CHARLES F RHODES V DONALD L HIGGINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________________________
In re ESTATE OF HELEN H. CAMBLIN,
Deceased.
CHARLES F. RHODES,
UNPUBLISHED
March 3, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 199332
St. Joseph Circuit
LC No. 94-000674-CH
DONALD L. HIGGINS and PATRICIA A.
HIGGINS,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
RODNEY D. PARKER, SHERYL E. PARKER
CARY KISTNER, and CAROL GERRITSEN,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Helen H.
Camblin, Deceased,
Defendants.
Before: Markey, P.J., and M.J. Kelly and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, the trial court held that plaintiff acquired title by adverse possession to
an area of real property encompassing a portion of the right-of-way owned by the two defendants who
now appeal to this Court as of right. The remaining four defendants named by plaintiff in this quiet title
action defaulted by failing to answer the complaint. We affirm the trial court’s judgment for plaintiff.
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According to the legal description of plaintiff’s property, defendants’ right-of-way lies several
feet south of the southern borderline of plaintiff’s property. Located approximately twenty feet within
the right-of-way is a gravel road that provides plaintiff with access to his landlocked property. Plaintiff
successfully argued below that he had gained title by adverse possession to the land located between
the southern borderline of his property and the northern borderline of the gravel road, an area that is
approximately 3,000 square feet. Thus, in the trial court, plaintiff not only gained title to a strip of land
that apparently had belonged to the defaulting parties in this case who were heirs to one of plaintiff’s
predecessors-in-interest, plaintiff also gained title to a portion of defendants’ right-of-way.
Defendants first assert that remand is necessary because the lower court forgot to rule on their
counterclaim for injunctive relief seeking to prohibit plaintiff from storing items or parking vehicles within
defendant’s right-of-way. Initially, we note that defendants failed to object when the trial court entered
judgment for plaintiff. MCR 2.602(B). Defendants also failed to move for amendment of the judgment,
MCR 2.611, or relief from the judgment, MCR 2.612. Therefore, this issue was not raised before the
trial court and is not preserved for review on appeal. See, e.g., Herring v Golden State Mutual Life
Ins Co, 114 Mich App 148, 157; 318 NW2d 641 (1982).
Nonetheless, even if we accepted defendants’ assertion and assumed that the trial court forgot
to rule on their counterclaim, remand for the purpose of permitting the trial court to rule on this issue
would be unnecessary because any further explanation by the trial court would not facilitate appellate
review. In deciding that plaintiff gained title to the disputed property by adverse possession, the trial
court implicitly found that defendants were not entitled to the injunctive relief they requested. If
defendants no longer own the right-of-way, they plainly have no basis to bar plaintiff from using it.
Although the trial court’s conclusion about defendants’ counterclaim should have been explicitly stated,
the fact that the trial court found defendants’ counterclaim to be without merit is inescapable in light of its
judgment for plaintiff. Moreover, we note that the trial court was aware of the issues in this case, as
evidenced by its well-reasoned and lengthy opinion.
Next, defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence of adverse possession to support the
trial court’s judgment for plaintiff. Actions to quiet title are equitable in nature, and a court acting in
equity “looks at the whole situation and grants or withholds relief as good conscience dictates.”
Michigan Nat’l Bank & Trust Co v Morren, 194 Mich App 407, 410; 487 NW2d 784 (1992),
quoting Hunter v Slater, 331 Mich 1, 7; 49 NW2d 33 (1951). This Court reviews the trial court’s
judgment de novo, but reviews the trial court’s factual findings for clear error. Morren, supra. The
sufficiency of the findings must be reviewed in the context of the specific legal and factual issues raised
by the parties and the evidence. See People v Rushlow, 179 Mich App 172, 177; 445 NW2d 222
(1989), aff’d on other grounds, 437 Mich 149; 468 NW2d 487 (1991).
As the party seeking title, plaintiff bore the burden of proving by clear and cogent evidence that
he satisfied the elements of adverse possession; McQueen v Black, 168 Mich App 641, 645, n 2; 425
NW2d 203 (1988); see also Thomas v Rex A Wilcox Trust, 185 Mich App 733, 736; 463 NW2d
190 (1990). The elements of adverse possession are well established: a claim of adverse possession
exists where possession is actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted for
fifteen years after the cause of action accrued. Thomas, supra. In actions tried without a jury, the trial
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court must find the facts and state separately its conclusions of law as to contested matters. MCR
2.517(A)(1), MCR 6.403, Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 883 (Brickley, J., joined by
Cavanagh, C.J. and Boyle, J.), 890 (Mallett, J., concurring in Justice Brickley’s opinion except with
regard to the standard of review); 526 NW2d 889 (1994).
Here, the trial court committed no clear error in its findings of fact and properly entered
judgment for plaintiff because plaintiff satisfied the elements of adverse possession. First, the trial court
did not commit clear error in finding that plaintiff’s possession of the disputed portion of land was actual
and visible. Testimony at trial consistently revealed that acts of possession included parking vehicles on
the disputed portion of the lot, maintaining that portion of the grass, and placing burn barrels, a bus stop,
and a mailbox within that area. Second, the trial court did not commit clear error in finding that
plaintiff’s possession of the disputed portion of land was open and notorious because plaintiff testified
that his actions were taken with the knowledge of the previous owner of record but without permission
or interference. Third, the trial court did not commit clear error in finding that plaintiff’s possession of
the disputed portion of land was exclusive. Indeed, testimony revealed that plaintiff’s use of the
disputed area was possible because the gravel road was only infrequently traveled by others. Last, the
trial court did not commit clear error in finding that plaintiff’s possession of the disputed portion of land
was continuous and uninterrupted for fifteen years. Even without including the acts of possession by
plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest, plaintiff’s own acts of possession, delineated above, occurred from at
least 1976 to 1992.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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