GREAT LAKES WINDOW INC V THERMAL PLUS ENERGY SAVER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GREAT LAKES WINDOW, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
February 17, 1998
Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellee,
v
No. 193672
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No 94-483357-CZ
THERMAL PLUS ENERGY SAVER, INC., BLUE
WATER DOORS AND WINDOW PLUS, INC.,
THERMAL SHIELD, FRED MEKLED, FRANK
HARLEY d/b/a HARLEY HOME
IMPROVEMENTS, CUSTOM VINYL
WINDOWS, JAMES CALVIN, III d/b/a
CONTRACTORS VINYL WINDOWS, J.W.S.
TECHNOLOGY, INC. d/b/a JOHN’S WEATHER
SEAL,
Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellants.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Saad and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal by leave granted from two circuit court orders which granted summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) in favor of plaintiff on defendants’ counter-complaint, and
denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration. We reverse and remand.
Defendants first claim that the trial court erred in dismissing their counterclaim for breach of
express and implied warranties contained in their second amended counterclaim (and denying their
motion for reconsideration of that ruling). Defendants contend that the allegations in the counterclaim
were sufficiently pleaded to give notice to plaintiff of the cause of action asserted. We agree.
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MCR 2.111 provides that a counterclaim must contain “a statement of the facts, without
repetition, on which the pleader relies in stating the cause of action, with the specific allegations
necessary reasonably to inform the adverse party of the nature of the claims the adverse party is called
on to defend.” In Michigan, a complaint or counterclaim must provide reasonable notice to the
opposing party of the allegations against which one must defend. See Dacon v Transue, 441 Mich
315, 329; 490 NW2d 369 (1992). Here, defendants’ second amended counterclaim was pleaded with
sufficient specificity to place plaintiff on notice of the warranty claims it must defend, and the defects at
issue. The details which plaintiff contends are lacking in the pleadings may be obtained through
discovery.
Defendants also argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their breach of contract claims and
denying their motion for reconsideration. We agree. Although defendants included a breach of contract
claim in their initial counterclaim, the trial court found that it was insufficiently pleaded to withstand a
motion for summary disposition; so defendants were permitted to amend to provide factual support for
their allegations. However, in their second amended counterclaim, defendants altogether omitted the
claim, and the trial court then denied their request to amend their pleadings for the third time. Although
the pleadings failed to include the label “breach of contract,” this oversight caused no prejudice and is
easily amended. The pleading itself provided adequate notice of defendant’s breach of contract theory.
Finally, defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to
amend their pleadings to allow them an opportunity to more sufficiently plead the breach of warranty
claim and to reallege the breach of contract claim. For the reasons already articulated, this issue is moot
on appeal. The trial court’s grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) is reversed.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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