DEBORAH J BORK V JAMES A BORK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DEBORAH J. BORK,
UNPUBLISHED
May 5, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193789
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-511147 DM
JAMES H. BORK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Young, Jr., and J.M. Batzer*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by granting plaintiff’s request for a divorce. We
disagree. The trial court’s finding that plaintiff’s testimony satisfied the statutory grounds for a divorce
was not clearly erroneous. See MCL 552.6(3); MSA 25.86(3) (a trial court should grant a divorce
where the evidence demonstrates that “there has been a breakdown in the marriage relationship to the
extent that the objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood
that the marriage can be preserved”). As the trial court properly acknowledged, a divorce can be
granted at the request of one of the parties to the marriage, even over the objection of the other party.
Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 424; 566 NW2d 642 (1997). Further, while this Court
respects defendant’s deeply held religious beliefs, we hold that the trial court acted within its authority in
dissolving the parties’ civil marriage contract notwithstanding defendant’s religious views to the contrary.
See Fisher v Fisher, 118 Mich App 227, 230; 324 NW2d 582 (1982) (the status of any ecclesiastical
union between the parties is unaffected by the trial court’s dissolution of the parties’ civil marriage
contract).
Next, we find that the trial court did not err in its division of the parties’ marital assets. The trial
court was not required to sell all the marital property as requested by defendant pursuant to his religious
beliefs. See Van Koevering v Van Koevering, 144 Mich App 404, 408; 375 NW2d 759 (1985) (in
divorce cases, this Court is only required to apply the laws of this state, not to enforce the religious
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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beliefs of either party). The trial court’s findings with respect to the division of marital property were not
clearly erroneous and the trial court’s dispositional ruling on this issue was fair and equitable because the
trial court essentially divided the marital assets equally and any minor deviation w justified by the
as
circumstances of the case. See Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 114-115; ___ NW2d ___
(1997) (to be equitable the division need not be mathematically equal, but any significant departure from
an equal division must be justified by the trial court). The parties’ primary asset, the marital home, will
be sold after the minor child completes high school and the proceeds will be equally divided at that time.
The trial court’s distribution of the other marital assets was essentially equal and any deviation was
justified by plaintiff’s assumption of care of the minor child and the marital home, and the large disparity
in the parties’ incomes. The trial court also properly divided defendant’s pension benefits because any
right to vested pension benefits accrued by a party during marriage must be considered part of the
marital estate. MCL 552.18(1); MSA 25.98(1). Further, contrary to defendant’s claim, there is no
right to a jury trial in a divorce action. Draggoo, supra at 427.
Next, we find that the trial court did not err in its award of alimony to plaintiff because the
award properly balanced the incomes and needs of the parties in a way that would not impoverish either
one. Magee v Magee, 218 Mich App 158, 162; 553 NW2d 363 (1996). The five-year period for
the award was justified by plaintiff’s assumption of the care of the marital home until its sale and by the
disparity in the parties’ income and work experience. The trial court’s reliance on plaintiff’s estimated
monthly expenses was not clearly erroneous because plaintiff testified that her estimate was based on
her actual past expenditures and because defendant did not raise any objections at trial to any of the
estimated expenses. Also, the trial court did not err by failing to consider defendant’s provision of
financial assistance to the parties’ adult son because such a consideration would only circumvent the
prohibition against court-ordered child support for adult offspring. See Lesko v Lesko, 184 Mich App
395, 405; 457 NW2d 695 (1990).
Lastly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring defendant to pay a portion of
plaintiff’s attorney fees. The award was justified as either necessary for plaintiff’s pursuit of the litigation
or as compensation for defendant’s unreasonable conduct during the course of litigation. Hawkins v
Murphy, 222 Mich App 664, 669; 565 NW2d 674 (1997). Further, defendant failed to establish that
the payment schedule set by the trial court was unreasonable and also failed to object to the
reasonableness of the fees claimed.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ James M. Batzer
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