PEOPLE OF MI V TERRANCE L HARRIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 5, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 195515
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-009583
TERRANCE L. HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The trial
court sentenced defendant to mandatory life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction and a
term of two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm.
On appeal, defendant argues that Quinittia Davis’ in-court identification was tainted by a pretrial
identification procedure that was unduly suggestive and conducted in violation of his right to counsel.
Because defendant did not challenge the propriety of Davis’ pretrial identification in the trial court, or
object to her in-court identification at trial, appellate review of this issue is precluded absent manifest
injustice. See People v Whitfield, 214 Mich App 348, 351; 543 NW2d 347 (1995). Even if a
pretrial identification is improperly conducted, a witness’ in-court identification will still be permitted if an
independent basis for the identification can be established. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303
(Griffin, J.), 318 (Boyle, J.); 505 NW2d 528 (1993), cert den 510 US 1058 (1994).
In the present case, the testimony at trial established that defendant was not a stranger to
Quinittia Davis. On the contrary, Davis testified that she knew defendant from the neighborhood and
saw defendant on a daily basis and on more than one hundred separate occasions during the months
immediately preceding the charged offense. Because Davis’ testimony sufficiently established an
independent basis for her in-court identification of defendant, we conclude that manifest injustice has not
been shown.
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We also reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
suppress Davis’ in-court identification. Counsel was not required to argue a frivolous or meritless
motion. People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411, 425; 564 NW2d 149 (1997).
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress
Donald Williams’ in-court identification. However, this claim is premised on the factual assertion that
Williams picked the wrong person out of a police line-up, and was then told by the police to pick
defendant. We have reviewed the record and find that it does not factually support defendant’s claim.
Although the attorney who presided over the line-up testified that it was her impression that Williams
had selected someone other than defendant, the attorney never testified that the police told Williams
which person to select, nor did she testify that the line-up itself was either unduly suggestive or unfairly
conducted. Therefore, defendant’s claim is without merit.
Next, defendant maintains that the prosecutor deliberately injected prejudicial insinuations and
innuendo during his examination of Quinittia Davis, thereby requiring reversal under the holding of
People v Whalen, 390 Mich 672; 213 NW2d 116 (1973). We disagree. Whalen instructs that it is
improper for a prosecutor to deliberately inject prejudicial insinuations or questions regarding irrelevant
matters, or to engage in personal attacks of a defense witness. See id. at 684-686. A review of the
challenged line of questioning reveals that the prosecutor was attempting to elicit testimony from
Quinittia Davis, a prosecution witness, regarding a possible motive for the offense. Evidence of motive
is always relevant in a murder case. People v Mihalko, 306 Mich 356, 361; 10 NW2d 914 (1943).
Also, Davis had testified that, upon seeing defendant, she tried to get Tirrell’s attention by waving her
arms and calling out Tirrell’s name. Through his questioning, the prosecutor was carefully attempting to
elicit an explanation for this conduct without causing Davis to offer a response that could be considered
hearsay. We are satisfied that the prosecutor’s questions did not prejudice defendant’s right to a fair
trial. See People v Minor, 213 Mich App 682, 689; 541 NW2d 576 (1995).
Next, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding certain hearsay
statements made by Donald Williams and Quinittia Davis to the police. We find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion because the statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule. See MRE 803(2); People v Kowalak (On Remand), 215 Mich App 554, 558; 546
NW2d 681 (1996). Each of the statements arose from the fatal shooting of Rahkine Tirrell, a startling
event, and related to the circumstances of that event. Moreover, the officers’ testimony established that
Williams and Davis were still under the stress of excitement caused by the event when the statements
were made. See People v Straight, 430 Mich 418, 424-425; 424 NW2d 257 (1988); Kowalak,
supra at 557-558.
Defendant further contends that his right to a fair trial was jeopardized because these evidentiary
matters were argued in front of the jury. Defendant’s claim is premised on the assumption that the
jurors, through the evidentiary discussions, were improperly exposed to inadmissible evidence.
However, because each of the statements was admissible, defendant was not prejudiced by the
discussions.
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Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Jaafar’s testimony regarding
an anonymous tip. The sole basis for defendant’s objection to this testimony at trial was that it
constituted hearsay. However, the testimony was offered to explain Officer Jaafar’s actions after
receiving the information, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, it was not hearsay.
See MRE 801(c); People v Lewis, 168 Mich App 255, 267; 423 NW2d 637 (1988).
Defendant further argues, for the first time on appeal, that Officer Jaafar should have been
permitted to testify only to the fact that he acted on certain information, without revealing the substance
of the information received. Cases have recognized that it may be improper to admit the content of an
informant’s tip under certain circumstances, even when the tip is offered for a nonhearsay purpose.
See, e.g., People v Wilkins, 408 Mich 69; 288 NW2d 583 (1980). As the Supreme Court explained
in Wilkins, however, admissibility of such evidence is not a question of hearsay, but rather relevancy
under MRE 401, or undue prejudice under MRE 403. Wilkins, supra at 72-73. In this case,
defendant’s objection to the testimony was that it constituted hearsay. Because an objection based on
one ground at trial is insufficient to preserve an appellate attack based on a different ground, People v
Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393, 398; 551 NW2d 478 (1996), defendant’s argument is not preserved for
appellate review. Furthermore, we find that manifest injustice will not result from our failure to review
this issue because the record indicates that the evidence in question was never argued by the
prosecutor, and because the only possible relevancy of the evidence involves the issue of identification
and the prosecutor provided other competent identification evidence through the testimony of Quinittia
Davis and Donald Williams. See Lewis, supra at 268; People v Slaton, 135 Mich App 328, 338;
354 NW2d 326 (1984).
Defendant next argues that a new trial is required because Officer Jaafar testified regarding his
request for an attorney upon being confronted by the police. Defendant contends such testimony
amounts to an impermissible comment on the exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent upon
arrest. However, because the request was made spontaneously, rather than during a custodial
interrogation, and before the police had the opportunity to advise defendant of his Miranda1 rights, it
was not constitutionally protected. See People v Greenwood, 209 Mich App 470, 472; 531 NW2d
771 (1995); People v Schollaert, 194 Mich App 158, 166-167; 486 NW2d 312 (1992).
Furthermore, we reject defendant’s claim that, apart from any constitutional question, Officer
Jaafar’s testimony was erroneously admitted as substantive evidence of his guilt. The record indicates
that the testimony was neither offered, nor argued, as substantive evidence of guilt. Rather, the
testimony came out as part of an unresponsive answer to an otherwise proper question. An
unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question is not grounds for a new trial unless the error is
so egregious that the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way. People v Lumsden, 168 Mich
App 286, 299; 423 NW2d 645 (1988). The test is not whether there were some irregularities, but
whether the defendant received a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 298. In this case, the reference to
defendant’s request for an attorney was fleeting, and the prosecutor did nothing to emphasize it to the
jury. Nor did the prosecutor mention the reference during argument. Accordingly, we conclude that the
reference did not prejudice defendant’s right to a fair trial.
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Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony by Officer Moore to the
effect that he was the only suspect in the case. Defendant claims that such testimony requires reversal
under the holding of People v Humphreys, 24 Mich App 411; 180 NW2d 328 (1970). We disagree.
Humphreys merely advances the well-established rule that it is improper to seek a conviction on the
basis of a police officer’s personal opinion as to the defendant’s guilt. See id. at 418-419. In this case,
Officer Moore did not offer a personal opinion as to defendant’s guilt. Rather, he testified regarding the
results of his police investigation, mentioning that the investigation did not produce any information or
evidence that led to any other suspect. In this context, we conclude that the testimony was not
improper.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Moore to testify as an
expert witness regarding the effectiveness of gun residue testing. We disagree. The determination
regarding the qualification of an expert and admissibility of expert testimony is within the trial court’s
discretion. People v Ray, 191 Mich App 706, 707; 479 NW2d 1 (1991). Because information
regarding the effectiveness of gun residue testing is not within the common knowledge of a layman, it is a
proper subject for expert testimony. Id. at 707-708. Under MRE 702, a witness may be qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. In this case, before the testimony in
question was received, Officer Moore had been questioned by defense counsel about gun residue
testing and was asked to explain the procedure to the jury. He did so, explaining the procedure in
detail. His testimony sufficiently established that he was qualified by knowledge, training, and
experience to testify regarding gun residue testing. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the officer’s subsequent testimony on this subject during the prosecutor’s redirect
examination. Cf. People v Stimage, 202 Mich App 28, 29-30; 507 NW2d 778 (1993); People v
Williams (After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 542; 499 NW2d 404 (1993); Ray, supra.
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court itself questioned Officer
Moore about gun residue. However, defendant did not object to the court’s comments below, and
appellate review is therefore precluded absent manifest injustice. People v Weatherford, 193 Mich
App 115, 121; 483 NW2d 924 (1992). Manifest injustice is not present here because the trial court
was merely seeking to clarify the witness’ testimony, and there is no indication that the questions were
asked in an intimidating or argumentative fashion, or that the questions demonstrated prejudice,
unfairness, or partiality. See People v Conyers, 194 Mich App 395, 404-405; 487 NW2d 787
(1992).
Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish premeditation and
deliberation, two necessary elements of first-degree murder. See People v Haywood, 209 Mich App
217, 229; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). We disagree. The evidence describing the manner in which
defendant approached the victim, the absence of any provocation by the victim, defendant’s use of a
deadly firearm, the number of shots fired, and defendant’s actions in fleeing the scene immediately
afterwards, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of
fact to infer the elements of premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992).
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Next, we reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to
testify during closing argument. Viewed in context, the challenged remarks were not intended to draw
attention to defendant’s failure to testify. Rather, the prosecutor was arguing that the evidence was
uncontradicted because defense counsel’s questions were not evidence. In this context, the
commentary was not improper. See People v Perry, 218 Mich App 520, 538; 554 NW2d 362
(1996).
Finally, defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s remarks about the police line-up. In the
absence of a proper objection, review is precluded unless a curative instruction could not have
eliminated the prejudicial effect or the failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of
justice. People v Nantelle, 215 Mich App 77, 86-87; 544 NW2d 667 (1996). Here, the remarks in
question were responsive to defense counsel’s closing argument and a curative instruction could have
cured any prejudice caused by the remarks. Accordingly, our failure to review this issue will not result
in a miscarriage of justice. See People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 16; 260 NW2d 58 (1977).
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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