PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM PATRICK HACKETT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 24, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 195698
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 94-001951-FH
WILLIAM PATRICK HACKETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Wahls and Gribbs, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of delivery of 50 grams or more, but less than
225 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii). He was sentenced to
four to twelve years’ imprisonment and appeals as of right. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly used his post-arrest silence against him in two
ways. We agree. First, the prosecutor asked defendant during cross-examination whether he ever
confronted Patrick Logue, who testified for the prosecution pursuant to a plea agreement. Defendant
responded that he had not been in contact with Logue since they were “locked up” after their
arraignment. The prosecutor next asked defendant whether he told Logue at that point that he had
nothing to do with the incident. Defendant responded that he had never made such a statement to
Logue. Second, the prosecutor stated during closing argument that defendant did not tell Logue he had
nothing to do with the incident because defendant was guilty.
On the existing record, there is no evidence that defendant’s silence with Logue occurred during
a custodial interrogation situation, nor that it was in reliance on Miranda warnings. Accordingly, there is
no basis upon which to conclude that defendant’s silence was a constitutionally protected silence.
People v Schollaert, 194 Mich App 158, 166; 486 NW2d 312 (1992). Instead, we must address
whether defendant’s testimony regarding his failure to confront Logue was admissible under the
Michigan Rules of Evidence. Id. at 167. Although defendant did not object to either instance of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, we review this issue because failure to do so would result in manifest injustice.
People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 336; 553 NW2d 692 (1996).
-1
The rule in People v Bigge, 288 Mich 417; 285 NW 5 (1939), precludes the admission of
evidence of a defendant’s failure to say anything in the face of an accusation as an adoptive or tacit
admission of the truthfulness of the accusation under MRE 801(d)(2)(B) unless the defendant has
“manifested his adoption or belief in its truth.” Schollaert, supra at 167. In this case, the evidence at
trial did not indicate that defendant either adopted or believed the accusation. Therefore, the evidence
should not have been admitted, and the prosecution should not have been permitted to base its
argument on that evidence. See, e.g., People v Greenwood, 209 Mich App 470, 472-474; 531
NW2d 771 (1995). We do not find these errors to be harmless. As in Greenwood, the evidence in
this case was purely circumstantial and hinged on the credibility of defendant. Therefore, we conclude
that defendant was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s misconduct. We reverse defendant’s
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
Several of defendant’s other issues on appeal either impact the viability of the prosecutor’s case
or are likely to reoccur at retrial; therefore, we will review these issues to assist the trial court on
remand.
Defendant argues that the 44-month delay in bringing him to trial following his first arrest
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. We note that defendant did not raise this issue
below; however, this Court may address a constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal.
People v Johnson, 215 Mich App 658, 669; 547 NW2d 65 (1996). We review the trial court’s
findings under the clearly erroneous standard, but we review the constitutional question of law de novo.
People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997). To determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, this Court considers the length of delay, the reason
for delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice to the defendant. Id.
A delay of eighteen months is presumed to be prejudicial. Id.
Regarding the first factor, defendant contends that 44 months lapsed between his trial and his
first arrest in 1991. However, defendant was not brought to trial based upon the arrest in 1991; rather,
defendant was brought to trial on charges that were re-authorized against him in 1993. Defendant was
not formally charged until September 7, 1994, when he appeared for arraignment. Thus, the period
from his appearance until he went to trial on April 20, 1995, was approximately eight-and-a-half
months. Therefore, there is no presumption that the delay before defendant’s trial was prejudicial.
Second, defendant’s own motions, though filed for valid reasons, shared a substantial role in the reason
for the delay of trial. Third, defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until his appeal; therefore,
the trial court did not have an opportunity to address the alleged delay. Finally, defendant has not
established that he was prejudiced by the delay. Accordingly, we find no constitutional violation.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of his previous arrest for
this offense. The record indicates that defendant and another person were arrested in 1991 in a
restaurant parking lot near the motel where Logue and an undercover police officer were engaged in a
drug transaction. The district court magistrate concluded that the police officers did not have probable
cause to arrest defendant and dismissed the charges against defendant. The circuit court judge affirmed
the district court’s ruling. After Logue agreed to testify against defendant, the police arrested defendant
in 1993 for the same incident. Citing Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed
-2
2d 441 (1963), and the “fruit of the poisonous” tree doctrine, defendant’s specific argument is that the
trial court should not have admitted testimony of the 1991 arrest because “the evidence of the arrest
itself was a fruit of its illegality, and should have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment and
Michigan exclusionary rules.” This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse
of discretion. People v Gibson, 219 Mich App 530, 532; 557 NW2d 141 (1996).
On its face, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine suppresses only evidence that is “derived
as a result of the illegal arrest.” People v Spencley, 197 Mich App 505, 508; 495 NW2d 824 (1992).
The fact that an arrest occurred cannot be evidence derived from the arrest itself; therefore, this doctrine
alone does not suppress admission of the fact of the arrest. Even assuming that any error occurred by
reason of this admission, the error was harmless in light of the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the
fact that the prosecutor charged defendant with a crime is not evidence of defendant’s guilt. See
People v Humphreys, 221 Mich App 443, 448; 561 NW2d 868 (1997). The trial court aptly stated
to the parties that it was no surprise to the jury that the police believed that defendant was criminally
involved in the incident because that was why defendant was facing a trial.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in barring evidence that defendant had no prior
criminal record. We find no abuse of discretion. Clearly, defendant’s character was a major focus of
his defense; however, the absence of a criminal record is not substantive evidence of a person’s
reputation or character, as permitted under MRE 404(a)(1). Neither is the absence of a prior criminal
record a specific instance of defendant’s conduct as permitted under MRE 405. Last, the absence of a
prior criminal record is simply not relevant evidence under MRE 401. See People v Phillips, 170
Mich App 675, 680-681; 428 NW2d 739 (1988).
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined defendant’s character
witnesses and deprived defendant of a fair trial as a result. Five defense witnesses testified as to
defendant’s character: Tamara Smith, Eric Reinhardt, Heather Thompson, Gary Lazar, and Lynn
Eastin. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked each witness if he or she was with defendant or
knew defendant when defendant was arrested. Whether a trial court has properly limited cross
examination is an issue reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Minor, 213 Mich App 682, 684;
541 NW2d 576 (1995). Regarding the cross-examinations of Thompson, Lazar, and Eastin, to which
defendant did not object below, this Court reviews the issue only to prevent manifest injustice. Turner,
supra at 583. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony at issue
during cross-examination, nor did manifest injustice result from the cross-examination. The testimony
was not beyond the scope of the direct examination and was relevant to the witnesses’ credibility or
basis of their knowledge of defendant’s honesty or integrity.
We decline to address the remaining issues raised by defendant. Reversed and remanded.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.