PEOPLE OF MI V GODFREY CADOGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 3, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 188716
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-003679-FH
GODFREY CADOGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Sawyer and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520d; MSA 28.788(4), and assault and battery, MCL 750.81; MSA 28.276. The trial judge
sentenced defendant to 1½ to 15 years of imprisonment for the CSC conviction and ninety days of
imprisonment for the assault conviction. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.
I
Defendant first alleges several instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Effective
assistance of counsel is presumed and defendant can only overcome this presumption by demonstrating
that counsel failed to perform an essential duty that was prejudicial to the defendant. People v
Sharbnow, 174 Mich App 94, 106; 435 NW2d 772 (1989).
The first four claims involve trial counsel’s conduct during jury selection. First, defendant argues
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to remove biased jurors. This Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, People v Barnett, 163 Mich App 331,
338; 414 NW2d 378 (1987), and jury selection is such a matter, People v Robinson, 154 Mich App
92, 94-95; 397 NW2d 229 (1986). Second, defendant claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to a substitute judge taking the jury’s verdict. A verdict taken by a substitute judge does not
constitute error warranting reversal unless it clearly appears that prejudice to the defendant has resulted.
People v Clyburn, 55 Mich App 454, 458-459; 222 NW2d 775 (1974). No such prejudice is
apparent on the record. Third, defendant claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
composition of the jury array. Because defendant provides no information regarding the composition of
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the array and such
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information is not apparent from the record, we need not review this issue. People v Juarez, 158 Mich
App 66, 73; 404 NW2d 222 (1987). Fourth, defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for
conducting sidebar conferences during voir dire with the prosecutor and trial judge outside defendant’s
presence. Contrary to defendant’s contentions, such a practice did not deny defendant his right to be
present at all critical stages of the proceeding. People v Harris, 133 Mich App 646, 652; 350 NW2d
305 (1984). Accordingly, because counsel’s conduct was not improper, defendant has failed to show
that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Sharbnow, supra at 106.
The remaining allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel involve counsel’s conduct
during trial. First, defendant maintains that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of
CJI2d 20.12(c) because it omits the term “sexual penetration.” However, the instruction correctly
incorporates the definition of cunnilingus, which is a form of penetration. Second, defendant argues that
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper attempt to elicit hearsay
testimony. However, the prosecutor was questioning defendant about defendant’s own statements,
which are not hearsay. See MRE 801(d)(2)(A). Third, defendant claims that counsel was ineffective
for failing to move for a directed verdict. This claim is without merit because the record contained
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the prosecutor established third
degree criminal sexual conduct and assault and battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Last, defendant
argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial after the prosecutor made remarks
unsupported by the evidence. As discussed infra in Section VII, the prosecutor’s comments were
supported by the evidence. Again, because counsel’s conduct was not improper, defendant has failed
to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Sharbnow, supra at 106.
II
Defendant also argues that his guarantee against double jeopardy was violated when the trial
court added four potential jurors to the venire at the beginning of the jury selection process.
Specifically, defendant argues that jeopardy attaches at the beginning of jury selection, when the venire
is first sworn. We disagree. Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a
defendant twice in jeopardy for a single offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; People v
Torres, 452 Mich 43, 63; 549 NW2d 540 (1996). However, double jeopardy does not attach until
the jury is selected and sworn. People v Mehall, 454 Mich 1, 4; 557 NW2d 110 (1997). Because
the jury had not been selected when the additional prospective jurors arrived, defendant’s claim is
without merit. Consequently, defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this
procedure is also without merit. Sharbnow, supra at 106.
III
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jurors to rely on their collective
memories in response to the jury’s question during deliberations. We disagree. The jury did not
request that certain testimony be reread; rather, the jury submitted a factual question. Answering such a
question would have been improper for the court. People v Bonner, 116 Mich App 41, 45-46; 321
NW2d 835 (1982). Additionally, because the judge did not instruct the jury that it could not have the
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trial testimony read to them, future review of the record by the jury was not foreclosed. Id. See MCR
6.414(H). Therefore, the court’s instruction to the jury was proper.
IV
Defendant also argues that his guarantee against double jeopardy was violated because the jury
convicted him of both third-degree criminal sexual conduct and assault and battery. We disagree. Two
separate punishable offenses generally exist when each offense requires proof of at least one fact that
the other does not. United States v Dixon, 509 US 688; 113 S Ct 2856, 2860; 125 L Ed 2d 556,
568 (1993). The essential elements of third-degree criminal sexual conduct are: (1) sexual penetration
of the victim (2) achieved by force or coercion. People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 380; 465
NW2d 365 (1990). The elements of assault and battery are: (1) that the defendant committed a
forceful or violent touching of the victim and (2) that the defendant intended to touch the victim. CJI2d
17.2. See, e.g., People v Terry, 217 Mich App 660, 662; 553 NW2d 23 (1996). Although both
third-degree criminal sexual conduct and assault and battery require proof of force, each offense
requires proof of at least one fact that the other does not; therefore, the two offenses do not constitute
the same offense.
V
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to
dominate voir dire and by making prejudicial remarks during voir dire. However, defendant did not
object to any of the alleged errors during voir dire. Moreover, defense counsel expressed satisfaction
with the jury and only exercised two of his five peremptory challenges. Therefore, defendant has
waived any claim regarding the scope of voir dire. People v Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 666-667;
482 NW2d 176 (1992).
VI
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting complainant’s
statement to a friend after the incident as an excited utterance. We disagree. We review a trial court’s
decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4; 532
NW2d 885 (1995). At issue here is whether the prosecution presented independent proof, direct or
circumstantial, of the startling event that led to the statement. People v Burton, 433 Mich 268, 294;
445 NW2d 133 (1989). Our review of the record reveals that there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence of the sexual assault. See, e.g., People v Kowalak (On Remand), 215 Mich App 554, 559
560; 546 NW2d 681 (1996). Complainant testified that she answered the telephone during the incident
and told the caller to contact 911 because she was being attacked. The caller verified that she
contacted complainant, who answered the telephone and said to call the police. According to the caller,
complainant was screaming and crying. Additionally, complainant’s friend testified that complainant was
crying and upset when complainant called. Complainant’s friend explained that when she arrived at
complainant’s home, complainant was shaking and still upset. Because the record contains independent
proof of the startling event that led to complainant’s statement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the testimony.
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VII
Defendant also alleges several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. We limit our discussion to
only those four instances that were preserved for appellate review by an objection by defendant
because the other alleged instances either did not involve misconduct or involved misconduct that an
appropriate instruction could have cured. People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 575; 540 NW2d 728
(1995). Issues of prosecutorial misconduct are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing
court must examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context.
People v LeGrone, 205 Mich App 77, 82-83; 517 NW2d 270 (1994).
First, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly argued during closing argument that
complainant informed the police on the night of the incident that oral penetration had occurred. We find
that this argument was properly drawn from a police officer’s testimony that during the interview after
the incident, complainant described the penetration as “kissing.” A prosecutor is free to relate the facts
adduced at trial to the theory of the case and to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising
from it to the jury. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995) (quoting People v
Gonzalez, 178 Mich App 526, 535; 444 NW2d 229 (1989)).
Second, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited from a lay witness an answer
to a hypothetical question. We disagree. A character witness for defendant testified that in her opinion,
defendant was not an assaultive person. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the witness,
over defense counsel’s objection, whether her opinion would change if she knew that a woman was
upset and that defendant pulled her pants down. The witness responded that if that were true, then it
might change her opinion. We find that the witness was merely providing opinion testimony. See MRE
701. Further, the use of a hypothetical question by the prosecutor was not improper. “In order to rely
on an opinion given in answer to a hypothetical question, the factual assumption in the hypothetical must
be in substantial accord with the evidence accepted at trial.” Gardner v Van Buren Public Schools,
197 Mich App 265, 273; 494 NW2d 845 (1992), rev’d on other grounds 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1
(1994). Here, defendant denied that he performed cunnilingus on complainant; however, he admitted
that during the incident the complainant was screaming, so he pulled her pants down to show her how
easy it would be for him to assault her. Because the prosecutor based the hypothetical question to the
witness on facts in evidence, the question was proper.
Third, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly stated during closing argument that a
sexual assault charge formerly had to be supported by corroborating evidence. Even if this statement
was incorrect, such an error was not prejudicial because the statement addressed past law and the
prosecutor was not arguing that the jurors should apply incorrect law. Moreover, when read as a whole
and evaluated in light of defense arguments, People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 353; 492 NW2d
810 (1992), the prosecutor’s comments were proper because immediately before the prosecutor made
the statement, defense counsel argued that defendant should not be convicted of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct because there was “no corroboration.”
Last, defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for complainant’s credibility by
stating the content of her conversation with complainant. We agree that the prosecutor’s conduct in this
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instance was improper because she was asserting her personal knowledge, People v Miron, 31 Mich
App 142, 144; 187 NW2d 497 (1971), and testifying to the jury, People v Brocato, 17 Mich App
277, 295; 169 NW2d 483 (1969). However, immediately after the prosecutor revealed what she told
complainant, the trial court cautioned the jurors to disregard the prosecutor’s comments. Jurors are
presumed to have followed a court’s instructions until the contrary is clearly shown. People v
McAlister, 203 Mich App 495, 504; 513 NW2d 431 (1994). Here, defendant has failed to
demonstrate that the jurors failed to follow the court’s instruction to disregard the prosecutor’s
statements. Accordingly, defendant’s claim is without merit.
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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