 449 Mich 901; 536 NW2d 781 (1995). Defendant
appeals from his jury trial conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver more than 650
grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1); MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA
14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i), and from his sentence of a mandatory life term without the possibility of parole.
We affirm.
The charges arose out of a series of incidents involving defendant, his codefendants (Aaron
Banks, Gerald Hill, Amir Wilson, and Terrence Moore), and certain other individuals. The jury found
that these incidents established a conspiracy to process crack cocaine in Oakland County and transport
it to Muskegon and elsewhere for sale. According to the testimony at trial, most of the sales took place
in an area in Muskegon called “the zone” or “the projects.” The activities undertaken in the furtherance
of this criminal agreement centered around an individual named Ricky Franklin, who would obtain the
cocaine, process it into crack, package it, and then give it to defendant and his codefendants to sell in
exchange for a portion of the proceeds.
Defendant first contends that his conviction violates his constitutional right to avoid being twice
placed in jeopardy for the same offense. In early 1991, defendant was convicted in Muskegon Circuit
Court of delivery of l ss than fifty grams of cocaine after one of the sellers who worked for him
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contacted the police. Defendant now argues (1) that the conduct forming the basis of his conspiracy
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conviction was part of the same transaction as the conduct forming the basis of his prior delivery
conviction and (2) that the instant prosecution must therefore be barred under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Michigan Constitution2 as a second prosecution for the same offense. We disagree.
Double jeopardy issues are reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 705;
542 NW2d 921 (1995).
The guarantee against being twice placed in jeopardy protects against both multiple
prosecutions and multiple punishments for the “same offense.” People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 706;
564 NW2d 13 (1997). Under the Michigan Constitution, the general rule applicable in multiple
prosecution cases appears to be the “same transaction” test adopted in People v White, 390 Mich
245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973).3 Under the “same transaction” test, two offenses involving criminal intent
are considered the “same offense” if they occurred in a continuous time sequence and displayed a single
intent and goal.4 Crampton v 54-A Dist Judge, 397 Mich 489, 501-502; 245 NW2d 28 (1976);
White, supra at 259; see also People v Wilson, 454 Mich 421, 461; 563 NW2d 44 (1997) (Boyle,
J.). But see People v Ainsworth, 197 Mich App 321, 323; 495 NW2d 177 (1992) and People v
Hunt (After Remand), 214 Mich App 313, 316; 542 NW2d 609 (1995) (limiting application of this
part of the White “same transaction” test to situations involving a series of crimes involving specific
criminal intent.)5 Despite the apparent confusion, our resolution of the specific question involved in this
case is dictated by a recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in which four Justices held that a
substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit that crime are not the same offense for double jeopardy
purposes. See People v Mezy, 453 Mich 269, 276 (Weaver, J.), 286 (Brickley, C.J.); 551 NW2d
389 (1996), citing United States v Felix, 503 US 378, 388-389; 112 S Ct 1377; 118 L Ed 2d 25
(1992). Like the instant case, Mezy involved multiple prosecutions. Mezy, supra at 276. Therefore,
even if the cocaine was in fact delivered in furtherance of the conspiracy,6 reversal is not required on
double jeopardy grounds.
Defendant next argues that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support his
conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine. We
disagree. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court views the evidence presented in a light
most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
A criminal conspiracy is a mutual understanding or agreement between two or more persons,
expressed or implied, to do or accomplish a criminal or unlawful act. It is a crime separate and apart
from the substantive offense. The elements of a conspiracy are satisfied immediately upon entry by the
parties into a mutual agreement; no overt acts need be established. People v Bettistea, 173 Mich App
106, 117; 434 NW2d 138 (1988). In order to convict a defendant of the offense of conspiracy to
possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the prosecution must prove that (1) the defendant
possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charged, (2) his coconspirators
possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charged, and (3) the defendant and his
coconspirators possessed the specific intent to combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged to a
third person. People v Justice, 454 Mich 334, 349; 562 NW2d 652 (1997).
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Defendant first contends that the evidence was insufficient because there was no testimony
conclusively connecting him with the group’s activities in Southfield or Detroit. While we agree that the
evidence was slight with regard to defendant’s conduct in the Detroit metropolitan area, the testimony of
the witnesses with regard to defendant’s activities in Muskegon, describing defendant’s transactions
with Franklin, Banks, and others who sold cocaine for defendant or for Franklin, was more than
sufficient to establish defendant’s knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy. Defendant’s role in
the conspiracy was illustrated by the testimony of Betty Louise Day, who testified that she saw
defendant remove what appeared to be bagged crack cocaine from an outside cooking vent and give
the bags to some boys, who then walked toward “the zone.” When Day accosted defendant about
dealing drugs, defendant told her that he was too smart to go to jail. Defendant introduced Day to
Franklin. According to this witness, people frequently came to give defendant money, which Day hid
for him. Day saw defendant with $4,000 or $5,000 on several occasions, and stated that she
overheard defendant call Franklin from her home to tell him to come and get his money. When Franklin
arrived, defendant left the house with money and returned without it. Both defendant and Banks
frequently stayed at Day’s house during their trips to Muskegon.
Marktwon Banks testified that he had purchased crack cocaine from defendant and sold crack
cocaine for defendant in “the zone” and that defendant told him he was “rolling for a man named Rick.”
Theoffilis Houston also engaged in cocaine transactions with persons h claimed were defendant’s
e
workers. Houston gave the proceeds from the sale to defendant’s worker, who gave the money to
defendant in Houston’s presence. The witnesses also testified regarding the relationships between
defendant, some of his codefendants, and other drug dealers in the area. Finally, Vicky Diggs-Hill
testified that she held about $6,000 worth of crack cocaine for defendant; she stated that she took the
money from the people who sold the cocaine and gave it to defendant. According to Diggs-Hill, before
she became involved, the sellers gave defendant the money directly. Each of these witnesses testified
that defendant had numerous people working for him selling crack. Thus, we find that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that defendant was a participant in a large-scale “chain”
conspiracy. See People v Meredith (On Remand), 209 Mich App 403, 412-413; 531 NW2d 749
(1995).
Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient because the total amount of over 650
grams of cocaine was reached by aggregating smaller amounts of cocaine. This contention is without
merit as smaller amounts may be aggregated to charge a defendant with possession and delivery of the
statutory amount. Justice, supra at 355.
Defendant also asserts in connection with this issue that the proofs were inadequate because the
prosecution was required to show that he personally possessed and intended to deliver more than 650
grams of cocaine, and that the evidence at trial established that, at most, defendant possessed less than
fifteen grams, which was the cocaine recovered from Diggs-Hill. In Justice, supra, the Michigan
Supreme Court acknowledged the proof problems presented in establishing the scope of a conspiracy,
and noted that circumstantial evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are frequently
the means used to establish the particular substantive offense intended by the coconspirators. Id. at
348. In this case, defendant argues that there was a lack of proof regarding his own specific intent to
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deliver the statutory minimum. However, given the volume of defendant’s operations, as demonstrated
by the testimony at trial regarding the number of people who were selling for him, the length of time in
which defendant engaged in this activity, and defendant’s transactions with Franklin, we hold that there
was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred defendant’s
specific intent to commit the charged offense. The fact that there was more than one third person
involved to whom the drugs were delivered does not compel a different result. Consequently,
defendant’s arguments in this regard are without merit.
Defendant also suggests that the trial court erred when it failed to adequately instruct the jury on
the issue of aggregation. However, the record reveals that defendant did not request a special
aggregation instruction at trial or object to its omission. Because defendant failed to object to the
instructions given at trial or to request further instructions, we would review this issue only to determine
if manifest injustice resulted. People v Maleski, 220 Mich App 518, 521 (1996). On appeal,
defendant has failed to adequately apprise this Court of the sort of instruction that should have been
given by the trial court. Accordingly, we deem this issue to have been waived. A defendant may not
merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims. People v Norman, 184 Mich App 255, 260; 457 NW2d 136 (1990); People v Heard, 31
Mich App 439, 446-447; 188 NW2d 24 (1971), rev’d on other grounds 388 Mich 182 (1972).
Next, defendant argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it admitted
the hearsay statements of his coconspirators before the prosecutor had proven the existence of a
conspiracy. Although defendant’s brief on appeal phrases the question in general terms, the only
testimony specifically mentioned in his argument is a statement made by Wilson to the police while in
custody indicating that he had once made a drug run from the Detroit area to Muskegon with a
“Robby” or Robert Johnson. 7 We need not determine whether the trial court erred in allowing Wilson’s
statement into evidence before proving the existence of a conspiracy, because Wilson’s statement was
made after his arrest. As such, it was inadmissible hearsay because it was not made in the course of, or
in furtherance of, the conspiracy. See People v Cadle, 204 Mich App 646, 653; 516 NW2d 520,
remanded on other grounds 447 Mich 1009 (1994), citing People v Trilck, 374 Mich 118, 124, 128;
132 NW2d 134 (1965). However, a preserved nonconstitutional error is harmless if it is highly
probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict. People v Gearns, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d
___ (1998) (5/5/98 slip op p 36-39); People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 218-221; 551 NW2d 891
(1996). In this case, considering the weight and strength of the untainted evidence presented at trial, we
conclude that the error was harmless.8
Defendant also contends that reversal of his conviction is required due to the prosecutor’s
misconduct by referring in his opening statement to an allegation in the indictment that defendant
assaulted another person upon Franklin’s orders. Because defendant did not object to these remarks
below, appellate review is precluded unless a curative instruction could not have removed any
prejudicial effect or failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Lee,
212 Mich App 228, 253; 537 NW2d 233 (1995). Although no evidence was presented at trial with
regard to the allegation and defendant was not charged in connection with assault, reversal is not
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required on the basis of this issue because a curative instruction could have eliminated any prejudice to
defendant that may have occurred as a result of the prosecutor’s statement.
Defendant next argues, in cursory fashion, that the trial court erred when it allowed into
evidence the preliminary examination testimony of Al Vanhemert, a sheriff’s deputy who died shortly
after the preliminary examination was conducted. Specifically, defendant asserts that the testimony was
inadmissible as hearsay not within the “former testimony” exception because defendant did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness with regard to certain allegations of misconduct on the part of
the witness. We disagree. The decision whether to admit evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and that decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. People v
Brooks, 453 Mich 511, 516-517; 557 NW2d 106 (1996). In this case, there was no error because
the preliminary examination transcript reveals that defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine
Vanhemert and exercised the opportunity to do so. See People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 674;
528 NW2d 842 (1995). That defendant subsequently discovered some information that he may have
been able to use to impeach Vanhemert’s credibility does not change our conclusion. See United
States v Monaco, 702 F2d 860, 870 (CA 11, 1983).9
Defendant also contends, for the first time on appeal, that Vanhemert’s preliminary examination
testimony should have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the
potential for confusion and unfair prejudice. Because defendant failed to object on this ground at trial,
this argument has not been preserved for appeal. MRE 103(a)(1); People v Considine, 196 Mich
App 160, 162; 492 NW2d 465 (1992). Defendant is not entitled to relief on appeal, because the
admission of Vanhemert’s testimony was not plain error in this respect. See MRE 103(d).
Next, defendant argues that his mandatory life sentence violates constitutional protections
against cruel or unusual punishment. Although defendant failed to raise this issue below, this Court may
consider it because it involves a constitutional issue. People v Zinn, 217 Mich App 340, 344; 551
NW2d 704 (1996). Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Houstina, 216
Mich App 70, 73; 549 NW2d 11 (1996). A mandatory life sentence for simple possession of 650
grams or more of cocaine violates the constitutional ban against “cruel or unusual” punishments. See
People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 30; 485 NW2d 866 (1992). However, the Michigan Supreme Court
has refused to extend this holding to cases involving drug offenses more serious than simple possession.
People v Fluker, 442 Mich 891; 498 NW2d 431 (1993); see also People v Stewart, 442 Mich 890;
498 NW2d 430 (1993); People v Lopez, 442 Mich 889; 498 NW2d 251 (1993); People v LoyRafuls, 442 Mich 915; 503 NW2d 453 (1993); People v Poole, 218 Mich App 702, 715-716; 555
NW2d 485 (1996). Thus, we hold that defendant’s sentence was not unconstitutionally harsh.
Finally, defendant claims he should be eligible for parole. The Legislature has expressly
provided, in MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3), that an individual subject to a mandatory term
of imprisonment under MCL 333.7401(2)(a); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a) shall not be eligible for parole.
Accordingly, defendant’s arguments in this regard are without merit.
Affirmed.
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/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
Defendant was sentenced to eight to twenty years’ imprisonment on the delivery conviction. His
conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court in an unpublished per curiam opinion. People v
Mark Johnson, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, i sued October 1, 1993 (Docket No.
s
138441).
2
Const 1963, art 1, § 15 provides in pertinent part, “No person shall be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy.” Defendant does not argue that the instant prosecution ran afoul of the double
jeopardy protections afforded by the federal constitution.
3
When the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the “same transaction” test in 1973, it noted that the
United States Supreme Court had not yet passed on the constitutional necessity of the “same
transaction” test for purposes of the federal constitution. See White, supra at 255. However, in 1985,
the United States Supreme Court made it clear that it rejected the “single transaction” view of the
Double Jeopardy Clause in multiple prosecution cases. See Garrett v United States, 471 US 773,
790; 105 S Ct 2407; 85 L Ed 2d 764 (1985); see also United States v Dixon, 509 US 688, 710 n
15; 113 S Ct 2849; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993). Under the federal “same elements” test, two offenses
are considered the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes whenever either of the two offenses
lacks a unique element. Dixon, supra at 696. After Garrett, the Michigan Supreme Court has
suggested in dicta that it would retain the “same transaction” view of Michigan’s Double Jeopardy
Clause in multiple prosecution cases despite the United States Supreme Court’s rejection of the test.
See People v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392, 401-402; 397 NW2d 783 (1986); People v Bullock¸ 440
Mich 15, 28 n 9; 485 NW2d 866 (1992). In no case since Garrett, however, has the Michigan
Supreme Court relied on the “same transaction” test in a holding. Moreover, at least two Justices have
questioned the propriety of the Michigan Supreme Court’s apparent continued adherence to White.
See People v Dahle, 450 Mich 870, 871; 539 NW2d 380 (1995) (Boyle, J., dissenting from denial of
leave to appeal); People v Harding, 443 Mich 693, 726-727 n 16; 506 NW2d 482 (Riley, J.);
People v Delafuente, 438 Mich 868, 868-869; 474 NW2d 292 (1991) (Riley, J., joined by Boyle, J.,
dissenting from denial of leave to appeal). Finally, in Wilson, supra, a recent multiple prosecution case
involving two of defendant’s codefendants charged with conspiracy in both Muskegon County and
Oakland County, a majority of three of the five participating Justices found a double jeopardy violation
under the rule of Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161, 169; 97 S Ct 2221; 53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977) (“The
same offense includes prosecution for a greater crime after conviction of the lesser included offense.”),
without addressing White, supra, or the “same transaction” test.
4
Where one or both of the offenses do not involve criminal intent, they are considered the “same
offense” if they are “part of the same criminal episode” and if they “involve laws intended to prevent the
same or similar harm or evil, not a substantially different, or very different kind of harm or evil.” See
Crampton, supra at 502.
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5
Although the crime of delivery of narcotics involves criminal intent, it is not a crime of specific criminal
intent. People v Maleski, 220 Mich App 518, 521-522; 560 NW2d 71.
6
It was never conclusively established at trial whether the particular batch of cocaine that formed the
basis of the Muskegon County conviction was obtained from Franklin pursuant to the Oakland County
conspiracy.
7
Wilson’s statement was admitted into evidence by way of the preliminary examination testimony of Al
Vanhemert, a sheriff’s deputy who died shortly after the preliminary examination. See infra. His
preliminary examination testimony was read into the record at trial. Objections were made to the
admission of Wilson’s statement during the preliminary examination. Defendant preserved this claim of
error by bringing these objections to the attention of the trial court.
8
We also note that defendant concedes in his brief on appeal that Vanhemert’s testimony (including
Wilson’s statement) “added little to the prosecution’s case.”
9
Although not binding on this Court, federal precedent may provide persuasive authority. See Ward v
Parole Board, 35 Mich App 456, 461; 192 NW2d 537 (1971).
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