EST OF EDMOND K RIASHI V RENEE FRANGEDAKIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THE ESTATE OF EDMUND K. RIASHI, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
March 3, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 190819
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 92-003900-CH
RENEE FRANGEDAKIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Saad and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking a judicial determination of his daughter’s interest in a
certain piece of real estate and for declaration of an equitable mortgage. The trial court entered
judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in declaring an equitable mortgage for the
property and in determining the terms of the equitable mortgage. Defendant claims that plaintiff failed to
meet his heavy burden and did not produce any evidence of the terms and conditions of the mortgage.
We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s declaration of an equitable mortgage de novo. Schultz v
Schultz, 117 Mich App 454, 457-458; 324 NW2d 48 (1982). However, this Court will not reverse
the trial court’s determination of an equitable mortgage unless its decision is clearly erroneous. Id.;
Grant v Van Reken, 71 Mich App 121, 125; 246 NW2d 348 (1976).
A court may declare a deed absolute on its face to be an equitable mortgage. Schultz, supra at
457; Grant, supra at 125. However, a party who asserts that an absolute deed is a mortgage bears a
high degree of proof and must clearly indicate to the trier of fact that the parties did not contemplate an
absolute sale. Schultz, supra at 458. There are two instances under Michigan law where courts
declare equitable mortgages when there is no writing to evidence an agreement. First, where a deed is
executed between two parties and one party stands in a relationship of trust or guidance to the other
party, but the relationship has been abused, an equitable mortgage will be declared to balance the
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inequities. Schultz, supra at 458. Second, courts will impose an equitable mortgage where a creditor
abuses the “power of coercion” which he may have over the debtor because of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction. Id. at 459. In this situation, courts will interfere between the parties’
negotiations in order to avoid oppression. Id.
In the instant case, we find that the doctrine of equitable mortgage was properly declared
because the testimony and evidence reveals that the parties contemplated and intended for defendant to
repay plaintiff the purchase price for the property in order to obtain an ownership interest in the real
estate. We cannot ascertain any other reason, and none was suggested to us by defendant, for which
plaintiff included his name on the deed, and then proceeded to regularly accept payments from
defendant as consideration for equity in the property. In addition, defendant admitted on the record that
from the time her father purchased the property for her, she assumed that she was required to repay him
the full purchase price in order to own the property outright. Therefore, we are persuaded that, under
the circumstances, the trial court did not err in declaring an equitable mortgage.
Defendant alternatively argues that plaintiff’s claim for equitable relief should be barred by the
doctrine of unclean hands. Defendant maintains that plaintiff failed to report the income he received
from the property on any of his income tax returns from 1987 to 1991. Apparently, plaintiff did not
even report that he acquired the property until 1992, at which time he claimed a depreciation for the real
estate. Nor did plaintiff claim the $8,500 defendant paid to him in consideration for greater equity in the
property.
A suit to quiet title or remove a cloud on a title is one in equity. MCL 600.2932; MSA
27A.2932; Crawford v Hamrick, 327 Mich 591; 42 NW2d 751 (1950); McKay v Palmer, 170
Mich App 288, 293; 427 NW2d 620 (1988). The maxim that “one who seeks the aid of equity must
come in with clean hands” is an integral part of any action in equity and is designed to preserve the
integrity of the judiciary. Isbell v Brighton Area Schools, 199 Mich App 188, 189; 500 NW2d 748
(1993).
While we agree with defendant that plaintiff’s conduct was clearly questionable, we do not find
that such misconduct precludes him from recovering in equity under the circumstances. Plaintiff’s
alleged failure to report the money did not in any way impact his relationship with defendant or the
agreement they had regarding ownership of the property. The alleged wrongdoing occurred after the
property was purchased, after the agreement between the parties was made, and after defendant began
making payments to plaintiff. Thus, we do not find any overreaching or unfairness in the transaction that
influenced defendant’s decision to purchase the property. Moreover, at the time the purchase was
made, and even thereafter, there is no evidence that plaintiff misled or deceived defendant in a manner
that affected her rights and ownership in the property. Thus, plaintiff’s relationship with the IRS is an
entirely different issue that will be addressed in the appropriate forum if necessary.
Lastly, defendant argues that the deed is unambiguous and, pursuant to contract law, must be
construed strictly against the drafter to give effect to the true intentions of the parties. Defendant
contends that the unequivocal language of “tenants in common” indicates that she owned that property
to the same extent as her father from the time of purchase. We disagree.
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If the language contained in a contract is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is a question of law
for the court. Port Huron Ed Ass’n v Port Huron Area School Dist, 452 Mich 309, 323; 550
NW2d 228 (1996); Pakideh v Franklin Mortgage, 213 Mich App 636, 640; 540 NW2d 777
(1995). Contractual language is construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning, and technical or
constrained constructions are to be avoided. Id. The primary rule in construing a contract is to
ascertain the intent of the parties. Damerau v C L Rieckhoff Co, Inc, 155 Mich App 307, 311; 399
NW2d 502 (1986).
A tenancy in common is a legal estate whereby each tenant has a separate and distinct title to an
undivided share of the whole. MCL 554.43; MSA 26.43; Quinlan Investment Co v The Meehan
Cos, 171 Mich App 635, 639; 430 NW2d 805 (1988). Each tenant is entitled to possession of the
whole and every part thereof, subject to the same rights in other cotenants. Id.
Although we agree with defendant that the warranty deed, on its face, is unambiguous and
indicates that the parties were tenants in common with no limitations, as we noted above, there are
certain circumstances where courts may declare a deed absolute on its face to be an equitable
mortgage. Schultz, supra at 457. We find this case to be one such instance. Thus, we must look
beyond the plain language of the deed and consider the conduct of the parties and circumstances
surrounding the purchase in order to ascertain the true intentions of the parties.
In doing so, we find several reasons why the deed in question should be deemed an equitable
mortgage, rather than a deed absolute. First, we find that plaintiff would not have placed his name on
the deed at all if his intentions were to provide defendant with the condominium as a pure gift. Instead,
we are convinced that he included his name on the deed to ensure that he maintained ownership rights
and interest in the property until the purchase price was paid. Second, if the property was truly a gift
from plaintiff to his daughter, as defendant suggests, he would not have accepted her monthly payments
of $500 as remuneration, nor would he have been willing to accept a lump sum of $8,500 to increase
defendant’s equity interest. This would have been unnecessary if she already owned the property.
Third, we find it interesting to note that plaintiff offered to pay for the property in cash so that defendant
would not have to pay high interest rates and excessive fees and costs associated with a mortgage. We
are not persuaded that he intended to give her the property for free; rather, it appears that he intended
to make the purchase easier and less expensive for his daughter. Finally, defendant’s conduct and
testimony demonstrates that she intended to repay her father for the property and that each payment she
made was increasing her equity in the condo. There was no suggestion by either party at the time the
deed was executed that this was to be a gift. Thus, despite the seemingly clear language in the deed, we
find that the facts of this case clearly warrant the imposition of an equitable mortgage.
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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