CHRISTMAN CO V LATICRETE INTL INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THE CHRISTMAN COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 21, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 189261
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 93-73926-CK
LATICRETE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JOHN B. ROSSI COMPANY, AMERICAN
CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING,
PENNSYLVANIA & STEIN, HINKLE, DAWE,
WOOD, AND JOHNSON,
Defendants.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Jansen and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
I. Facts
Defendant Laticrete International, Inc. (“Laticrete”) appeals by right a judgment for Plaintiff
Christman Company (“Christman”) entered following a jury trial. Christman was the general contractor
for the construction of the Capitol Commons Center, a seven story office building in Lansing owned by
Heart of the City Associates (“Heart of the City”). Laticrete provided external porcelain tiles and
related materials to be used as adhesives to attach the tiles to the building. However, after the tiles were
placed, a substantial number of them detached and fell from the building. Christman essentially
premised its claims against Laticrete,1 including claims assigned to Christman by Heart of the City, on
alleged defects in the materials provided by Laticrete, including an assertion that the tiles, with the
corresponding adhesive materials, were simply not appropriate for use in a northerly climate. In
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accordance with the findings of the jury in its special verdict, the trial court entered judgment for
Christman and against Laticrete for $1,379,000. We affirm.
II. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Laticrete argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (“JNOV”). We disagree. In reviewing this issue, we view the evidence and all legitimate
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550,
557; 537 NW2d 208 (1995). Only if the evidence viewed in this manner fails as a matter of law to
establish a claim, should a motion for JNOV be granted. Id. at 558.
Laticrete relies on limitation of damages provisions in the “limited warranty” that it provided to
Christman in connection with the purchase of the exterior tiles and related goods at issue. The limited
warranty provides for the following remedy:
In the event of a breach of this warranty, LATICRETE will pay for replacement on a
square foot basis of so much of the facade portion of the system as is defective, this
payment to include labor and installation; provided, however, that the cost to
LATICRETE of replacement of the facade on a square foot basis shall not exceed your
original purchase price of the facade calculated on a square foot basis. As used in this
warranty, the term “facade” includes the System plus frame, fasteners and tile or other
covering adhered to the System. LATICRETE will not be liable for damages due to
construction delays or any other damages, losses or expenses or any manner of
consequential or incidental losses or damages.
The last two paragraphs of the limited warranty provide the following limitation of damages provisions:
This implied warranty is given in lieu of all other express warranties. Any implied
warranties arising by operation of law, if any, are limited to the ten (10) year limited
warranty period herein provided for.[2]
THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR
OTHERWISE WHICH EXTEND BEYOND THE DESCRIPTION ON THE FACE
HEREOF.
Laticrete asserts that the trial court should have granted JNOV because the limitation of damages clause
in the limited warranty applied to preclude Christman from obtaining a greater remedy than that
provided by the limited warranty. We disagree.
The limited warranty includes an explicit statement that it is in lieu of all other “express
warranties,” but includes no such statement regarding implied warranties. At minimum, this creates an
ambiguity regarding whether the limited warranty is given in place of any implied warranties. We
recognize that the limited warranty does include a statement that there are “no warranties, express or
implied, of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose or otherwise which extend beyond the
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description on the face hereof” (capitalization omitted). Standing alone, this second statement might
constitute a valid disclaimer of implied warranties to the extent allowed by law. However, when viewed
in context, the limited warranty as a whole is ambiguous regarding implied warranties, particularly in light
of the explicit disavowal of express warranties other than those provisions of the limited warranty itself.
It is a general precept of contract law that a contract is construed against the party responsible
for drafting a disputed provision. Schroeder v Terra Energy, Ltd, 223 Mich App 176, 183-184; 565
NW2d 887 (1997). Thus, we conclude that the limited warranty, drafted by Laticrete, should be
construed as only providing that it is in lieu of express warranties, not that it is in lieu of implied
warranties. Accordingly, we reject Laticrete’s position that the limited warranty precluded Christman
from obtaining greater remedies than those provided for by the limited warranty on Christman’s claim
that Laticrete breached implied warranties. As discussed further below, absent a valid disclaimer, every
contract for a sale of goods subject to Article 2 of the Michigan Uniform Commercial Code (the
“UCC”) includes implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Lumber
Mutual Ins Co v Clarklift of Detroit, Inc, 224 Mich App 737, 739; 569 NW2d 681 (1997).3
The jury in its special verdict answered “yes” to the question whether Laticrete breached an
implied or express warranty in any way alleged by Christman. Our above analysis shows that
Laticrete’s position for claiming that the trial court should have granted JNOV is incorrect because the
limited warranty did not preclude Christman’s claim for greater relief than that provided for in the limited
warranty for Laticrete’s alleged breach of one or more implied warranties. Laticrete does not challenge
the failure of the trial court to have had the jury separately questioned regarding alleged breaches of
express warranties and alleged breaches of implied warranties. Accordingly, we will not now grant
relief to Laticrete based on the jury having been asked in a single question whether Laticrete violated
any applicable express or implied warranties.
Under the implied warranty of merchantability, a seller of goods warrants that they are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which they are used. Latimer v William Mueller & Son, Inc, 149 Mich App
620, 632; 386 NW2d 318 (1986).4 Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Christman with
regard to this issue, the jury could reasonably have determined that the goods at issue here, exterior
building tiles and corresponding adhesive materials, were not fit for their ordinary purposes due to the
tiles falling off the building very shortly after they were applied in a proper way. Alternatively, the
provision of the UCC regarding the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. [MCL
440.2315; MSA 19.2315.]
The jury could reasonably have determined from testimony and other evidence regarding the course of
dealing among Christman, Heart of the City and Laticrete that Laticrete had reason to know that
Christman and Heart of the City were relying on Laticrete to furnish them with exterior building tiles and
materials for adhesion of those tiles that would work at the Capitol Commons Center in Lansing. Cf.
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National Cash Register Co v Adell Industries, Inc, 57 Mich App 413, 414-416; 225 NW2d 785
(1975) (upholding trial court’s finding of breach of implied warranty of fitness where the seller knew that
the primary purpose for the purchase of an accounting machine was to substantially reduce the number
of work hours involved in preparing the buyer corporation’s payroll and to enable the buyer to get its
payroll out on time). From the detachment of a large number of the tiles provided by Laticrete and the
expert testimony about the unsuitability of the exterior tiles and adhesive materials provided by Laticrete
for use in a northerly climate, the jury could reasonably have determined that Laticrete breached an
implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose of using the goods at the Capitol Commons
Center. Thus, the trial court properly denied Laticrete’s motion for JNOV.
In light of our above analysis, we need not reach Christman’s arguments that the remedy offered
in the limited warranty failed of its essential purpose, was unreasonable in light of the harm experienced
and was unconscionable.
III. Jury Instructions Under SJI2d 25.12
Laticrete argues that the trial court abused its discretion by giving only part of SJI2d 25.12 and,
thereby, not instructing the jury that, with regard to the claims of breach of express warranty, Christman
had to prove that the product at issue was defective at the time that it left Laticrete’s control. We
review decisions by the trial court about jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Colbert v Primary
Care Medical, PC, 226 Mich App 99, 103; ___ NW2d ___ (1997); Joerger v Gordon Food
Service, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 173; 568 NW2d 365 (1997). We review jury instructions in their
entirety and should not extract them piecemeal. Id. Reversal is not required if the theories of the parties
and applicable law are, on balance, fairly and adequately presented to the jury. Id.
The trial court instructed the jury:
The following instructions are applicable to the claim against Laticrete. An
express warranty is a representation or statement made in writing, orally or by other
means by a seller that his or her product has certain characteristics or will me[e]t certain
standards. In order to prevail on its claim for breach of express warranty, Christman
must prove each of the following:
A) That Laticrete expressly warranted the Laticrete panel system in one or
more of the ways claimed by Christman.
B) That Christman relied upon Laticrete’s warranty.
C) That the Laticrete panel system was defective in the ways claimed by
Christman.
D) That Christman has sustained damage. And,
E) That Laticrete’s breach of warranty was a proximate cause of the damages
sustained by Christman.
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Your verdict on this claim will be for Christman if you find that Christman has
proven all of those propositions. Your verdict on this claim will be for Laticrete if you
find that Christman has failed to prove any of these propositions.
In contrast, SJI2d 25.12 provides:
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following:
a. that the defendant expressly warranted the product in one or more of the ways
claimed by the plaintiff
b. that the [plaintiff / plaintiff ’s decedent] [relied upon / or / was protected by] the
warranty
c. that the product (description of alleged failure to meet express warranty)
d. that the product (description of alleged failure to meet express warranty) at
the time it left defendant’s control
e. that the [plaintiff / plaintiff ’s decedent] [was injured / sustained damage]
f. that the (description of alleged failure to meet express warranty) was a proximate
cause of the [injuries / damages] to [plaintiff / plaintiff ’s decedent].
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if you decide that all of these have been
proved.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if you decide that any one of these has
not been proved. [Emphasis supplied.]
A standard civil jury instruction must be given on a party’s request if it is applicable and accurately
states the applicable l w. Walker v City of Flint, 213 Mich App 18, 20; 539 NW2d 535 (1995);
a
accord, MCR 2.516(D)(2).
However, in the circumstances of this case, it is unnecessary to determine whether the trial court
technically erred by departing from SJI2d 25.12. First, the central point of Christman’s claims against
Laticrete was that the goods at issue were improperly promoted for use on the exterior of the Capitol
Commons Center when they were unsuitable for use in the winter climate of this northerly location. This
alleged “defect” in the panel system, with respect to areas like Lansing and Michigan generally that
repeatedly have very cold winters, would be present regardless of when the panels installed on the
Capitol Commons are considered to have left Laticrete’s control. Also, Laticrete has not pointed to
any evidence of a significant change in the nature of the exterior tiles and adhesive materials that it
provided between any point that could reasonably be considered as the point that those materials left
Laticrete’s control and the time that the tiles were attached to the Capitol Commons Center. While
Laticrete argues that a hotly contested issue in this case was whether the exterior tiles detached because
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of a defect in the goods provided by Laticrete or because of misapplication of the exterior tiles by a
third party, the trial court’s instructions only allowed a finding of liability against Laticrete based on a
defect in the goods provided by Laticrete. No reasonable juror would have understood the trial court’s
instructions as allowing an imposition of liability on Laticrete for misapplication of those goods by a
third party because that would not involve any defect in the goods themselves. Thus, we conclude that,
even if the trial court’s instructions to the jury were somewhat imperfect by failing to inform the jury that
an actionable defect in any of the materials provided by Laticrete had to be present at the point of sale,
the instructions did not constitute error requiring reversal because they fairly and adequately presented
the pertinent issues to be tried. Joerger, supra at 173.
IV. Jury Instructions under SJI2d 140.44
Laticrete argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give SJI2d 140.44
regarding the elimination or modification of an implied warranty under the UCC or, alternatively, that the
trial court erred by failing to rule as a matter of law that the limited warranty eliminated all other
warranties. However, as explained in Part I, because of ambiguous language in the limited warranty, its
limitation of remedy provisions as a matter of law did not constitute a valid elimination or modification of
any implied warranty. Thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to give SJI2d 140.44 or by failing to
rule that, as a matter of law, the limited warranty eliminated all other warranties.
V. Hearsay Testimony
Laticrete argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay testimony from
Christman’s expert witness Charles Parisi. Laticrete bases this argument on the trial court having
overruled an objection to Christman’s counsel questioning Parisi about what he learned from talking to
certain consultants.
MRE 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. The court may require that underlying facts or data essential to an opinion or
inference be in evidence.
First, although apparently not recognized by Laticrete, an expert witness may base an opinion on
hearsay. Triple E Produce Corp v Mastronadi Produce, Ltd, 209 Mich App 165, 175; 530 NW2d
772 (1995). However, more to the point, the testimony at issue was non-hearsay evidence because it
was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. As defined in MRE 801(c), a statement is hearsay
only if, in pertinent part, it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Here, as explained on the
record, the trial court admitted the testimony at issue on redirect examination to rebut an implication
from cross-examination of Parisi that his investigation of the alleged problems with the Laticrete panel
system was inadequate. The trial court expressly instructed the jury not to consider the testimony at
issue for the truth of the matter asserted. Jurors are presumed to understand and follow instructions.
Bordeaux v The Celotex Corp, 203 Mich App 158, 164; 511 NW2d 899 (1993). Thus, Laticrete’s
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position regarding this issue rests on a flawed premise, as the testimony at issue did not constitute
hearsay.
VI. Expert Testimony
Next, Laticrete argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Parisi to testify as an
expert about exterior ceramic tile systems. We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision that an
expert witness is qualified for an abuse of discretion. Bahr v Harper-Grace Hospitals, 448 Mich 135,
141; 528 NW2d 170 (1995); Mulholland v DEC Int’l Corp, 432 Mich 395, 402; 443 NW2d 340
(1989). Laticrete argues, in essence, that Parisi had no expertise in the field of exterior panelized tile
systems. Laticrete cites testimony showing that Parisi was not a member of certain “tile-related
associations” and that he had never done specifications for exterior vertical tile installations. However,
according to Parisi’s testimony, he was an architect who had been involved in major architectural
projects and was a member of professional organizations related to that field. The main thrust of
Parisi’s testimony was that the tile system used on the exterior of the Capitol Commons Center was
inappropriate due to the climate of the area. The trial court surely could consider this to be within the
scope of Parisi’s expertise as an architect. Arguable deficiencies in Parisi’s expertise as applied to
exterior tile paneling might have been relevant to the weight of his testimony, but such considerations did
not preclude its admission. Cf. Woodruff v USS Great Lakes Fleet, Inc, 210 Mich App 255, 259
260; 533 NW2d 356 (1995) (gaps in the expertise of an expert witness were relevant to the weight of
the testimony, not to its admissibility).
VII. Scientific Evidence
Finally, Laticrete argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting scientific evidence
from Richard Muenow about the results of resonant frequency testing of the quality of the adhesion of
the exterior tiles provided by Laticrete at the Capitol Commons Center.
The trial court stated with regard to Muenow’s testimony about the resonant frequency testing
results:
With respect to the various objections raised by both the counsel, I would point
out that there has been peer review of this matter, because the peer review is the system
by which scientific journals accept articles for publication. That is, that people who are
recognized experts in the field, review proposed articles and make a determination as to
whether or not they contribute to the field.
This witness has testified that he has had two articles, which deal solely with
resonant frequency, as well as three other articles that are referred to, published in
ACIA Journals, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission publication, and another
publication that he said so quickly, that I couldn’t get it written down.
I believe this witness has established his qualifications as an expert in the field of
resonant frequency testing. It is not necessary to prove that that testing is—has been
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retested for porcelain tile or retested for any particular kind of material. The issue is
whether or not this is an accepted materials test by the scientific construction
community, and his testimony establishes that it is so accepted.
With respect to relevance, that argument goes to weight and not to admissibility.
Again, with respect to whether or not the preliminary nature of the report means that it is
a final report, goes to relevance—or goes to weight and not to admissibility.
For all of these reasons, 1, [sic] the Court overrules the objection to the
testimony of Mr. Muenow as an expert in the field of materials testing and particularly
ultrasonic devises and testing, and overrules the objection to the admission of Plaintiff ’s
Proposed Exhibit 299. It is admitted. You may proceed.
Under the Davis-Frye rule,5 novel scientific evidence must have gained general acceptance to
be admissible at trial. People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 262; 537 NW2d 233 (1995). The party
offering the evidence has the burden of showing its acceptance in the scientific community. Id.
However, the Davis-Frye rule is only applied to novel scientific techniques or principles. People v
Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 221; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). A party is not required to show the
general acceptance of an already established test. Id.
Laticrete asserts that Muenow, who made his living from doing resonant frequency testing, did
not provide any evidence that the testing had achieved scientific acceptance for testing exterior porcelain
panelized tile and that Christman presented no other evidence to establish the admissibility of the test.
However, Muenow testified that he was a civil structural engineer who specialized in the evaluation of
damaged structures. In light of Muenow’s testimony, the trial court reasonably determined that the
resonant frequency testing that Muenow provided evidence about established tests within the scientific
community. Thus, the trial court did not need to apply the Davis-Frye rule in determining the
admissibility of the testimony in question and did not abuse its discretion, Lopez v General Motors
Corp, 224 Mich App 618, 634 (1997), in admitting the testimony.
Affirmed. Christman, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
As indicated in the caption of this case, three other companies were defendants below. In accordance
with the jury verdict, the judgment in this case provided that Christman would recover $453,000 plus
statutory interest from Defendant Stein, Hinkle, Dawe, Wood, and Johnson and $450,000 plus
statutory interest from Defendant John B. Rossi Company. However, those companies have not
appealed. The judgment also provided, in accordance with the jury verdict, that Christman was not
entitled to recover from American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania.
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2
Because this suit was filed within ten years of the purchase of the goods at issue, it is immaterial
whether this actually requires any suit for breach of implied warranties to have been filed within a ten
year period.
3
MCL 440.2314; MSA 19.2314 provides for the implied warranty of merchantability. MCL
440.2315; MSA 19.2315 provides for the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
4
The implied warranty of merchantability has also been described as a warranty “that goods are of
average quality in the industry.” Guaranteed Construction Co v Gold Bond Products, 153 Mich
App 385, 392-393; 395 NW2d 332 (1986). We see no real difference between these two ways of
stating the content of the implied warranty of merchantability.
5
The reference is to the decisions in People v Davis, 343 Mich 348, 370-372; 72 NW2d 269 (1955)
and Frye v United States, 54 US App DC 46; 293 F 1013 (1923).
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