IN RE TREVOR CARRIS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________________________
In the Matter of JAYMZ CARRIS, KIMBERLIE
CARRIS, and TREVOR CARRIS, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 1997
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 201564
Jackson Juvenile Court
LC No. 96-018762 NA
RAEMONDA CARRIS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JIM ROGERS, LARRY HULL and JACK
CHOATE, III,
Respondents.
__________________________________________
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 201761
Jackson Juvenile Court
LC No. 96-018762 NA
LARRY VERNE HULL,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
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RAEMONDA CARRIS, JIM ROGERS and JACK
CHOATE, III,
Respondents.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Markman and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 201564, respondent Raemonda Carris (respondent-mother) appeals as of right
from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). In Docket No. 201761,
respondent Larry Hull (respondent-father) appeals as of right from the juvenile court order terminating
his parental rights to Trevor Carris under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (h); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (h). We affirm in both cases. This case is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
With regard to respondent-mother, the juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that the
statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Miller, 433
Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 471-473; 564 NW2d
156 (1997). Termination of respondent-mother’s rights was appropriate under § 3(c)(i) because she
failed to participate in therapy that was necessary to enable her to provide proper care for the children.
Respondent-mother was not required to have custody of the children in order for the court to find that
the conditions that caused the court to assume jurisdiction continued to exist and that there was no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable amount of time.
Termination of respondent-mother’s rights was also appropriate under §§ 3(g) and (j) given that
she had neglected the children in their emotional, medical, and educational needs. Because she did not
complete the goals of her treatment plan, it was likely that the children would be harmed or neglected in
the future if returned to her care. Furthermore, respondent-mother was provided with adequate
services by petitioner to assist her in working to regain custody of the children, but she either failed to
take advantage of the services offered or failed to show the necessary improvement in her parenting
skills. She was also given adequate time to work on the goals of her treatment plan.
Respondent-mother also argues that the juvenile court improperly shifted the burden of proof
onto her to establish what was in the children’s best interests. We disagree. The juvenile court only
noted the absence of evidence produced by respondent-mother that termination was clearly not in the
children’s best interests. The court then had a mandatory duty to terminate respondent-mother’s rights
since she did not rebut the statutory presumption found at MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5). In re Hall-Smith, supra at 472-473. This procedure
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did not involve a shifting in the burden of proof, but only in the burden of production. In re Hamlet,
___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 198096, issued 9/26/97, slip op at 19-22).
With regard to respondent-father’s rights, the juvenile court did not clearly err in terminating his
rights under § 3(h) because he was incarcerated and not eligible for parole for at least two years. While
incarcerated, respondent-father failed to provide a viable plan for the child’s care. While he offered his
relatives as a possible placement at the termination hearing, there was no evidence that his relatives
would have agreed to care for the child. The juvenile court was not required to place the child with a
relative. People v McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
Similarly, respondent-father’s failure to provide for the child’s care in the past and his
incarceration supported termination of his rights under §§ 3(g) and (c)(i). In re Jackson, 199 Mich
App 22, 25-26; 501 NW2d 182 (1993); In re Systma, 197 Mich App 453, 457; 495 NW2d 804
(1992). Termination of respondent-father’s rights was appropriate under § 3(a)(ii) because he had not
sought custody of the child for at least ninety-one days before he wrote to the court in November 1996
regarding Trevor. In re Mayfield, 198 Mich App 226, 230, 235; 497 NW2d 578 (1993).
Respondent-father also argues that the juvenile court e
rred in terminating his parental rights
when he was not offered services by petitioner and, therefore, could not complete a court-ordered plan
for treatment. Respondent-father was not offered services as a result of his incarceration and his lack of
involvement with his child. His rights were not terminated for the reason that he did not seek treatment
or complete a court-ordered treatment plan. We, therefore, do not find error with the juvenile court’s
decision to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights. The caseworker was not required to observe
respondent-father with the child to assess his fitness as a parent since the facts of this case did not
involve a question over the quality of respondent-father’s care, but rather his failure to provide any care
or support for the child.
Respondent-father also argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that termination of his rights
was in the child’s best interests. The juvenile court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. In re HallSmith, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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