PEOPLE OF MI V LEONARD ANTWANE WILBURN JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 30, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 200502
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 96-000818-FC
LEONARD ANTWANE WILBURN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Sawyer and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Leonard Antwane Wilburn, Jr., was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to
murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The jury found that defendant, who was the passenger in one
moving vehicle, fired several shots at a second moving vehicle driven by the victim with the intent to kill
him. The victim had a small bullet fragment embedded in his shoulder as a result of the incident, but was
not seriously injured. However, the victim’s vehicle was considered a complete loss due to the
shattered windows and bullet holes. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court as an habitual offender,
second offense, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, to two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm followed
by a life sentence for assault with intent to murder. We affirm defendant’s convictions but remand for
resentencing.
I
Defendant first claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenge of a juror
for cause based upon the juror’s admitted racial prejudice. MCR 2.511(D) provides several grounds
for a challenge for cause, such as when the person: “(3) is biased for or against a party or attorney; (4)
shows a state of mind that will prevent the person from rendering a just verdict, or has formed a positive
opinion on the facts of the case or on what the outcome should be; [or] (5) has opinions or
conscientious scruples that would improperly influence the person’s verdict.” A juror who expresses an
opinion referring to some circumstance of the case which is not positive in character, but swears that he
can render an impartial verdict, may not be challenged for cause. People v Roupe, 150 Mich App
469, 474389 NW2d 449 (1986). The challenging party bears the burden of proving bias or prejudice.
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Id. The trial court’s decision on a challenge for cause will be reversed only where this Court finds a
clear abuse of discretion. People v Skinner, 153 Mich App 815, 819; 396 NW2d 548 (1986).
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors whether any of them harbored
racial prejudice or bias against African-Americans. One juror raised his hand and reluctantly admitted
that he felt racial prejudice as the result of his upbringing. Defense counsel asked that the juror be
excused for cause on that basis. After further questioning by the trial court, the juror indicated that he
was eighty to eighty-five percent certain that he could act impartially in this case despite his prejudice.
The court denied defendant’s challenge for cause because MCR 2.511(D)(5) states that it is only
grounds for a challenge for cause that the juror had opinions or conscientious scruples that absolutely
“would,” as opposed to that “might” or “could,” improperly influence his verdict. The trial court’s
denial of defendant’s challenge for cause was a clear abuse of discretion. The juror candidly admitted
that he could not completely set aside his racial prejudice. Even if the juror promised to do his best, it is
unlikely that he could truly disregard the feelings of racial prejudice that had been engrained in him since
childhood. Because the indicia of the juror’s impartiality did not outweigh his stated racial bias, the
court abused its discretion. Roupe, supra, 150 Mich App at 474-475.
A four-part test is used to determine whether an error in refusing a challenge for cause merits
reversal. There must be a clear and independent showing on the record that (1) the court improperly
denied a challenge for cause, (2) the aggrieved party exhausted all peremptory challenges, (3) the party
demonstrated a desire to excuse another subsequently summoned juror, and (4) the juror whom the
party wished to later excuse was objectionable. People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 248-249; 537
NW2d 333 (1995). Here, the first prong of the test was satisfied. However, defendant failed to satisfy
the second prong by exhausting all of his peremptory challenges. Defendant was entitled to five
peremptory challenges under MCR 6.412(E), but used only four. Under the circumstances, defendant
had no reason for not peremptorily challenging the juror after his request to have the juror removed for
cause was denied. At that point defendant had not used any of his peremptory challenges. Moreover,
at the conclusion of voir dire, defense counsel stated that defendant was pleased with the jury panel.
Therefore, reversal is not warranted in this case.
II
Defendant claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury which is representative
of a fair cross section of the community because there were only two African-Americans in the jury
array of forty-two. A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community. Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 527; 95 S Ct 692; 42 L Ed 2d 690
(1975). Id. In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the
defendant must show
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2)
that the representation of this group in venires from which jurors are selected is not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that
this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in
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the jury-selection process. [Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364; 99 S Ct 664; 58 L
Ed 2d 587 (1979); People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 473;
552 NW2d 593 (1996).]
Questions of systematic exclusions of minorities from venires are reviewed de novo by this Court.
Hubbard, supra at 472.
The first prong of the Duren test is satisfied in this case because the group alleged to be
excluded, African-Americans, are considered a constitutionally cognizable group in considering whether
the fair-cross-section requirement has been met. Hubbard, supra at 473. However, defendant did not
satisfy the second prong by showing that the representation of African-Americans in venires from which
jurors are selected in Berrien County was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such
persons in the community. Defendant did not provide statistical information regarding the racial
composition of Berrien County, nor did defendant provide information regarding what percent of the
Berrien County venires were comprised of African-Americans. Therefore, it is impossible for this Court
to determine whether the representation of African-Americans in the venires was fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of African-Americans in the community. Furthermore, the fact that nineteen
jurors were legitimately excused or failed to appear has no bearing on the fairness of the jury selection
system used by the county. Although the trial court expressed its belief that a decrease in the number of
“no-shows” generally improved the racial composition of the venire, the fact that some individuals have
a legitimate excuse or simply fail to appear for jury duty does not constitute systematic exclusion.
III
Defendant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s request
for a substitution of appointed counsel. After the court began the jury voir dire, defendant asked the
court for substitution of his appointed counsel on the ground that he did not believe that counsel was
going to fight for his case because he told defendant that he was “already in a losing battle.” The court
denied defendant’s request because defendant failed to state a specific reason to support his request.
Although an indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment of a lawyer at the public expense, he is not
entitled to a substitution of appointed counsel except upon a showing of good cause and where
substitution will not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process. People v Mack, 190 Mich App 7, 14;
475 NW2d 830 (1991); People v Tucker, 181 Mich App 246, 255; 448 NW2d 811 (1989). Good
cause exists where a legitimate difference of opinion exists between a defendant and his appointed
counsel regarding a fundamental trial tactic. Id. However, a defendant’s claim that he lacks confidence
in his attorney, without the support of a substantial reason, does not amount to good cause, particularly
where the request is belated. Id. The trial court’s denial of a request for a new attorney is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Mack, supra at 14.
Even if defense counsel expressed his concern regarding the strength of defendant’s case, there
is no indication on the record that defense counsel did not provide defendant with zealous
representation. Defendant did not claim that he and defense counsel disagreed on a fundamental trial
tactic, but merely expressed a lack of confidence in counsel’s commitment to his case. Defense
counsel’s statement that defendant was in a losing battle does not constitute a “substantial reason” for
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substitution of counsel, particularly when jury voir dire has already commenced. Therefore, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s request for substitute counsel.
IV
Finally, defendant claims that his sentence was disproportionate. The sentencing of an habitual
offender is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Cervantes, 448 Mich 620, 627; 532 NW2d
831 (1995). A sentencing court abuses its discretion when it violates the principle of proportionality.
People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636, 654; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
At the time of trial, nineteen-year-old defendant had only been convicted of one felony—
attempted carrying of a concealed weapon. Defendant had three juvenile offenses as well as three adult
misdemeanors, but none of them were violent in nature. However, at the time of his sentencing,
defendant had pending charges for assault with intent to murder, armed robbery, first-degree home
invasion and felony-firearm. Therefore, there was an indication that the severity and violent nature of
defendant’s criminal activity were escalating. A sentencing judge may consider a defendant’s juvenile
record when determining a sentence. People v Smith, 437 Mich 293; 470 NW2d 70 (1991). A court
may also consider pending criminal charges against the defendant provided the defendant is given the
opportunity to test the accuracy of the allegations. People v Ewing (After Remand), 435 Mich 443,
446 (Brickley, J), 473-474 (Boyle, J); 458 NW2d 880 (1990).
In this case, the trial court explicitly stated that it was not considering defendant’s juvenile
record or pending charges in determining defendant’s sentence. As a result, defendant was not given an
opportunity to rebut or explain the serious charges pending against him as required by Ewing. The
crimes for which defendant was convicted in this case were very serious and warranted a severe
penalty. In sentencing defendant to life, the court improperly considered defendant’s “parental
upbringing.” Although a court may generally consider a defendant’s social and personal history in
determining the sentence, People v Ross, 145 Mich App 483, 495; 378 NW2d 517 (1985), the court
may not hold the defendant culpable for the criminal behavior of his parents or family members. In this
case, the court improperly sentenced defendant to life because it did not believe that there was any hope
that defendant could be rehabilitated in light of the fact that he had been raised by parents who both
engaged in long-term patterns of criminal activity. While we are not convinced that the sentence
imposed is necessarily disproportionate, neither are we satisfied by the reasons given to justify the
sentence. Accordingly, we believe that defendant is entitled to be resentenced without consideration of
the inappropriate factors.
Defendant’s convictions are affirmed, but his sentence is vacated and we remand for
resentencing.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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