IN RE NICOLE RICHMOND MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of NICOLE RICHMOND, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 3, 1998
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 200338
Oakland Juvenile Court
LC No. 96-061316 NA
CHARLES RICHMOND,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and MacKenzie and N.O. Holowka*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.
Respondent first argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
adjourn the termination proceedings until after his criminal trial. A trial court’s decision whether to grant
an adjournment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Peña, 224 Mich App 650, 660; 569
NW2d 871 (1997). Whatever compulsion to testify existed was insufficient to amount to a violation of
respondent’s right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. In re Stricklin, 148 Mich App 659,
664-665; 384 NW2d 833 (1986). Furthermore, the juvenile court offered to preclude use of
respondent’s testimony at any subsequent criminal trial. Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in denying respondent’s motion to adjourn.
Next, the juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). The
evidence indicated that the death of respondent’s younger daughter resulted from physical abuse
inflicted by respondent. How a parent treats one child is probative of how
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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that parent may treat other children. In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 588; 528 NW2d 799 (1995).
There was a reasonable likelihood the minor child would be harmed if returned to respondent’s home.
Although respondent offered evidence that his mental illness might improve sufficiently to enable him to
become a successful father, the evidence did not establish that the condition would be rectified “within a
reasonable time considering the age of the child.”
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g). Further, respondent failed to show that termination of his parental rights was
clearly not in the child’s best interest. In re Hall-Smith, supra. Thus, the juvenile court did not err in
terminating respondent’s parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5).
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Nick O. Holowka
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