LEE HAENER V BILL J WEST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LEE HAENER,
UNPUBLISHED
May 19, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 203474
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-613345 NI
BILL J. WEST and DONNA PLANK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of EARL WAYNE
PLANK, Deceased,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Neff, P.J., and O’Connell and Young, Jr., JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this negligence case arising out of an automobile accident, plaintiff Lee Haener appeals as of
right from the order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Donna Plank, personal
representative of the estate of Earl Wayne Plank, deceased.1 We affirm.
We first address Haener’s claim that the trial court erred in permitting Plank to amend her
answer to add an affirmative defense. This Court will not reverse a trial court’s decison on a motion to
amend a pleading absent an abuse of discretion that results in injustice. Phillips v Diehm, 213 Mich
App 389, 393; 541 NW2d 566 (1995). A court should freely grant leave to amend when justice so
requires. Id. The rules pertaining to the amendment of pleadings are designed to facilitate amendment
except where prejudice to the opposing party would result. Id. We conclude that Haener has failed to
show prejudice on this record. Moreover, contrary to Haener’s claim, there is no indication that
Plank’s request to amend her answer was made in bad faith. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s decision.
Haener next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his lawsuit on collateral estoppel
grounds. Again, we disagree. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent,
different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final
-1
judgment and the issue was actually and necessarily determined in the prior proceeding. Detroit v
Qualls, 434 Mich 340, 357; 454 NW2d 374 (1990). A default judgment will “‘be given collateral
estoppel effect in a subsequent suit between the parties arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence,’” Braxton v Litchalk, 55 Mich App 708, 714; 223 NW2d 316 (1974), quoting Sahn v
Brisson, 43 Mich App 666, 670-671; 204 NW2d 692 (1972), because the entry of a default judgment
is equivalent to an admission by the defaulting party to all of the matters well pleaded. Sahn, supra.
In the present case, Haener was barred by collateral estoppel from maintaining an action against
Plank. The default judgment in the previous litigation necessarily determined that Haener was negligent
and that this negligence caused the accident. Although Haener maintains that collateral estoppel should
not apply here because Earl Plank may also have been negligent, Haener cites no authority for that
proposition. This Court will not search for authority to sustain a party’s position. Patterson v Allegan
Co Sheriff, 199 Mich App 638, 640; 502 NW2d 368 (1993). Moreover, this case is factually
indistinguishable from Braxton, supra, where this Court held that the plaintiff was barred from
maintaining a negligence action against Bendix Corporation arising from an automobile accident because
Bendix had obtained a default judgment against the plaintiff in a previous lawsuit arising from the same
accident. Id. at 718. The trial court properly granted summary disposition to Plank under MCR
2.116(C)(7).
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
1
Haener obtained a default judgment in the amount of $30,000 against defendant Bill J. West, who is
not a party to this appeal.
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