IN RE EST OF RAYMOND BURGIN DEC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Estate of RAYMOND BURGIN, Deceased.
__________________________________________
FLORENCE M. BLOUGH and JERRY H. PELKY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 23, 1998
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
BERNICE YOUNG, Personal Representative of the
Estate of RAYMOND BURGIN, deceased,
No. 196327
Muskegon Probate
LC No. 94-068951-CH
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs sued to foreclose a mortgage on property in the estate of Raymond Burgin. The lower
court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiffs
appeal as of right. We reverse and remand.
We are called upon once again to resolve a dispute arising from the Diamond Mortgage
Corporation/A.J. Obie & Associates, Inc., mortgage-backed securities fraud.1 In this case, decedent
Raymond Burgin and Ida Burgin executed and delivered to Diamond a promissory note, secured by a
mortgage on their home, in the amount of $10,500, in the expectation that they would receive a loan for
the same amount. Diamond, however, without ever disbursing the loan funds to the Burgins, assigned
the note and mortgage to plaintiffs, Florence Blough and Jerry Pelky, for face value. The mortgage was
recorded with the Muskegon County Register of Deeds, and plaintiffs received only a single payment
under the loan and mortgage agreement.
Subsequently, decedent Raymond Burgin died intestate, his wife having predeceased him. An
independent probate estate was filed in Muskegon Probate Court, and defendant Bernice Young was
appointed the independent personal representative of the estate. Pursuant to her powers as estate
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representative, defendant, on May 31, 1994, without knowledge of the recorded mortgage, contracted
with Ronald and Susan Kroll to sell the decedent’s property which was implicated by the mortgage.
During a title search, however, conducted pursuant to the sales contract, defendant discovered the
outstanding mortgage on the property in plaintiffs’ favor. On March 20, 1995, defendant notified
plaintiffs of her intention to rescind the underlying credit transaction pursuant to the federal Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), 15 USC 1601 et seq. Plaintiffs brought suit to foreclose the mortgage.
We review de novo a trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition, Pinckney
Community Schools v Continental Casualty Co, 213 Mich App 521, 525; 540 NW2d 748 (1995),
by examining the record in the same manner as must the trial court to determine whether the movant was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 398; 541 NW2d 566
(1995).
Plaintiffs raise several contentions of error concerning the lower court’s decision to grant
summary disposition in favor of defendant, but we find that only one is meritorious. Plaintiffs argue that
the trial court erred in finding that defendant’s right to rescind the underlying credit transaction endured
after defendant contracted to sell the implicated property to the Krolls. We agree.
As a starting point, TILA § 1635(a) provides that an obligor retains a right to rescind credit
transactions like the one involved in this case; however, the right to rescind is not unlimited. Particularly,
Regulation z of the Federal Reserve Board provides, inter alia, that the consumer’s right to rescind
expires upon sale of the property, 12 CFR 226.23(a)(3), and TILA § 1635(f) states that “[a]n
obligor’s right to rescind shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or
upon the sale of the property, which ever occurs first.” Plaintiffs cite Hefferman v Bitton, 882 F2d
379, 383-384 (CA 9, 1989), in support of their argument that the sales contract with the Krolls
terminated any right to rescind that defendant might have had under the TILA.
In Hefferman, the federal court held that in order to properly rescinded a credit transaction, the
consumer must send notice of her intention to rescind before contracting to sell her property.
Hefferman, supra at 384. The court stated that it believed the “sale” that TILA § 1635(f) establishes
as a cutoff to rescission occurs when the consumer irrevocably agrees to sell the property, not upon the
ultimate conveyance of the property. Id.
Defendant argues that the language in Hefferman on which plaintiffs rely is nonbinding dicta
because the federal court had already concluded, on a different ground, that the consumer had no right
to rescission. We disagree. The federal court posited the portion of the Hefferman decision discussing
the timing of the rescission as an alternative basis for ruling against the consumer and, in so doing, stated,
“we hold that [the consumer] should have sent notice [of her intention to rescind] before contracting to
sell the property.” Hefferman, supra at 384 (emphasis added). This is not the language of dicta.
Further, Hefferman is a federal case construing federal law, and we are bound by authoritative holdings
of federal courts on federal questions when there is no conflict. Kocsis v Pierce, 192 Mich App 92,
98; 480 NW2d 598 (1991). Because we have found that no other federal court has addressed this
aspect of the TILA, we must follow the Hefferman decision.
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The lower court attempted to distinguish Hefferman from the case at bar in several respects. In
Hefferman, the lender had disbursed the funds of the credit transaction to the consumer. Hefferman,
supra at 380. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Diamond never disbursed the funds of the loan to
the decedent. In Hefferman, the consumer had knowledge of the previous credit transaction and
security interest involving her property when she contracted to sell the property. Id. at 380. In the
instant case, defendant claims to have had no knowledge of the mortgage and lien that had attached to
the property until a title search, conducted pursuant to the contract to sell the property, revealed the
existence of the encumbrance. However, these differences are insufficient to render Hefferman
inapplicable to the instant case because the policy considerations supporting the Hefferman decision do
not hinge on such distinctions. The federal court in Hefferman stated the following respecting its
holding:
Congress probably enacted § 1635(f) because it worried that allowing a
consumer to rescind after selling his residence would cloud property titles and inhibit
transactions. Terminating the right to rescind when the consumer irrevocably agrees to
sell the property fulfills this policy better than terminating the right upon the actual
conveyance. Allowing consumers to rescind or attempt to rescind after entering such a
contract implicates the rights of the purchaser and his financing agency and could
produce needless litigation and other difficulties. Although [the consumer] may have
concealed the attempted rescission from [the buyers], or informed them of her intentions
but assuaged their doubts by paying the lenders in full at the conveyance, some sellers
might attempt to extract an advantage from their buyers. By threatening to rescind, for
example, they might attempt to impede, delay, or abort a sale or to exact tribute from a
buyer who worries that the original creditor, if not paid, may demand payment at a later
date, a possibility that might cause the buyer’s banker to withdraw his loan commitment.
If the cutoff for rescission occurs upon the contract to sell, however, these possibilities
will be eliminated and all buyers will know exactly what they are facing. [Id. at 384
(citation omitted).]
As is readily seen, the federal court in Hefferman interpreted the term “sale” in TILA § 1635(f)
as it did, not to protect the creditor or the consumer, but rather to protect the buyer of property
implicated by a security interest which results from a credit transaction. The danger of a contrary
interpretation is highlighted by examining the affidavit of the prospective buyer of the subject property in
the case at bar, Ronald Kroll. Kroll avers that he and his wife contracted to buy the subject property
from defendant on or about May 31, 1994. Kroll claims that after they contracted, defendant informed
him that a mortgage had been discovered on the property that defendant wanted to avoid paying. After
several extensions of the purchase contract, Kroll alleges, defendant informed Kroll that the contract
had terminated and refunded Kroll’s earnest money deposit. As of the date of the affidavit, however,
Kroll maintained that defendant did not properly terminate the contract and that he and his wife “have at
all times been ready, willing and able” to purchase the subject property. It is this type of buyer discord,
and resulting potential for litigation that the federal court in Hefferman sought to prevent.
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Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in finding that defendant’s right of rescission
endured after she contracted to sell the subject property to the Krolls. We agree with the remaining
portions of the lower court’s decision.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
See Franck v Bedenfield, 197 Mich App 316; 494 NW2d 840 (1992); Meretta v Peach, 195
Mich App 695; 491 NW2d 278 (1992); Kocsis v Pierce, 192 Mich App 92; 480 NW2d 598
(1991); Thoms v Leja, 187 Mich App 418; 468 NW2d 58 (1991); Mox v Jordan, 186 Mich App
42; 463 NW2d 114 (1990); Elsner v Albrecht, 185 Mich App 72; 460 NW2d 232 (1990); People v
Greenberg, 176 Mich App 296; 439 NW2d 336 (1989); Thomas v State Mortgage, Inc, 176 Mich
App 157; 439 NW2d 299 (1989); People v Mitchell, 175 Mich App 83; 437 NW2d 304 (1989).
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