LISA M LATHROP V DAVID M LATIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LISA M. LATHROP,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 204514
Osceola Circuit Court
LC No. 88-004654-DP
DAVID M. LATIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Hood and Sawyer, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right the order granting the parties continued joint legal custody of their
minor child and changing physical custody from defendant to plaintiff. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that plaintiff did not present clear and convincing evidence warranting a
change of custody. When reviewing a child custody matter, this Court must affirm the decision of the
trial court unless its factual findings are against the great weight of the evidence, its discretionary rulings
demonstrate a palpable abuse of discretion, or it has made a clear legal error with regard to a major
issue. MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8); Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 876-877; 526 NW2d
889 (1994); York v Morofsky, 225 Mich App 333, 335; 571 NW2d 524 (1997). A trial court’s
findings regarding the existence of an established custodial environment and its findings on each custody
factor should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. Fletcher,
supra at 879. The abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court’s discretionary rulings. To
whom custody is granted is a discretionary dispositional ruling. Fletcher, supra at 880. In order to
have an abuse in reaching such determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact
and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but
defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias. Fletcher, supra at 879-880.
MCL 722.27(c); MSA 25.312(7)(c) provides in pertinent part:
The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a
new order so as to challenge the established custodial environment of a child unless
there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.
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The child’s best interests are measured by the factors set forth in MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3).
Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding on factor (c), which concerns the capacity and
disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, or other
remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other
material needs. Defendant argues that no basis existed for the court’s conclusion that plaintiff, who was
unemployed, had a slight advantage regarding her capacity because of her arrangement with her current
husband, who was employed and earning an annual income of approximately $18,000. However,
evidence was presented that the FBM Bank of Reed City had loaned money to plaintiff and her
husband, a licensed builder, to enlarge their house and that plaintiff and her husband were reliable and
responsible in taking care of financial matters. Also, plaintiff testified that a new loan had been
approved for a family room addition and an expansion of the girls’ bedroom, implying that they were not
considered to pose a financial risk to loaning institutions. Plaintiff testified that since her husband was
steadily employed, it was possible for her to be home with her two youngest children. Although plaintiff
testified that the family sometimes had to rely on financial assistance from the government to supplement
the family income, her testimony showed a fairly steady family income from her husband’s employment
as a builder. By comparison, defendant did not provide evidence of any income or steady employment.
He testified that he had worked for Star, Inc. for about two and one-half to three years until the plant
closed in 1996, that he worked for short periods at Evart Products, Allan Bickel Construction, and
Fitzsimons Manufacturing, and that he left Fitzsimons Manufacturing because of a back injury and
currently had a worker’s compensation case pending. Considering this testimony, the trial court’s
finding was not against the great weight of the evidence. Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich App 130, 138;
406 NW2d 246 (1987).
Next, defendant challenges the trial court’s finding on factor (d), which concerns the length of
time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
Defendant argues that since the court acknowledged that the minor child was doing well in her present
environment, the court should have afforded an advantage to defendant. The evidence showed,
however, that defendant had moved several times and was not involved in a stable relationship. He and
the minor child lived with his parents from approximately 1988 to 1994, when he moved to Chase to
live with his girlfriend. During this time, the minor child continued in Reed City schools and lived at times
with defendant and his girlfriend, and at times with her grandparents. Defendant subsequently moved to
Evart, where he lived for about one year. Defendant’s next move was to Dailey’s trailer park, about
one mile west of Reed City, and then to a house that he was in the process of building. He had to move
out because he was not allowed to occupy the residence until the decks and cupboards had been
completed. Defendant then moved back to his parents’ house. Defendant lived with his girlfriend for
approximately two and one-half years, during which time they had a child. However, he and his
girlfriend had separated. The trial court’s finding that there was instability which precluded this factor
from particularly advantaging the father was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Next, defendant challenges the trial court’s finding on factor (e), which concerns the
permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. In Fletcher, supra
at 884-885, the Court found that the trial court erred in considering acceptability, rather than
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permanence, of the custodial unit. Adhering to that explanation, the Court in Ireland v Smith, 451
Mich 457, 465; 547 NW2d 686 (1996), noting that the focus of factor (e) is the child’s prospects for a
stable family environment, explained:
The stability of a child’s home can be undermined in various ways. This might include
frequent moves to unfamiliar settings, a succession of person residing in the home, live-in
romantic companions for the custodial parent, or other potential disruptions. [Id. at
465, n 9.]
Defendant argues that the trial court’s finding was erroneous because it did not consider that plaintiff had
cohabited and had children with various third-party males, indicating that her life history was
characterized by a lack of permanence and moral turpitude. While defendant focuses on plaintiff’s past
history, the trial court concluded that her upheaval in terms of relationships seemed to have sorted itself
out, and that she now had a permanent family unit. Permanence, as a family unit, of the proposed
custodial home was evident from plaintiff’s testimony that she and her present husband had lived
together for three years before they were married and at the time of trial had been together for seven
years. Moreover, plaintiff testified that they had a stable home which they were in the process of
expanding. In contrast to plaintiff’s relatively permanent home and marriage relationship, defendant had
moved several times, was once again living with his parents, and had no certain future plans. The trial
court’s findings regarding this factor were not clearly erroneous.
Finally, defendant challenges the trial court’s findings regarding factor (j), which concerns :the
willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent
child relationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents. Defendant argues
that the evidence purporting to show an unwillingness on his part to facilitate a positive relationship
between his daughter and plaintiff did not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence. Defendant
also argues that the trial court should have considered plaintiff’s admission of wrongdoing with regard to
a harassment charge that was brought against her in reference to defendant and his girlfriend. We
disagree. Regarding defendant’s willingness to encourage a close and continuing relationship between
plaintiff and the minor child, the evidence showed a denial of visitation. Since July 9, 1995, defendant
had denied plaintiff twenty visitation days with the minor child. The trial court’s finding was supported
by the evidence. Although the trial court did not mention wrongdoing on plaintiff’s part regarding
defendant’s girlfriend when it considered this factor, there was no evidence that plaintiff ever deliberately
kept the minor child away from her father and contrary to defendant’s argument, the evidence showed
that plaintiff pleaded not guilty to a harassment charge and agreed to a six-month nolle prosequi. Thus,
the trial court did not err in not considering this evidence to be significant for a determination of factor
(j).
The trial court determined that its analysis of factors (e) and (j) was sufficient to support a
finding that “by clear and convincing evidence, the child would be better served with the placement with
the mother.” It did not make findings against the great weight of the evidence, commit a palpable abuse
of discretion, or make a clear legal error on a major issue. We find that it exercised sound judgment in
considering the quality of the evidence and in applying a clear and
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convincing evidence standard of proof. Heid v Aaasulewski (After Remand), 209 Mich App 587,
594; 532 NW2d 205 (1995); Arndt v Kasem, 135 Mich App 252, 257; 353 NW2d 497 (1984).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the parties were not equal on the statutory best
interest factors and that plaintiff satisfied the clear and convincing standard of proof to justify a change in
custody.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly admitted and considered testimony that
was conclusory, vague, and unspecified regarding date, time, and place. The decision whether to admit
evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and that decision will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. Relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is not. MRE 402. Even
relevant evidence may be excluded where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. MRE 403. Relevant evidence is
evidence that tends to make the existence of any fact at issue more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. MRE 401; People v Brooks, 453 Mich 511; 557 NW2d 106 (1996).
Every instance of evidence that defendant objected to as being vague and unspecified was
potentially helpful in throwing light on a material point and could therefore be considered to be relevant.
People v Kozlow, 38 Mich App 517, 524-525; 196 NW2d 792 (1972). When plaintiff testified that
she tried to encourage her other daughter, of whom she had custody, to respect and love her father, and
in that way tried to encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship, the trial court overruled
defendant’s objection. In considering this evidence regarding plaintiff’s willingness to encourage a
continuing relationship with a noncustodial parent to be relevant in considering factor (j), the trial court
did not abuse its discretion.
The trial court also allowed plaintiff to testify that defendant had made false accusations against
her to the police and overruled an objection. In doing so, it acknowledged that plaintiff’s statements
were not specific but reminded defendant’s counsel that the matter could be developed during cross
examination. Defendant had the opportunity to question plaintiff regarding the specifics of the
allegations. Considering that evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact
which is of consequence to the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence, MRE 401, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed evidence that might have
had probative value with regard to factor (j).
Similarly, when the trial court admitted testimony regarding missed school days and defendant’s
denial of visitation to plaintiff, the court noted that this testimony was relevant to factor (j). The court
did not abuse its discretion when it allowed this questioning, which it believed was “proper and [went]
to the issues of willingness and ability.”
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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