PEOPLE OF MI V HENRY LEE DILLARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 20, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 189228
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 94-009842-FC
TOBY ROGER DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 189232
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 94-009964-FC
HENRY LEE DILLARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and MacKenzie and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants were tried together in two separate trials arising out of two separate incidents, which
occurred within hours of each other in July 1994. In the first trial, where defendants were charged with
several crimes related to the murder of Donald Wright, both defendants were convicted of second
degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549 and possession of a fire arm during commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). In the second trial, where defendants were charged with
several crimes related to the attempted robbery and shooting of Quentin Bledson, defendant Davis was
convicted of assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284; assault with intent to
murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278; and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).
Defendant Dillard was acquitted of all charges.
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Davis was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for each of his felony-firearm convictions, forty
to eighty years' imprisonment for second-degree murder, fifteen to thirty years' imprisonment for assault
with intent to rob while armed, and twenty-five to fifty years' imprisonment for assault with intent to
murder. Dillard was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction and twenty
five to forty years' imprisonment for second-degree murder. Both defendants appeal as of right from
their convictions. We affirm, except with regard to Davis' conviction for assault with intent to rob while
armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284. We vacate that conviction and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I
Both defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant them
separate murder trials. Each defendant made a pretrial motion requesting separate trials. During the
murder trial, the motions were renewed and mistrial was requested on several occasions. The trial court
denied each of these motions. We disagree that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the
defendants separate murder trials.
A trial court has discretion to try codefendants separately or jointly. MCL 768.5; MSA
28.1028; MCR 6.121(D). Severance is required only when a defendant shows that severance is
necessary to avoid prejudice to his substantial rights. MCR 6.121(C). A defendant does not have an
absolute right to a separate trial. People v Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 52; 492 NW2d 490 (1992).
In fact, "[t]here is a strong policy favoring joint trials in the interest of justice, judicial economy and
administration." Id.
In People v Hana, 447 Mich 325; 524 NW2d 682 (1994), the Court set forth numerous
considerations for determining when separate trials for codefendants are required:
Severance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant provides the
court with a supporting affidavit, or makes an offer of proof, that clearly, affirmatively,
and fully demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is
the necessary means of rectifying the potential prejudice. The failure to make this
showing in the trial court, absent any significant indication on appeal that the requisite
prejudice in fact occurred at trial, will preclude reversal of a joinder decision. [Id. at
346-347.]
The Court recognized that there are serious negative implications for codefendants in a joint trial where
each is presenting a defense that is antagonistic to the other. Id. at 347. Nevertheless, the Court
imposed a very high standard when determining if severance is mandated. Severance should be granted
"only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the
defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Id. at 359
360.
Otherwise stated, "the defendant 'must show that the magnitude of the prejudice denied
him a fair trial.' . . . [R]eversible prejudice exists when one of the defendant's
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'substantive rights,' such as the 'opportunity to present an individual defense,' is
violated." [Id. at 360, citing United States v Tootick, 952 F2d 1078, 1082 (CA 9,
1991).]
The Court further ruled:
Inconsistency of defenses is not enough to mandate severance; rather, the defenses must
be "mutually exclusive" or "irreconcilable." Moreover, "[i]ncidental spillover prejudice,
which is almost inevitable in a multi-defendant trial, does not suffice. The "tension
between defenses must be so great that a jury would have to believe one defendant at
the expense of the other." [Id. at 349.]
Finger pointing is not a sufficient reason to grant separate trials. Id. at 355.
In this case, the trial court properly refused to grant separate trials. The pretrial motions did not
provide any concrete facts or reasons to justify separating the proceedings. Defendants simply claimed
that separate trials were warranted since each defendant would be blaming the other for firing the fatal
shot at Wright. As the Court noted in Hana, supra at 355, finger pointing is an insufficient reason to
mandate separate trials. This is especially so where, as here, defendants could not articulate any
substantial rights that would be prejudiced if a consolidated trial was held. Id.
In addition, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny separate trials or a mistrial during the
murder trial. First, the defenses in this case were not mutually exclusive such that separate trials were
necessary. The jury did not have to believe one defendant at the expense of the other and in fact, it did
not. Both were tried and charged as principals and aiders and abettors. Both were convicted of
second-degree murder. In People v Gallina and People v Rode, the companion cases to Hana, the
defendants were pointing fingers at each other. Each claimed the other killed the victim. One of the
defendants was charged as an aider and abettor and the Court held that "[f]inger pointing by the
defendants when such a prosecution theory is pursued does not create mutually exclusive antagonistic
defenses." Id. at 360-361.
The properly instructed jury could have found both defendants similarly liable without
any prejudice or inconsistency because one found guilty of aiding and abetting can also
be held liable as a principal. [Id. at 361.]
Similarly, the finger pointing defenses in this case were not mutually exclusive, antagonistic defenses.
The jury was instructed that each defendant could be guilty as a principal or as an aider and abettor, and
there was sufficient evidence to convict both defendants. Id. at 350-351.
Second, we find no indication that either defendant was irretrievably prejudiced at trial. Neither
defendant testified, so there were no direct cross-accusations to answer. Hana, supra at 355-356. In
addition, the prosecutor would have been entitled to present the same evidence in each of two separate
trials. There was no evidence heard by the jury that would have been inadmissible as to one of the co
defendants had he had a separate trial. Id. The strategy of each defendant was to elicit testimony
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favorable to himself from the prosecution witnesses and then argue that, based on his interpretation of
that testimony, the other defendant must have fired the fatal bullet. As was noted in Hana, supra at
355, the attorneys' "verbal tug of war" did not transform the proceedings into an unfair trial. Moreover,
there has been no showing that the defendant's strategies would have been different had they had
separate trials. In addition, although there was evidence that was antagonistic to each defendant in this
case, it was equally antagonistic to both. The jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that either one
fired the fatal bullet and that the other aided and abetted. Finally, the trial court cautioned the jury that
each case had to be considered and decided separately and each case should be decided on the
evidence. Id. at 351, 356. This case is really one of simple finger pointing and, as the Court noted in
Hana, supra at 347-348, it is natural that codefendants will try to point the finger at each other and will
end up being forced, to some extent to defend against their codefendant as well as the government.
This reason is insufficient to justify separate trials where defendants were not restricted in any way from
presenting their defenses and where they were not prejudiced.
II
Defendant Davis argues that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of the attempted robbery
and shooting of Bledson (the second incident) into the first trial, which arose out of the shooting death of
Wright (the first incident). We disagree.
The admissibility of other bad-acts evidence is within the trial court's discretion. People v
Catanzarite, 211 Mich App 573, 579; 536 NW2d 570 (1995). MRE 404(b) provides:
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are
contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in this case.
In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), the Court clarified the standard for
the admission of evidence of other crimes or wrongs. The evidence must be relevant to an issue other
than propensity under rule 404(b); must be relevant to an issue or fact of consequence; and must not be
more prejudicial than probative under MRE 403. Id. at 74-75. In addition, the trial court may, upon
request, provide a limiting instruction. Id. at 75.
In this case, the evidence of the second incident was relevant to identity and intent. Bledson, the
victim at the second crime scene, identified Davis as being his assailant. Another witness, testifying
under a grant of immunity, confirmed that Davis shot Bledson at the second crime scene. Forensic
evidence matched the nine-millimeter bullet casings and bullets that were shot at the second crime scene
to those from the murder scene. Thus, the evidence from the second crime scene was relevant to Davis'
identity at the murder scene. It was also relevant to intent because the way Davis interacted with the
second victim, specifically approaching the victim's vehicle, pulling a gun, stating his intention to rob him,
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and shooting when the victim failed to comply, shows that more likely than not, Davis intentionally shot
Wright under similar circumstances.
Davis also argues that even if the evidence was relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative
and thus, it should not have been admitted. Again, we disagree. Contrary to defendant's claims, the
record does not demonstrate that the evidence of the second incident was introduced early at trial or
that it was given undue weight. Moreover, Davis makes no showing that the prejudicial nature of the
evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 74-75; 537
NW2d 909 (1995). He merely argues that the evidence unfairly tainted the jury's impression of him.
Unfair prejudice does not simply mean damaging. Id. at 75.
III
Davis also argues that his conviction for assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89;
MSA 28.284, should be vacated. The prosecutor concedes that this conviction should be vacated and
we agree.
The offense of attempted armed robbery is a lesser included offense of assault with intent to rob
while armed. People v Bryan, 92 Mich App 208, 225; 284 NW2d 765 (1979). Davis requested that
the trial court instruct the jury on the lesser offense of attempted armed robbery and the trial court
refused. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense. See People v
Hendricks, 446 Mich 435, 442; 521 NW2d 546 (1994).
We vacate Davis' conviction for assault with intent to rob while armed. On remand, the trial
court shall enter judgment of conviction for the offense of attempted armed robbery or, if the prosecutor
wishes, it may retry Davis on the greater offense. Bryan, supra at 225-226.
IV
Defendant Dillard argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
second-degree murder. We disagree.
In order to be convicted of second-degree murder, the following elements must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt: that defendant caused a death with malice and without justification or
excuse. People v Neal, 201 Mich App 650, 654; 506 NW2d 618 (1993). Defendant takes issue
only with whether there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that he
caused the death of the victim. While much evidence pointed at Davis as being the shooter who
delivered the fatal bullet, there was evidence pointing directly at Dillard, including that Dillard fired a
second shot into the victim's car and claimed that he fired the fatal bullet. Dillard also bragged to a
witness that he was the shooter at the second crime scene. The bullets from that crime scene matched
the nine-millimeter bullet suspected to have caused Wright's death. The jury could have believed that
Dillard, and not Davis, had the nine-millimeter gun responsible for the death. Moreover there was
testimony that it was not impossible that the .22-caliber bullet caused the death. Therefore, even if
Dillard had the .22-caliber gun and not the nine-millimeter gun, the jury could have believed that he fired
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the fatal shot, especially where the jury could have inferred from other evidence that Davis' shot, the first
shot, may have just hit Wright in the hand and not the head. Viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have determined that the essential elements of
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748 (1992).
More importantly, we note that Dillard could have been found guilty on an aiding and abetting
theory as opposed to being found guilty as the principal. There was ample evidence to support his
conviction as an aider and abettor. Dillard ignores this aspect of the case in its entirety when making his
argument on appeal.
V
Dillard also argues that his sentence of twenty-five to forty years' imprisonment was
disproportionate and amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree.
A sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the
offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). It is
therefore appropriate for the sentencing court to review the nature of the offense and the background of
the offender. Id. at 651. A sentence that falls within the sentencing guidelines is presumptively proper
and proportionate. People v Fisher, 442 Mich 560, 582; 503 NW2d 50 (1993); People v Albert,
207 Mich App 73, 75; 523 NW2d 825 (1994). Only in unusual circumstances will a sentence falling
within the guidelines be determined to be disproportionate. Milbourn, supra at 651.
The sentencing guideline range in this case for this offense was ten to twenty-five years.
Although it was at the highest end, Dillard's sentence clearly falls within the guidelines. Dillard has failed
to articulate any mitigating or unusual circumstances that would lead to a finding that this presumptively
proper sentence was disproportionate. In addition, we note that at the time of sentencing, the trial court
considered the proper criteria. The sentence was proportionate to the offense and the offender and we
will not remand for resentencing. Moreover, because the sentence was proportionate in relation to the
crime, it is not cruel or unusual. People v Williams, 198 Mich App 537, 543; 499 NW2d 404 (1993).
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ William B. Murphy
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