PEOPLE OF MI V BODIE J DAVIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 198578
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-000735
BODIE J. DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Sawyer and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548,
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).
Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first-degree premeditated murder conviction and
two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right, and we
affirm.
Both issues raised on appeal involve the lower court’s refusal to suppress a statement given by
defendant to the police. First defendant contends that the statement was inadmissible because police
lacked probable cause to arrest him and, therefore, the statement was the fruit of an illegal arrest without
a warrant. We disagree.
Appellate review of a lower court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence is made
under the clearly erroneous standard. People v Malach, 202 Mich App 266, 276; 507 NW2d 834
(1993); People v O’Neal, 167 Mich App 274, 279: 421 NW2d 662 (1988). A lower court’s finding
will be found to be clearly erroneous only where, although there is evidence to support the ruling, the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
In People v Lewis, 160 Mich App 20, 24; 408 NW2d 94 (1987), this Court recognized that
“when a defendant is detained or taken into custody by the police acting without a warrant, the
detention is illegal unless the police have probable cause to arrest that defendant.” Further, “when an
unlawful detention has been employed as a tool to directly procure any type of evidence from a detainee
such evidence shall be excluded as the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Malach, supra at 274. Thus,
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whether the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was proper turns upon whether there existed
probable cause to arrest defendant. We hold that the trial court properly determined that the police had
probable cause to arrest defendant.
In reviewing a claim that a police officer lacked probable cause to arrest, the reviewing court
must determine whether facts available to the officer at the moment of arrest would justify a fair-minded
person of average intelligence in believing that the suspected person had committed a felony. People v
Oliver, 111 Mich App 734, 747; 314 NW2d 740 (1981). There must be an actual belief in the mind
of the arresting officer; mere suspicion is insufficient. People v O’Neal, 167 Mich App 274, 281; 421
NW2d 662 (1988). Each case must be analyzed in light of the particular facts confronting the arresting
officer. Oliver, supra. The prosecution has the burden of establishing that an arrest without a warrant
is supported by probable cause. O’Neal, supra.
In this case, the facts available to the police pointed to defendant as the perpetrator of the
offense. Officer Kirk testified that Carla, the victim’s girl friend, told him that in the fifteen minutes
preceding the shooting, the victim was traveling to defendant’s house to discuss why defendant was
angry with him. At 12:45 a.m. the victim was on his way to defendant’s; the shooting was at
approximately 1:00 a.m. It was also known that some sort of “feud” was ongoing between the victim
and defendant. Witness Hughes gave a statement to the police that there was a disturbance in front of
defendant’s house near the time of the shooting. The shooting occurred near defendant’s home and the
area of the disturbance. After reviewing the foregoing information, Kirk believed that defendant was
involved in the fatal shooting.
We conclude that the foregoing facts were sufficient to create an honest belief that defendant
had committed the felony. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in its finding that there was
probable cause to arrest defendant for the murder.
Defendant also challenges the trial court’s finding that the statement was voluntary and
admissible. An appellate court must give deference to the trial court’s findings in a suppression hearing.
People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 29-30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). “Although engaging in a de novo
review of the entire record . . . , this Court will not disturb a trial court’s factual findings regarding a
knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda [v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694
(1966)] rights ‘unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.’” Id.
Whether a suspect has validly waived his Miranda rights depends in each case on the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Cheatham, supra at 27. In Cheatham, the Supreme
Court stated that the totality of the circumstances approach
permits—indeed, it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation. This includes evaluation of the [suspect’s] age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the
warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of
waiving those rights. [Id. at 27.]
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The burden is on the state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the suspect properly
waived his rights. Id. To establish a valid waiver, the state must present sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the defendant knew he had the right not to speak, that he had the right to an attorney
and that the state could use what he said in a later trial against him. Id. at 29. In Cheatham, the
Supreme Court recognized that
[t]he test is not whether [the defendant] made an intelligent decision in the sense that it
was wise or smart to admit his participation in the crime, but whether his decision was
made with the full understanding that he need say nothing at all and that he might then
consult with a lawyer if he so desired. [Id.]
With respect to the testimony that was presented at the Walker1 hearing, the testimony of the
two witnesses, Police Officer Quick and defendant, was diametrically opposed. Quick’s testimony
established that defendant understood his rights and that he thereafter voluntarily gave a statement.
Defendant’s testimony to the contrary was inherently incredible in all respects. The question of
voluntariness ultimately boiled down to credibility. The trial court rejected defendant’s version of the
events in its entirety. The trial court’s assessment of defendant’s credibility was sound and, therefore,
should be left undisturbed. People v Oliver, 111 Mich App 734, 750-751; 314 NW2d 740 (1981).
The trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress was not clearly erroneous.
Finally, in his supplemental brief, defendant raises a hearsay issue. In light of the admission of
his inculpatory statement, we conclude that even if the statement is hearsay, it is harmless.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
1
People v Walker, 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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