IN RE RITA RYNO MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In Re RITA RYNO, a Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 15, 1998
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 201694
Genesee Juvenile Court
LC No. 94-098730 NA
MARGARET RYNO,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Gribbs and R.J. Danhof*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights
to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i) and (c)(ii); MSA 27.3178 (598.19b)(3)(b)(ii),
(c)(i) and (c)(ii). We affirm.
We conclude that the juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for
termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445
NW2d 161 (1989); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 471-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997).
Rather, we believe that termination was justified under § 19b(3)(b)(ii) because there was clear and
convincing evidence that, apart from any abuse inflicted by her deceased husband, respondent also
failed to protect the minor child from known physical and sexual abuse by others. Furthermore, while
respondent worked on her treatment plan and to some extent participated in the services offered, she
failed to demonstrate that she had made significant progress in her ability to properly protect the minor
child in the future. Thus, there was no basis to conclude that there exists a reasonable likelihood that
respondent would be able to protect the minor child in the foreseeable future from the types of injury
and abuse identified in § 19b(3)(b)(ii), even if respondent was provided with intensive individual
instruction.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Evidence was also presented that respondent lacked the ability to learn how to properly care
for the minor child. Accordingly, there was no reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to
rectify within a reasonable time considering the child’s age either the conditions that led to adjudication,
or other conditions that caused the child to come within the court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, termination
of respondent's parental rights was also appropriate under §§ 19b3(c)(i) and (c)(ii).
Given that the statutory grounds for the termination has been established by clear and convincing
evidence, it is the responsibility of respondent “to put forth . . . evidence that termination is clearly not in
the child’s best interest.” In re Hall-smith, supra at 473. See also MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5). Respondent has failed to fulfill this burden. Therefore, we hold that the juvenile
court did not clearly err in terminating respondent's parental rights. In re Hall-Smith, supra at 472;
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
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