PEOPLE OF MI V RONALD D RUFF
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 27, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193984
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-010696
RONALD D. RUFF,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Cavanagh and N. J. Lambros*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his bench trial convictions of armed robbery, MCL 750.529;
MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2). He was sentenced to three to fifteen years in prison for his armed robbery conviction, to be
served consecutively to a two-year prison sentence for his felony-firearm conviction. We remand for
further findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Michael Krzesowiak and Christopher Valentin were riding Krzesowiak’s moped when
defendant and another male approached in a car. According to Krzesowiak, defendant got out of the
car he was driving, put a gun to Krzesowiak’s head and told him to get off of the moped. Defendant
also asked for a ring that Krzesowiak had on his finger. The person who accompanied defendant left
on the moped, and defendant left in the car. Krzesowiak knew defendant because they at one time
lived across the street from each other. They had each visited the other’s house, although Krzesowiak
said they were not friends. Valentin’s testimony concerning the crime was similar to Krzesowiak’s, with
a few minor differences.
Defendant denied having a gun but admitted that he threatened to hit Krzesowiak. Defendant
said that his companion told Krzesowiak to give up the moped and a helmet, and that defendant forced
Krzesowiak to give up the ring. Defendant explained that Krzesowiak owed him some money from the
purchase of a remote-controlled car. Krzesowiak admitted collecting model cars and owning a remote
controlled car that he was given for Christmas, but denied buying anything from defendant.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial
because the court did not consider defendant’s claim of right defense when making its findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The claim of right defense is explained in People v Karasek, 63 Mich App
706, 710-712; 234 NW2d 761 (1975). That decision indicates that if property is taken by a creditor
in the honest, although mistaken, belief that he has the right to pay himself the debt in this way, there is
no felonious intent, and therefore, no armed robbery.
The court did not explicitly address the claim of right defense when it made its findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
There doesn’t appear to be too much dispute as to the circumstances leading up
to this except for whether or not a weapon was used by the defendant, Mr. Ronald
Ruff. Mr. Ruff admits that he did take the ring, that he did take the moped, he denies
that he used a weapon in doing so. We have testimony from the complainant as well as
Mr. Valentin that a weapon was used, that a weapon was placed at the head of the
complainant, and the defendant threatened the complainant and took the property from
him. That is a classic example of armed robbery.
The Court finds that the prosecutor has proven the necessary elements for that
offense. In addition, the Court finds that the elements for the offense of felony firearm
also have been proven. The Court finds the defendant guilty of Count II and Count III
of the information.
Defendant filed a motion for new trial arguing that the court had failed to consider the claim of
right defense. The court denied the motion, explaining its reasoning as follows:
There is a claim here that at the time of the waiver trial that the Court did not
properly consider all of the defenses that were put forward. I have some recollection of
the trial and have reviewed the transcript to a certain degree.
The main thrust, as I remember it, of Mr. Ruff’s defense was that he had a claim
of right to take the items from the person that he took them from, and so the Court was
very aware of the claim that he was making and the defense that he was raising, and the
Court considered that in making the decision that was made regarding the verdict in that
case, so that all of those, all of those matters were taken into consideration and the
Court did consider the defenses that were raised, so there’s no basis for this motion.
The motion for a new trial based on that theory is denied.
We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new
trial because a new trial is not an appropriate remedy for inadequate findings. When this Court
determines that findings are inadequate, we generally remand for additional findings unless we determine
that “additional articulation is unnecessary where it is manifest that the court was aware of the factual
issues and resolved them and it would not facilitate appellate review to
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require further explication of the path the court followed in reaching the result.” People v Johnson (on
Rehearing), 208 Mich App 137, 141; 526 NW2d 617 (1994). A new trial is appropriate when the
trier of fact is unavailable to make the supplemental findings. See e.g. People v Maghzal, 170 Mich
App 340, 348 n 2; 427 NW2d 552 (1988); Dauer v Zabel, 381 Mich 555; 164 NW2d 1 (1969).
In the present case, even if the trial court had agreed with defendant that its findings were
inadequate, the appropriate remedy would have been to make new findings and conclusions, and if
necessary, a new judgment. MCR 2.611(2)(d). Inadequacy of findings does not mandate a new trial
when the trial judge is available to supply the additional findings. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in
the court’s denial of a remedy to which defendant was not entitled.
Although we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for new trial, we conclude
that further articulation is warranted in this case. The purpose of articulation is to facilitate appellate
review. Johnson, supra at 141. As stated previously, the court did not address defendant’s claim of
right defense when it made its findings of fact and conclusions of law. In ruling on the motion for new
trial, the court stated that it had considered the claim of right defense, but did not explain why the
defense was rejected. The court may have rejected the defense because it did not believe defendant’s
testimony that he sold a remote-controlled car to the Krzesowiak. The court may have concluded that
the defense was legally inapplicable to the circumstances for some reason. Because the rationale for the
court’s rejection of the defense has not been revealed, we cannot determine if the court’s factual
findings were clearly erroneous or if its legal conclusions were flawed. Accordingly, we remand for
further findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Nicholas J. Lambros
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