PATTI HOLLAND V CITY OF LANSING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATTI HOLLAND and TIMOTHY HOLLAND,
UNPUBLISHED
October 31, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
CITY OF LANSING, JACK NELSON, ELEANOR
LOVE and DONNA WYNANT,
No. 185667
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 94-076686-NZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Sawyer and Young, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to
defendants in this case arising out of plaintiffs’ operation of two adult foster-care facilities in the City of
Lansing. We affirm.
On February 1, 1992, plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit, alleging that defendants engaged in a
pattern of discrimination and harassment in an attempt to prevent plaintiffs from operating their adult
foster-care facilities. The complaint alleged that defendants denied plaintiffs’ requests for special land
use and building permits, and held plaintiffs’ buildings to more stringent code requirements. The 181
paragraph complaint sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging state claims of discrimination in
violation of the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et
seq. (Count I), age discrimination in violation of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.;
MSA 3.548 (101) et seq. (Count II), violation of the Adult Foster Care Facility Licensing Act, MCL
400.701 et seq.; MSA 16.610(51) et seq. (Count III), violation of public policy (Count IV), and
tortious interference with contractual and business relations (Count VI). Plaintiffs also alleged claims,
pursuant to 42 USC 1983, that defendants, acting under color of state law, violated plaintiffs’ federal
due process and equal protection rights, and also committed various violations of federal law (Counts V
and VII).
Defendants brought a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and
(C)(10). The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition and dismissed all counts of
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plaintiffs’ complaint. The trial court based its decision on governmental immunity (Count VI), the two
year statute of limitations contained in the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3601 et seq., failure to
state a claim, qualified immunity, and failure to exhaust existing administrative remedies. We review the
trial court’s decision de novo on appeal. Stehlik v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206 Mich App 83, 85;
520 NW2d 633 (1994). Plaintiffs limit their appeal to the dismissal of their age discrimination,
handicapper discrimination, violation of public policy, and § 1983 claims.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their discrimination claims brought pursuant
to the Civil Rights Act and HCRA. We disagree. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude
that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact that would
preclude summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Consequently, the trial court’s decision to
dismiss those claims is affirmed. See Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993);
Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994); Marsh v Dep’t of Civil
Service (After Remand), 173 Mich App 72, 77-78; 433 NW2d 820 (1988).1
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim for violation of public
policy. We disagree. Without citation to authority, plaintiffs state that “it is the public policy of this state
and this Nation to disburse people living in group homes and adult foster care homes into the general
population.” However, because plaintiffs’ have not demonstrated the existence of a common law right
to be free of age or handicapper discrimination, and because the Civil Rights Act and HCRA
specifically prohibit the type of discriminatory conduct alleged by plaintiffs, the remedies provided by
those statutes are exclusive. Thus, plaintiffs’ public policy claim cannot be sustained. See Dudewicz v
Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 78-80; 503 NW2d 645 (1993). Moreover, we believe that
plaintiffs’ public policy claim suffers from the same shortcomings as their claims under the Civil Rights
Act and HCRA.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition on their claims brought
under 42 USC 1983. We deem this issue abandoned because it is insufficiently briefed. Dresden v
Detroit Macomb Hosp Corp, 218 Mich App 292, 300; 553 NW2d 387 (1996). A party is not
permitted to merely announce its position and leave it to us to discover and rationalize the basis for the
claim. In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 477; 484 NW2d 672 (1992).
Finally, because plaintiffs’ cause of action suffers from deficiencies that cannot be overcome, we
conclude that the trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint. See MCR
2.116(I)(5).
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
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1
In any event, we question the competency of plaintiffs’ so-called “affidavid” that was filed in response
to defendants’ motion for summary disposition. That document merely incorporates the allegations
contained in the complaint.
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