ANDREW THOMAS PFOSCH V SECRETARY OF STATE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANDREW THOMAS PFOSCH,
UNPUBLISHED
November 4, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 199431
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-517304-AL
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Griffin and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right the order denying his petition for restoration of his driver’s license. We
affirm.
This case arises from plaintiff’s fourth arrest for drunk driving. Plaintiff was convicted of
operating while impaired (OWI) in 1985, and operating under the influence (OUIL) in 1987 and 1988.
Defendant administratively revoked plaintiff’s driver’s license in 1989, but granted him a restricted
license three years later. After plaintiff’s arrest in 1994, defendant reinstated its prior revocation of
plaintiff’s license. Plaintiff subsequently was convicted of OUIL 3d, formerly MCL 257.625(6)(d);
MSA 9.2325(6)(d). The trial court did not revoke plaintiff’s license. However, after receiving proof of
the conviction, defendant administratively revoked plaintiff’s license pursuant to MCL 257.303(2);
MSA 9.2003(2). Plaintiff thereafter petitioned for restoration of his restricted license. The trial court
denied the petition because, it determined, the court lacked jurisdiction under MCL 257.323(6); MSA
9.2023(6), to reinstate plaintiff’s license.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erroneously determined that it did not have jurisdiction to
grant him equitable relief in the form of a restricted license. We disagree. This Court reviews questions
of subject matter jurisdiction and statutory interpretation de novo. Bruwer v Oaks (On Remand), 218
Mich App 392, 395; 554 NW2d 345 (1996); Heinz v Chicago Road Investment Co, 216 Mich
App 289, 295; 549 NW2d 47 (1996). Const 1963, art VI, § 28 guarantees judicial review of judicial
and quasi-judicial administrative decisions that affect private rights or licenses. However, the
constitution does not guarantee an unencumbered, de novo right to appeal. Rather, the Legislature has
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the authority to control how a person appeals an administrative decision. McAvoy v H B Sherman Co,
401 Mich 419, 442-443; 258 NW2d 414 (1977).
We reject plaintiff’s argument that the circuit court had the authority to grant him a restricted
license because the trial court did not suspend or revoke plaintiff’s license as part of his sentence for
OUIL. The circuit court’s jurisdiction to review defendant’s decision to revoke a license is governed by
MCL 257.323; MSA 9.2023. Prior to the Legislature’s amending of the statute in 1991, the circuit
court had the authority to modify defendant’s decision to revoke a license except under certain limited
circumstances. The court could not modify or set aside a revocation, suspension or denial of a license
when a court ordered it as part of a sentence for a drunk driving violation. This Court recognized this
limitation on the circuit court’s jurisdiction in, among other decisions, Dabrowski v Secretary of State,
201 Mich App 218; 506 NW2d 10 (1993), and Dudley v Secretary of State, 204 Mich App 152;
514 NW2d 167 (1994).
In 1991, the Legislature further limited the circuit court’s jurisdiction by adding MCL
257.323(6); MSA 9.2023(6), which applies in this case. 1991 PA 100. This subsection now provides
as follows:
(6) In reviewing a determination resulting in a denial or revocation under section
303(1)(d), (e), or (f) or section 303(2)(c), (d), (e), or (f), the court shall confine its
consideration to a review of the record prepared pursuant to section 322 or the driving
record created under section 204a, and shall not grant relief pursuant to subsection (3).
The court shall set aside the secretary of state’s determination only if the petitioner’s
substantial rights have been prejudiced because the determination is any of the following:
(a) In violation of the Constitution of the United States, the state constitution of 1963,
or a statute.
(b) In excess of the secretary of state's statutory authority or jurisdiction.
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure resulting in material prejudice to the petitioner.
(d) Not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole
record.
(e) Arbitrary, capricious, or clearly an abuse or unwarranted exercise of discretion.
(f) Affected by other substantial and material error of law.
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The record in this case does not clearly indicate whether defendant revoked plaintiff’s driver’s
license pursuant to MCL 257.303(2)(c); MSA 9.2003(2)(c), or MCL 257.303(2)(f); MSA
9.2003(2)(f). In either case, the outcome remains the same. Upon receipt of the record of
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plaintiff’s convictions, defendant was required to revoke plaintiff’s driver’s license under MCL
257.303(3); MSA 9.2003(3), notwithstanding the lack of a court order. See Matheson v Secretary
of State, 170 Mich App 216, 219; 428 NW2d 31 (1988). Under MCL 257.323(6); MSA
9.2023(6), the circuit court could set aside, not modify, the revocation only if plaintiff’s substantial rights
had been prejudiced in one of the enumerated ways. Rodriguez v Secretary of State, 215 Mich App
481; 546 NW2d 661 (1996). The court did not have jurisdiction to grant plaintiff’s petition to modify
the revocation because of hardship.
We also reject plaintiff’s claim that MCL 257.303; MSA 9.2003, and MCL 257.323; MSA
9.2023, are unconstitutional because they usurp the trial court’s authority to grant equitable relief. The
statutes do not limit the circuit court’s equity jurisdiction. Rather, the court’s equity powers do not
permit review outside of the statute under the circumstances of this case. An appeal to equity is not
alone and by itself sufficient to invoke equity jurisdiction. Ortiz v Textron, Inc, 140 Mich App 242,
244; 363 NW2d 464 (1985). Plaintiff’s petition simply does not state grounds for equity jurisdiction.
See McMillan v Secretary of State, 155 Mich App 399, 403; 399 NW2d 538 (1986).
Further, the Driver’s License Appeal Board did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for an
appeal hearing under MCL 257.322; MSA 9.2022, because defendant had no authority to grant
plaintiff a restricted license on hardship grounds. Defendant was required to revoke plaintiff’s license
when it received proof of his conviction. MCL 257.303(3); MSA 9.2003(3). Defendant may not issue
plaintiff a license until five years after the date of revocation. MCL 257.303(4)(a)(ii); MSA
9.2003(4)(a)(ii); Dudley, supra at 154. Under these circumstances, plaintiff was afforded due process
within the process of conviction. State v Jennings, 150 Ariz 90, 93; 722 P2d 258 (1986).
Affirmed.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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