PEOPLE OF MI V MONTEZ LEE KENNEDY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 198520
Manistee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-002603-FH
MONTEZ LEE KENNEDY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Bandstra and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial conviction of assault of a prison employee, MCL
750.197c; MSA 28.394(3), his subsequent bench trial conviction of being a fourth offense habitual
offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084, and his enhanced sentence of five to fifteen years’
imprisonment. We affirm defendant’s assault of a prison employee conviction, but we vacate
defendant’s conviction and sentence as an habitual offender, fourth offense, and remand for
resentencing.
I
Defendant first contends that the trial court committed error requiring reversal by admitting into
evidence for impeachment purposes the prior convictions of defendant and other defense witnesses who
saw the altercation between defendant and prison guards. We disagree. “A trial court’s decision to
admit evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” People v Coleman, 210 Mich
App 1, 4; 532 NW2d 885 (1995). The prior convictions the prosecutor wished to utilize for
impeachment purposes all involved robbery. This Court has previously held that crimes of robbery
involve an element of theft constitute prior convictions falling within MRE 609(a)(2) if they satisfy the
balancing test set forth in People v Allen, 429 Mich 558, 605-606; 420 NW2d 499 (1988), which
requires the court to examine the degree of probativeness and prejudice inherent in the admission of the
prior conviction. People v Cross, 202 Mich App 138, 146; 508 NW2d 144 (1993). If the evidence
is more probative than prejudicial, the court does not abuse its discretion to admit the evidence. Cross,
supra at 146-147.
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Michigan Rule of Evidence 609 explains the admissibility standard for prior convictions of
witnesses as follows:
(a) General rule. For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall not be admitted unless the
evidence has been elicited from the witness or established by public record during
cross-examination, and,
***
(2) the crime contained an element of theft, and
(A) the crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or death
under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
(B) the court determines that the evidence has significant probative value on the
issue of credibility and, if the witness is the defendant in a criminal trial, the court further
determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
(b) Determining probative value and prejudicial effect. For purposes of
the probative value determination required by subrule (a)(2)(B), the court shall consider
only the age of the conviction and the degree to which a conviction of the crime is
indicative of veracity. If a determination of prejudicial effect is required, the court shall
consider only the conviction’s similarity to the charged offense and the possible effects
on the decisional process if admitting the evidence causes the defendant to elect not to
testify. The court must articulate, on the record, the analysis of each factor.
A
We first consider the trial court’s admission of prior convictions for impeachment of witnesses
other than defendant. The instant defense witnesses had been convicted of assault with intent to rob
while armed, armed robbery, and unarmed robbery. All of these robbery crimes involve an element of
theft. See, e.g., Cross, supra. All of these robbery crimes also constitute felonies punishable by at
least one year imprisonment. With respect to the age factor in determining the probative value of prior
convictions, MRE 609(c) only prohibits introduction of evidence of convictions “if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the release of the witness from the
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date.” The defense witnesses convicted
of these robberies were all still imprisoned at the time of defendant’s trial, so this prohibition is
inapplicable.
Regarding the indication of veracity element in determining the probative value of theft
convictions, our Supreme Court has said that crimes containing an element of theft “are more probative
of veracity than other crimes.” Allen, supra at 595, judgment held in abeyance sub nom, People v
Pedrin, 430 Mich 1201; 423 NW2d 215 (1988). Thus, because the defense witnesses’ recent felony
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robbery convictions are probative of veracity, Allen, supra, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to exclude these convictions.
B
We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant’s prior
convictions for armed robbery, a felony involving an element of theft, were admissible for impeachment
purposes. Cross, supra. When faced with the question whether to permit the prosecution to introduce
evidence of prior convictions to impeach a defendant who may testify on his own behalf in a criminal
case, “the trial judge would exercise his discretion in determining the admissibility of the evidence by
examining the degree of probativeness and prejudice inherent in the admission of the prior conviction.”
Allen, supra at 605-606. Considering the probative value of defendant’s armed robbery convictions,
these convictions not only possessed some probative value regarding veracity, id. at 611, but also
occurred shortly over a year before defendant’s instant assault of a prison employee conviction. To
determine the prejudicial effect of prior convictions against which the trial judge must balance their
probative value, MRE 609(b) directs that the court consider the similarity of the prior convictions to the
charge for which the defendant currently stands trial and “the possible effects on the decisional process
if admitting the evidence causes the defendant to elect not to testify.”
In the instant case, defendant’s prior armed robbery convictions resembled his instant assault
charge only to the extent that both crimes primarily involved assault. Allen, supra. Defendant testified
in his own behalf, however, knowing that the prosecutor could impeach him with his prior convictions.
Thus, it appears that the prior convictions evidence had very little effect on defendant’s decision to
testify. We agree with the trial court that defendant’s prior convictions had significant probative value
given their recency and their element of theft. Although these prior convictions may also have created
some prejudice given that they, like the instant assault charge, involved violence, we cannot conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of his prior
convictions.
II
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor’s overzealous mischaracterization of defendant’s
testimony and defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s mischaracterization deprived
defendant of due process and his right to a fair trial. We disagree. “An appellate court will reverse in
the absence of an objection if a curative instruction could not have eliminated the prejudicial effect of the
[prosecutor’s] remarks or where failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 179-180; 561 NW2d 463 (1997). Here, the prosecutor’s
remarks did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. Defense counsel questioned defendant on redirect
examination regarding whether defendant had seen a nurse for the injuries defendant received in his
altercation with corrections officers:
Q: When the prosecutor asked you about a nurse seeing you, is it possible that
a nurse could have seen you without your knowledge of it?
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A: If she [were] invisible.
Defendant argues that the following statements by the prosecutor during his closing arguments
mischaracterized this statement: (1) “And he told you, I never saw a nurse. Do you remember? He
said, if I saw one, she had to be invisible”; (2) “And then Mr. Kennedy: They were jumping on me.
They weren’t restraining me, so I fought back. And I got hurt, but the invisible nurse didn’t see anything
to report it”; (3) “But I never saw the nurse. She must have been invisible. That’s what he said. She
must have been invisible.” Defendant contends that these statements imply that he claimed an invisible
nurse visited him.
Upon our review of the record and the remarks taken in the context of the evidence presented
at trial, we believe the first and third alleged mischaracterizations accurately summarize defendant’s own
contention that only an invisible nurse could have examined him without his knowledge. However, when
we consider the prosecutor’s statements in light of trial testimony regarding whether the corrections
officers had injured defendant and whether a nurse had subsequently visited defendant, we conclude
that the prosecutor utilized defendant’s statement about the invisible nurse to undermine defendant’s
credibility. Defendant testified that the corrections officers punched him and that he had suffered a split
lip, but that no nurse had examined him or treated his lip. The prison nurse then contradicted
defendant’s testimony, claiming that she examined defendant after his altercation and discovered no
visible injuries.
By referring to the invisible nurse during closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to
undermine defendant’s credibility by reminding the jury that, in light of the prison nurse’s testimony that
she examined defendant, his claim that only an invisible nurse could have visited him without his
knowledge must have meant that either the prison nurse was invisible or that defendant lied when he said
no nurse visited him. Thus, because “[a] prosecutor’s comments must be considered in light of defense
arguments,” Messenger, supra at 181, and because “[p]rosecutors are accorded great latitude
regarding their arguments and conduct . . . [and are] free to argue the evidence and all reasonable
inferences from the evidence as it relates to [their] theory of the case,” People v Bahoda, 448 Mich
261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995),1 we conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks about the invisible
nurse reasonably and appropriately intended to contravene defendant’s testimony. The prosecutor’s
statements could only have prejudiced defendant to the extent that they convinced the jury that
defendant had lied about the guards striking him. Therefore, no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and
defendant is not entitled to a new trial.
Based on our conclusion that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, we also conclude that
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his attorney’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s remarks is without merit.
III
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a fourth habitual offender
instead of as a second habitual offender when defendant’s first three underlying felony convictions all
arose from a single criminal transaction. We agree.
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“Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” People v Peña, 224
Mich App 650, 655; 569 NW2d 871 (1997). The Michigan Supreme Court and this Court have
repeatedly recognized that, when promulgating Michigan’s habitual offender statutes, MCL 769.10
769.13; MSA 28.1082-28.1085, the Michigan Legislature intended to “provide more severe
punishment for a person who declines to change his or her ways following an opportunity to reform.”
People v Stewart, 441 Mich 89, 93; 490 NW2d 327 (1992). Cf. People v Preuss, 436 Mich 714,
731-732; 461 NW2d 703 (1990); see also People v Stoudemire, 429 Mich 262, 270; 414 NW2d
693 (1987); People v Derbeck, 202 Mich App 443, 447; 509 NW2d 534 (1993); People v Jones,
171 Mich App 720, 726; 431 NW2d 204 (1988); People v Curry, 142 Mich App 724, 732; 371
NW2d 854 (1985). When a prosecutor attempts to use a criminal’s multiple prior convictions arising
from a single underlying transaction to qualify the criminal for habitual offender status, the Michigan
Supreme Court has disapproved:
[T]he legislative history of the [fourth habitual offender] statute indicates that the
Legislature, by using the phrase “after having been three times convicted,” intended that
the fourth-offender penalties reach only incorrigible criminals who had failed three
separate times to reform -- who had been convicted three separate times where the last
two convictions were for crimes committed after the prior conviction. The Legislature
used the phrase “after having been three times convicted” as shorthand. [Stoudemire,
supra at 266.]
***
[Defendant] had one opportunity to reform before he was charged as a fourth
felony offender. Before the assault in the instant case, [defendant] had been tried and
sentenced but once. He could only have been charged as a second offender. To deem
[defendant] a fourth-felony offender, subject to the most severe habitual offender
penalties, would be contrary to the legislative purpose of applying the fourth-felony
offender penalties against only those persons who, after failing three separate
opportunities to reform, were deemed incorrigible criminals. [Id. at 271.]
In 1994 the Michigan Legislature amended MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1004. Before the 1994
amendment, the statute provided that “[i]f a person has been convicted of 3 or more felonies, attempts
to commit felonies, or both . . . ,” the defendant qualified as a fourth offense habitual offender. This was
the language interpreted in 1987 by the Stoudemire court, supra at 264. The 1994 amendment
changed the wording to: “[i]f a person has been convicted of any combination of 3 or more felonies or
attempts to commit felonies . . . ,” then that person qualifies as a fourth offense habitual offender. The
evidence that the 1994 amendment was nothing more than an attempt to grammatically improve the
statute is overwhelming. First, the Legislature did not in any way alter the language of MCL 769.12(1)
between the date of the Stoudemire decision, 1987, and 1994. The 1994 House and Senate journals
regarding House Bill 4782, that included amendments to MCL 769.12(1), and the House Legislative
Analysis contain no reference whatsoever of any intention to alter the Stoudemire decision. In fact, the
purpose for House Bill 4782 was “to create a sentencing commission to develop sentencing guidelines. .
. .” Further, in the summary of the bill it is specifically noted that “multiple convictions arising out of a
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single transaction would be considered one conviction when sentencing on a conviction arising out of
that transaction.” Thus, we cannot agree that the 1994 amendment to MCL 769.12(1) in any way
changed the holding in Stoudemire.
Additionally, the 1990 Michigan Supreme Court decision in People v Pruess, supra at 737,
also specifically reiterated that “there is sufficient indicia of legislative intent to support the narrow
holding in Stoudemire that a defendant’s prior offenses must arise from separate incidents.”
In short, both the Supreme Court and this Court have consistently applied Stoudemire’s
holding that multiple criminal acts or convictions arising from one underlying criminal transaction may
only be counted once for consideration under the habitual offender statutes. See Stewart, supra at 94;
see also People v Ellis, 174 Mich App 139, 147; 436 NW2d 383 (1988); People v Reed, 172 Mich
App 182, 186; 431 NW2d 431 (1988); Jones, supra at 721-723; People v Carson, 115 Mich App
202, 205; 320 NW2d 343 (1982).
In the instant case, the parties did not contest that all of defendant’s underlying convictions arose
from a single underlying transaction and that defendant underwent a single sentencing procedure for all
his prior convictions. Thus, because defendant has not received three separate opportunities to reform
as the Legislature contemplated when they promulgated the fourth habitual offender statute, we
conclude that the trial court improperly sentenced defendant as a fourth offense habitual offender.
Stoudemire, supra.
The prosecutor relies on the Michigan Legislature’s 1994 amendment of MCL 769.12; MSA
28.1084 to argue that the explicit language of the statute commands that a court consider any
convictions arising from a single underlying transaction as separate convictions for habitual offender
purposes. However, because the Legislature’s amendment merely reflects its desire to improve the
statute grammatically and because no evidence of an intent by the Legislature to overrule Stoudemire
appears in the 1994 amendment’s legislative history, House Legislative Analysis, HB 4782, June 7,
1993, we decline to adopt this argument.
We affirm defendant’s conviction for assault of a prison employee, but vacate defendant’s
habitual offender, fourth offense conviction and remand for resentencing as a second habitual offender.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
1
Bahoda, supra, cites to People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1; 260 NW2d 58 (1977), and People v
Gonzalez, 178 Mich App 526, 535; 444 NW2d 228 (1989).
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