JUDIE BETH KIM V ROBERT BRUCE LACOSTE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDIE BETH KIM, f/k/a JUDIE BETH LACOSTE
UNPUBLISHED
March 27, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant
Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 202713
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 91-043918
ROBERT BRUCE LACOSTE,
Defendant-Appellee
Cross-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Hood and Sawyer, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff filed a petition to change the domicile of the parties' minor child from Michigan to
Minnesota where her new spouse had accepted a job. Defendant contested the petition and
alternatively, requested that he be granted custody. Pursuant to an agreement between the parties and a
previous court order, the case was submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitrator ruled against plaintiff
on her petition. Plaintiff then moved to vacate the arbitration award in the trial court. After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court refused to vacate the arbitration award, and plaintiff appeals as of
right. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Plaintiff first argues that the arbitration award should be vacated because the arbitrator
exceeded her authority by implementing a procedure, which was an improper “hybrid” form of
arbitration and by disregarding the procedure set out in the arbitration agreement and prior consent
order. She also claims that it was improper for the arbitrator to exclude the parties' attorneys from part
of the proceeding and that the arbitration award was procured by fraud. We disagree that the
arbitration award should have been vacated on any of these grounds.
A court's power to vacate a binding arbitration award is very limited. Gordon Sel-Way , Inc v
Spence Brothers, Inc, 438 Mich 488; 475 NW2d 704 (1991). MCR 3.602(J)(1) provides:
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(1) On application of a party, the court shall vacate an award if:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(b) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral,
corruption of an arbitrator; or misconduct prejudicing a party's rights;
(c) the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers;
(d) the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient
cause, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the
hearing to prejudice substantially a party's rights.
Review of an award alleged to have been the result of an arbitrator exceeding her power is limited to
cases where the arbitrator acted beyond the material terms of the contract or arbitration agreement. Id.
at 495-496 (1991); Dohanyos v Detrex Corp (After Remand), 217 Mich App 171, 175-176; 550
NW2d 608 (1996).
We find no merit to plaintiff's argument that an improper form of "hybrid" arbitration was used
contrary to the mandates of MCL 600.5001 et seq.; MSA 27A.5001 et seq., and MCR 3.602. In
Dick v Dick, 210 Mich App 576; 534 NW2d 185 (1995), upon which plaintiff relies, the arbitration
agreement did not comport with the requirements of the arbitration statute. The agreement included
provisions that allowed the parties to appeal substantive issues to the Court of Appeals. This Court
held that the "hybrid" type of arbitration that the parties had attempted to create was not enforceable
because parties are not permitted to agree to expand the scope of judicial review in a binding
arbitration. Id. at 588-589. The issue at hand is not remotely similar to that presented in Dick. The
parties in this case did not have an arbitration agreement, which contained terms that are fundamentally
diametric to the binding nature of a binding arbitration. They also did not attempt to expand the scope
of judicial review in contravention of the statute.
The arbitration agreement at issue contained provisions that the arbitrator would decide the
format, with the objective of expediting the proceedings, and would attempt to reach a settlement of the
issues during the proceedings. There is no authority to support that this arbitration agreement, which
contemplated that the arbitrator would work with the parties to mediate the dispute, is an unenforceable,
"hybrid" arbitration. Based on our review of the record, the parties here agreed that mediation or
settlement negotiations would be attempted as part of the arbitration process prior to the issuance of a
binding arbitration award. Plaintiff did not object to the mediation attempts by the arbitrator, which
would have, if successful, expedited this matter. The arbitrator did not act beyond the material terms of
the arbitration agreement in attempting to mediate the case.
Moreover, the fact that the parties were directed by the arbitrator to appear without their
attorneys at the first meeting does not lead to a conclusion that the arbitration award should be vacated.
It was unwise and contrary to Michigan law for the arbitrator to order the parties to appear for the first
meeting without counsel. MCR 3.602(G) provides that a party has a right to be represented by an
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attorney at an arbitration hearing. However, an arbitration award is not vacated simply where there is
an error of law. NuVision v Dunscombe, 163 Mich App 674, 684; 415 NW2d 234 (1987). Rather
for a court to vacate an award, there "must be error so material or so substantial as to have governed
the award, and but for which the award would have been substantially otherwise." Id., citing DAIIE v
Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 443; 331 NW2d 418 (1982). Based on our review of the record, the absence
of counsel at the initial meeting was not an error of law that was material or substantial enough to justify
vacating the award. We also note that there was testimony at the evidentiary hearing that plaintiff knew
the arbitrator wanted to first meet with the parties alone in order to try to reach a settlement. She never
objected to this procedure.
We also find that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority by failing to follow one of the
procedures set forth in the arbitration agreement. The provision provided that in “the absence of a
mediated agreement, the parties shall each present the mediator with a proposed resolution and the
mediator shall then choose the proposal which is in the child’s best interest ....” In this case, the
arbitrator did not chose either party's proposal, finding that neither was in the child's best interest. The
arbitrator devised her own proposed solution. By the terms of the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator
was vested with authority to decide all of the issues raised by the parties with regard to custody, change
of domicile, parenting time, child support, and transportation, as well as any other issues raised by the
parties. The provision at issue was flawed where it required the arbitrator to pick the proposal that
was in the child's best interest but failed to outline what procedure to follow if neither proposal was in
the child's best interest. The provision could not be enforced in the situation presented where neither
proposal was in the child's best interest. The appropriate remedy, where a provision of an arbitration
agreement is not enforceable, appears to be to strike the provision and enforce the remainder of the
agreement. Bruckner v McKinlay Transport, 454 Mich 8; 557 NW2d 536 (1997); Dick, supra at
589. Accordingly, we reform the arbitration agreement to take out the provision requiring the arbitrator
to pick one provision or the other. We find that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority by deciding
the issues presented by the parties.
Critical to our determination of this issue is the fact that the parties agreed and approved of the
arbitrator's decision to reach her own solution instead of adopting wholesale one proposed resolution or
the other1. This occurred after counsel for defendant raised an issue about the provision being flawed2.
General contract principles apply to arbitration agreements. Grazia v Sanchez, 199 Mich App 582,
586; 502 NW2d 751 (1993). Thus, "[a] true meeting of the minds is required for a valid arbitration
agreement, just as in any contract." McKain v Moore, 172 Mich App 243; 431 NW2d 470 (1988).
Parties can agree to modify a contract if there is a meeting of the minds on the modification. See DPOA
v Detroit, 452 Mich 339, 348; 551 NW2d 349 (1996). The parties agreement to modify a contract
can be deduced from their course of conduct, id., or by consent. See Kondzer v Wayne Sheriff, 219
Mich App 632, 635; 558 NW2d 215 (1996). In this case, the record indicates that the parties
consented to allow the arbitrator to fashion her own resolution to the issues. There was a meeting of the
minds with respect to the new term and thus, there was an agreement to modify the arbitration contract.
Finally, we find that there was insufficient evidence to support that the arbitration award was
procured by fraud. First, our review of the record does not reveal that there were any fraudulent or
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intentional misrepresentations made by defendant. Second, the award was based on the arbitrator’s
assessment of the matter under the test set forth in D’Onofrio v D’Onofrio, 144 NJ Super 200; 365
A2d 27 (1976), which was adopted by our Court for settling matters regarding the removal of minors
from Michigan. Dick v Dick, 147 Mich App 513, 517; 383 NW2d 240 (1985). Our review of the
record reveals no evidence to suggest that the arbitrator relied on misrepresentations in rendering her
award. Therefore, we hold that the arbitration award was not procured by fraud.
II
Next, plaintiff argues that the arbitrator improperly delegated her fact finding function and her
responsibility to hear evidence to a psychologist, Dr. Clark. We disagree.
Based on the record, it is clear that the arbitrator in this case did not delegate any of her
functions to Dr. Clark. Instead, the arbitrator requested that Dr. Clark evaluate the potential change of
custody situation and make an assessment. Michigan law allows for a court to utilize resources in the
behavioral sciences and other professions and consider the recommendations for resolving custody
disputes. MCL 722.27(1)(d); MSA 25.312(7)(1)(d). There is no reason that an arbitrator may not
similarly utilize an expert professional to assist in resolving a dispute. Moreover, the parties agreed that
Dr. Clark should conduct an evaluation in this case. Further, nothing in the record indicates that Dr.
Clark made binding findings of fact or conclusions of law, reviewed motions, required the production of
evidence, issued subpoenas, conducted any proceedings, examined witnesses, or recommended a
proposed judgment. The arbitrator alone made the decision in this case. We find that the arbitrator did
not exceed her authority in any way by calling upon Dr. Clark for an evaluation and then considering Dr.
Clark's conclusions 3.
III
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to
defendant for defending against the proceedings to vacate the arbitration.
In Hawkins v Murphy, 222 Mich App 664, 669; 565 NW2d 674 (1997), this Court stated:
A court may award a party in a divorce action "any sums necessary to enable the . . .
party to carry on or defend the action, during its pendancy." MCL 552.13(1); MSA
25.93(1). An award of legal fees in a divorce action is authorized when it is necessary
to enable the party to carry on or defend the suit. MCR 3.206(C)(2); Maake v
Maake, 200 Mich App 184, 189; 503 NW2d 664 (1993). They may also be
awarded when the party requesting payment has been forced to incur them as a result of
the other party's unreasonable conduct in the course of the litigation.
This Court applied the stated rule to a post-divorce dispute in Hawkins.
MRE 2.114(D) and (E) provide:
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(D) The signature of an attorney or a party, whether or not the party is represented by
an attorney, constitutes a certification by the signer that
(1) he or she has read the document;
(2) to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
and
(3) the document is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
(E) If a document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, on the motion of a party
or on its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party,
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party
or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
document, including reasonable attorney fees. The court may not assess punitive
damages. [emphasis added.]
A court may also assess sanctions under MCL 600.2591; MSA 27A.2591 based on the filing of a
frivolous action.
In this post-divorce proceeding, defendant requested costs, attorney fees and sanctions for
having to defend against plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitration award. The trial court ruled:
The Court finds Defendant to be the prevailing party in this dispute. The Court had
taken the matter of costs and fees under advisement, and had stated on the record that
it would award costs and fees to the prevailing party. Accordingly, the Court orders
costs to be paid by the Plaintiff Defendant's counsel and the arbitrator's counsel. MCR
2.625(A)(1). With respect to attorney fees, the Court did state that it would consider
an award of fees after it had heard the matter. The Court is of the Opinion that because
there was no merit to Plaintiff's arguments, counsel for Defendant and the arbitrator shall
be paid by Plaintiff at the rate of $100.00 per hour . . .
On appeal, plaintiff's question presented does not address the issue of the trial court's awarding
costs to defendant. Therefore, we will not address the issue of the taxable costs that were awarded
pursuant to MCR 2.625(A)(1). Orion Twp v State Tax Comm, 195 Mich App 13, 18; 489 NW2d
120 (1992).
With regard to the award of attorney fees, there was no showing that defendant needed an
award of fees to enable him to defend against the post-divorce motion. Moreover, there was no finding
by the trial court that plaintiff's attempt to vacate the arbitration amounted to unreasonable conduct in
the course of litigation, Hawkins, supra, nor did it make a finding that her claims were frivolous or that
her motion was filed in violation of MCR 2.114(D). The trial court simply found that plaintiff's
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arguments lacked merit and then awarded fees to be paid by plaintiff. On appeal, defendant argues that
the trial court found plaintiff's request to vacate the arbitration award to be frivolous. Our review of the
record does not lead to a similar conclusion. It is entirely unclear as to why and under what provisions
fees were granted and whether there was a finding of frivolity. Therefore, we reverse the grant of fees
and remand for the trial court to make findings as to whether fees are warranted against plaintiff or her
counsel under Hawkins, supra or the applicable court rules and statute4.
On cross appeal, defendant argues that the trial court's award of $100 per hour as an attorney
fee was improper and inconsistent with the language of MCR 2.114(E). Defendant's argument hinges
on whether the trial court granted fees pursuant to that provision. Because there is nothing in the record
to suggest that fees were granted under MCR 2.114(E), we will not make a determination as to whether
$100 was a proper amount under that court rule. Defendant should address his argument to the trial
court on remand if the trial court grants fees pursuant to MCR 2.114(E).
Finally, we do not find plaintiff's appeal to be vexatious pursuant to MCR 7.216(C)(1)(a).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ David H. Sawyer
1
Testimony at the evidentiary hearing supported that counsel for both parties were consulted when the
flaw in the provision at issue became apparent. Everyone agreed that the arbitrator should not be
bound to accept one proposal or the other. In fact, in her own proposal, plaintiff specifically stated that
the arbitrator should not be constrained to choose one proposal over the other.
2
Recall that the arbitrator had authority to decide all issues raised by the parties.
3
Plaintiff's reliance on Carson Fisher Potts & Hyman v Hyman, 220 Mich App 116, 121; 559
NW2d 54 (1996) is misplaced. In that case, the court issued an order giving the expert witness
authority to engage in judicial functions. This Court held that a trial court may not delegate its judicial
functions to an expert.
4
On cross appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred by not requiring that the award of
attorney fees be paid, in part, by plaintiff's counsel. Because it is unclear as to why fees were being
awarded, this Court cannot address the merits of defendant's argument on this issue and cannot
determine whether it was error for the trial court to fail to award fees against plaintiff's counsel.
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