DOUGLAS CRAIG V WINDY HUDSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DOUGLAS CRAIG and FREIDA CRAIG,
UNPUBLISHED
December 30, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 200193
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-498551-DC
WINDY HUDSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Saad and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right an August, 1996, order granting joint legal custody of defendant’s
minor child to plaintiffs and defendant for a period not to exceed four years with physical custody of the
child to plaintiffs and visitation to defendant. We affirm.
The minor child was born to defendant and Rodney Hudson in April, 1990. Defendant and
Hudson were married approximately six months later. Plaintiffs are the child’s paternal grandparents.1
In March, 1992, Hudson, who was in the Marine Corps, was killed in a helicopter crash while on duty
in Somalia. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs began caring for the child on a continuous basis.
In December, 1994, plaintiffs were appointed the child’s temporary guardians by the probate
court. In June, 1995, and shortly before the guardianship expired, plaintiffs filed in circuit court a third
party complaint for custody of the child. Later that same month, the circuit court entered an order
awarding legal and physical custody of the child to plaintiffs pending further order of the court and
staying the guardianship proceedings in the probate court pending the outcome of the child custody
dispute. Defendant subsequently moved in circuit court for summary disposition to terminate both the
third-party custody case and the temporary guardianship. In May, 1996, the circuit court appointed a
guardian ad litem for the child. In June, 1996, the guardian ad litem filed with the court a proposed plan
recommending, in relevant part, that plaintiffs have physical custody of and defendant visitation with the
child. A custody hearing was set for August, 1996.
In July, 1996, a pretrial hearing was held. During this hearing, the parties agreed to meet with
the circuit court off the record in the court’s chambers without their attorneys for the purpose of settling
-1
the custody dispute. After this meeting, the court indicated on the record that the parties had basically
agreed to the guardian ad litem’s plan and that the court was going to treat the matter as a temporary
custody situation with the goal being the eventual reunification of defendant and her child. The August
order that is the subject of this appeal was purportedly entered in conformance with the court’s ruling at
the July hearing.
On appeal, defendant contends that the custody “settlement agreement” is not binding because
“substantial questions exist with respect to whether there was truly consent to the substance of any
agreement.” It is true that parties must, in fact, consent to an agreement before the agreement will
become effective. Howard v Howard, 134 Mich App 391, 397; 352 NW2d 280 (1984). However,
we must also bear in mind that this is a custody case. The parties in a child custody case do not have
the power to control the determination of custody by agreement. Koron v Melendy, 207 Mich App
188, 191; 523 NW2d 870 (1994). Rather, the determination of child custody rests in the discretion of
the court. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 880; 526 NW2d 889 (1994); Koron, supra. The trial
court is not bound by the parties’ stipulation or agreements regarding child custody. Sivorvey v
Campbell, 223 Mich App 59, 82; 565 NW2d 857 (1997); Koron, supra at 191. However, neither is
the court precluded from accepting the parties’ agreement and including it in the orders of the court.
Koron, supra. In cases where the parties are in agreement regarding custody and visitation and present
the court with such an agreement, the trial court need not expressly articulate each of the best interest
factors. Id. at 192. Implicit in the court’s acceptance of the parties’ agreement is its determination that
the arrangement is in the child’s best interest. Id.
In this case, our review of the record indicates that parties did, in fact, agree to the guardian ad
litem’s written plan and the goal of reunifying defendant and her child as soon as possible with four years
being an outer boundary for reunification. Our review further indicates that the August order as entered
correctly reflects the agreement of the parties. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not
commit clear legal error on a major issue. York v Morofsky, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___
(Docket No. 188845, issued 9/12/97), slip op p 1. Implicit in the court’s acceptance of the plan, as
agreed to by the parties, was its determination that the plan was in the child’s best interest. Koran,
supra. We therefore conclude that the court’s ultimate dispositional custody ruling did not constitute a
palpable abuse of discretion. Id.
Finally, there is no basis in the record for finding that plaintiffs’ guardianship was a statutory
limited guardianship. Thus, we reject defendant’s argument that plaintiffs’ temporary guardianship did
not give plaintiffs standing to initiate a custody dispute. See In re Ramon, 208 Mich App 610, 614
615; 528 NW2d 831 (1995).
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
-2
1
Mr. Craig was Hudson’s stepfather.
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.