MICHAEL WASIELEWSKI V PRICE WATERHOUSE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL WASIELEWSKI,
UNPUBLISHED
November 4, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
PRICE WATERHOUSE, LIONEL ENDSLEY, and
MATT SCHUYLER,
No. 195426
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-507767
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Michael J. Kelly and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this employment action alleging handicap discrimination and retaliatory discharge, plaintiff
Michael Wasielewski appeals by right the order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We unanimously affirm the court’s order regarding the retaliation claim; a
majority holds that the court did not err in granting summary disposition regarding the handicap
discrimination claim.
Plaintiff began working for defendant Price Waterhouse in 1980. Price Waterhouse promoted
plaintiff to Office Services Supervisor within two years. At the time of his discharge in 1993, plaintiff’s
job responsibilities included: package handling, mail pickup and delivery, supply purchasing and
maintenance, janitorial services, physical plant maintenance, furniture moving and setting up or packing
up offices.
In 1986, plaintiff suffered a back injury at work. He had surgery in 1991, for which he filed a
worker’s compensation claim. Following his surgery, plaintiff was restricted from engaging in lifting,
pushing, pulling, twisting, turning, and bending. Plaintiff later asked defendants to hire additional staff to
do the required lifting, to replace two assistants who had left. Defendant Matt Schuyler, Personnel
Director, told plaintiff that newly-hired John Truitt would assist with lifting. After Truitt resigned, Price
Waterhouse hired Robert Swihart to perform manual labor tasks that plaintiff could not perform.
Plaintiff reinjured his back in summer, 1993. Plaintiff’s employment ended in November 1993.
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Plaintiff filed suit against Price Waterhouse, Schuyler, and defendant Lionel Endsley, his former
supervisor, alleging that defendants discharged him in retaliation for seeking workers’ compensation
benefits and discriminated against him because of his handicap.1 Plaintiff claims that he was discharged
and that defendants did so with discriminatory intent. Defendants contend that plaintiff chose to leave
after a negative performance review cited plaintiff’s “bad attitude” toward fellow employees. The
circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants.
I.
Plaintiff first contends that the circuit court erred in granting summary disposition on his handicap
discrimination claim because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether defendants failed
to reasonably accommodate his handicap. We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo an order granting a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10).2 Hall v
Hackley Hospital, 210 Mich App 48, 53; 532 NW2d 893 (1995). A motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Id. A court grants a MCR
2.116(C)(10) motion “when, except with regard to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue
regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. This
Court considers the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
A prima facie case under the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA), MCL
37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq., requires a plaintiff to prove that: (1) the plaintiff is
“handicapped” as defined by the HCRA;3 (2) the handicap is unrelated to the plaintiff’s ability to
perform the duties of a particular job; and (3) the employer has discriminated against the plaintiff in one
of the ways enumerated in the HCRA. Id. at 53-54.
Michigan courts previously have interpreted the first two elements of a prima facie case as
requiring the plaintiff to prove either that the plaintiff’s handicap did not interfere with the job or would
not interfere with the job if reasonably accommodated. Id. at 54 n 2. The HCRA provides that an
employer shall accommodate a handicapped employee for employment unless the employer
demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship. MCL 37.1102; MSA
3.550(102).
To sustain a claim under the HCRA, the plaintiff-employee must prove that the defendant
employer failed to accommodate the handicap. Hall, supra at 54-55. Once the plaintiff has proven a
prima facie case, the defendant has the burden to produce evidence that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship. Id. When the defendant has met this burden of production, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the accommodation would not
impose an undue hardship. Id.; MCL 37.1210(1); MSA 3.550(210)(1).
Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact that defendants failed to reasonably
accommodate him. In Hall, supra, the plaintiff, who was asthmatic, claimed that her employer failed to
reasonably accommodate her by placing her in a different position or by banning smoking at her place of
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employment. Id. at 51-53. This Court held that the employer was not required to accommodate the
plaintiff in either of the suggested ways. Because the Legislature did not impose a specific duty to place
an employee into a new position, this Court declined to read such a requirement into the HCRA. Id. at
58. Moreover, the 1990 amendments to the HCRA specifically recognized three types of
accommodation: (1) purchasing equipment and devices, (2) hiring readers or interpreters, and (3)
restructuring jobs and altering schedules for minor or infrequent duties. Id. at 58.
Neither equipment/devices nor readers/interpreters are relevant in this case. Accordingly, we
examine whether the HCRA required defendants here to restructure plaintiff’s job to accommodate his
inability to lift. This type of accommodation requires that the job duties that plaintiff cannot perform be
“minor or infrequent.” MCL 37.1210(15); MSA 3.550(210(15).
Plaintiff’s own description of his job illustrates that the duties were neither minor nor infrequent.
In a handwritten memorandum, plaintiff wrote: “Everything in O.S. [Office Services] requires lifting,
which I am unable to do. Matt [defendant Schuyler] asked about a secretary helping with mail. I don’t
see any problem only cautioning that, for example, on 8/2 we shipped 375#’s UPS and maybe 200#’s
Fed Ex [sic].” In his affidavit, plaintiff described additional physical duties for which he was responsible
in Troy:
The files . . . needed to be weeded out. Those that were selected to be sent to storage
needed to be logged and boxed to be sent off-site. Those that were needed by staff
moving downtown needed to be packaged and transported. The file rooms downtown
needed to be weeded and adjusted also. And, there was the regular rotation of files to
storage that needed to be completed at this time. . . . I was solely responsible for the
Office Services work . . . .
In his brief and supporting documentation, plaintiff never alleged that lifting was a minor or infrequent
duty. To the contrary, the above facts demonstrate that lifting comprised a considerable portion of
plaintiff’s job. Also, plaintiff presumably would not have requested two additional assistants if the lifting
duties were minor or infrequent. The HCRA thus did not require defendants to restructure plaintiff’s job
to accommodate his lifting restrictions.
The dissent suggests that plaintiff has raised a question of fact on the accommodation issue. We
respectfully disagree. Plaintiff’s comment that he was “solely responsible” for the Office Services work
in Troy demonstrates that his own job required him to lift – he was not functioning only as a supervisor.
Plaintiff’s job duties included package handling, mail delivery, janitorial services and furniture moving.
Even viewing the facts most favorably toward plaintiff, plaintiff did not argue that his duties primarily
were supervisory in nature.
Also, in contrast to the dissent, we do not recognize a meaningful distinction, in this context,
between failing to hire additional workers to assist plaintiff and “the withdrawal of established support.”
The record does not reflect that defendants withdrew the assistants and refused to replace them.
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Rather, defendants hired Truitt and Swihart to help plaintiff. Nonetheless, the extensive lifting
requirements of plaintiff’s job made him unable to perform it despite the help of assistants.
Further, plaintiff effectively is arguing that Price Waterhouse was bound to hire more than one
assistant to reasonably accommodate his handicap. The HCRA does not call for such an
accommodation. Plaintiff cites no authority; we will not search for authority to sustain a party’s
argument. Ramsey v Michigan Underground Storage Tank Fin Assurance Policy Bd, 210 Mich
App 267, 271; 533 NW2d 4 (1995).
Case law also supports our ruling on this issue. In Hatfield v St Mary’s Medical Center, 211
Mich App 321, 326-327; 535 NW2d 272 (1995), this Court held that under the pre-1990 HCRA, a
condition was not a handicap unless it was unrelated to an employee’s ability to perform the job and the
employer therefore had no duty to modify the employee’s job duties. Id. Under Hall, supra, the 1990
amendments limited the requisite accommodation to purchasing equipment and devices, hiring readers
or interpreters, and restructuring jobs and altering schedules for minor and infrequent duties. Hall,
supra at 58. The amendments do not require an employer to hire more than one person to assist a
handicapper with regular job duties. As stated in Hall, “[t]his Court is precluded from reading into the
HCRA something not otherwise clearly therein.” Id. at 59.
Plaintiff further argues that hiring additional assistants for him would not impose an undue
hardship on Price Waterhouse given its size and financial resources. This argument is irrelevant. MCL
37.1210(1); MSA 3.550(210)(1) provides that the undue hardship analysis arises only after the
handicapped employee proves a prima facie case. Because plaintiff has not proven a prima facie case,
we do not reach the undue hardship issue.
Plaintiff next contends that various obligation of employers contained within the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC § 12111(9)(B),4 should be read into the HCRA. This Court
previously declined to read ADA requirements into the HCRA. Hall, supra at 58. Regarding the
ADA provision requiring employers to place handicappers in vacant positions, this Court noted that the
Legislature did not include such a provision when it enacted the 1990 HCRA amendments, although it
could have done so. Id. Plaintiff’s argument thus is better directed to the Legislature.
Plaintiff’s contention that Price Waterhouse should have given his “temporary [back] condition”
a reasonable time to heal fails because plaintiff has not demonstrated that he requested a reasonable
time to heal.
II.
Plaintiff next contends that the circuit court erred in granting summary disposition on his claim
that defendants retaliated against him for seeking worker’s compensation benefits. We unanimously
reject plaintiff’s argument. MCL 418.301(11); MSA 17.237(301)(11) forbids the discharge of, or
discrimination against, an employee because the employee filed a complaint under the Worker’s
Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq. Plaintiff has the
burden to prove that his worker’s compensation claim was a significant factor in Price Waterhouse’s
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decision to discharge him. Goins v Ford Motor Co, 131 Mich App 185, 198; 347 NW2d 184
(1983).
Plaintiff claims that his 1991 worker’s compensation claim spawned a series of discriminatory
acts that led to his 1993 discharge. Plaintiff, however, has offered no evidence to link his 1991 claim to
defendants’ alleged discriminatory conduct. Plaintiff therefore has failed to show that his worker’s
compensation claim was a significant factor in defendants’ actions. As evidence of retaliation, plaintiff
submits that defendants never replaced his two former assistants. Plaintiff’s admission that defendant
hired Truitt and Swihart to assist him belies this argument. Plaintiff thus has offered no evidence of
discriminatory conduct by defendants that is connected to his 1991 worker’s compensation claim.
Plaintiff finally indicates that his discharge was in retaliation for an anticipated worker’s
compensation claim that he planned to file later in 1993. His argument fails because a retaliatory
discharge case must be based upon a filed worker’s compensation claim, not on an anticipated claim.
Griffey v Prestige Stamping, 189 Mich App 665, 667-668; 473 NW2d 790 (1991).
Affirmed.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
1
Plaintiff’s suit also alleged age discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination. Plaintiff has
abandoned those claims on appeal.
2
Defendants moved for summary disposition under both MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). The circuit
court did not specify which subsection served as the basis for its order. Because the court referred to
plaintiff’s failure to put forth prima facie evidence, we interpret the motion as granted under MCR
2.116(C)(10). GAF Sales & Service, Inc v Hastings Mutual Ins Co, 224 Mich App 259, 261 n 1;
___ NW2d ___ (1997).
3
The HCRA defines “handicap” as
[a] determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result from
disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the characteristic: .
. . substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is
unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position or
substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated
to the individual’s qualifications for employment or promotion.
[MCL
37.1103(e)(i)(A); MSA 3.550(103)(e)(i)(A).]
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4
That subsection holds that “reasonable accommodation” includes: “job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.” 42 USC § 12111(9)(B).
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