PEOPLE OF MI V JAMIEL DENNIS VAUGHAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 10, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 196422
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-005435
JAMIEL DENNIS VAUGHAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Murphy and Young, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL
750.520b(1)(e); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e), and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279. He was sentenced to life in prison for the CSC I conviction, and
six years, eight months to ten years in prison for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm
conviction, the two sentences to run concurrently. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that he was deprived of due process when the trial court
refused to appoint a DNA expert at public expense to assist defendant in disputing the testimony of the
prosecution’s DNA expert. We disagree. The trial court’s decision regarding the appointment of an
expert is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Browning, 106 Mich App 516, 528; 308
NW2d 264 (1981). In People v Jacobsen, 448 Mich 639, 641; 532 NW2d 838 (1995), the
Michigan Supreme Court held that a trial court’s decision not to appoint an expert for the defense is not
erroneous when there is no “indication that expert testimony would likely benefit the defense.” See,
also, People v Leonard, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket Nos. 178121 and 186776,
issued 7/18/97), slip op p 7 (“a defendant is not entitled to a DNA expert without making a
particularized showing of need for the expert”). Here, defendant has made no showing of need, nor has
he shown that his defense would have benefited from the testimony of a DNA expert. Defendant has
offered no reason to believe that the results of an independent DNA analysis would differ in any respect
from the results obtained by the prosecution’s DNA expert. Further, defendant has not shown that
there is any reason to call into question the results of the DNA analysis performed by the prosecution’s
expert. Jacobsen, supra at 642. We find no abuse of discretion. See, also, Browning, supra (trial
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court’s decision not to appoint a defense expert is not an abuse of discretion “[a]bsent some showing
that the test results reached by the prosecutor’s expert witnesses were in error or that the testing
procedures were inadequate”).
Defendant argues that failure to appoint a DNA expert denies him a “basic tool[] of an
adequate defense or appeal” as required by Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 77; 105 S Ct 1087; 84 L
Ed 2d 53 (1985) [quoting from Britt v North Carolina, 404 US 226, 227; 92 S Ct 431; 30 L Ed 2d
400 (1971)]. The United States Supreme Court in Ake held that where the defendant’s sanity is a
significant issue at trial, the state must provide the defendant with access to a competent psychiatrist.
Ake, supra at 83. We do not believe that Ake requires the appointment of a DNA expert in this case.
We find the Supreme Court’s language in the later case of Caldwell v Mississippi, 472 US 320, 323 n
1; 105 S Ct 2633; 86 L Ed 2d 231 (1985), to be applicable in the present case. In Caldwell, the trial
court had refused to appoint an investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert. Id. The
Supreme Court stated that “[g]iven that petitioner [i.e., the defendant] offered little more than
undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation of due
process in the trial judge’s decision.” Id. Similarly, here, defendant has made no showing that the
testimony of an independent DNA expert would benefit his defense. Therefore, the trial court’s
decision not to appoint an expert did not deprive defendant of due process. See, also, Leonard,
supra, slip op pp 6, 7, 11.
Defendant’s second argument on appeal is that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his trial attorney failed to move to suppress the in-court identification of defendant by the
complainant based upon suggestive practices that occurred at a photographic presentation in which the
complainant identified defendant. We disagree. Because defendant failed to move for a new trial or an
evidentiary hearing on this basis below, appellate review is foreclosed “unless the record contains
sufficient detail to support defendant’s claims, and, if so, review is limited to the record.” People v
Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 672; 528 NW2d 842 (1995). A defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel based upon defective performance has
the burden of showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that but for the unprofessional
errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. [People v Mitchell, 454
Mich 145, 157-158; 560 NW2d 600 (1997).]
Moreover, the defendant has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the challenged action
constitutes sound trial strategy. Id. at 156.
Here, the record contains no indication of any suggestive practices at the photographic showup.
Defendant speculates on appeal that the complainant was shown a picture of defendant and failed to
recognize him in an earlier photographic presentation. However, there is no evidence to support that
assertion. Given the lack of evidence of suggestive practices, counsel’s failure to file a motion on that
basis does not constitute deficient performance. Counsel “was not required to argue a frivolous or
meritless motion.” People v Gist, 188 Mich App 610, 613; 470 NW2d 475 (1991). In addition,
counsel’s decision not to raise the possibility of suggestive
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practices on cross-examination is presumed to be sound trial strategy. See, generally, People v Burns,
118 Mich App 242, 247; 324 NW2d 589 (1982); People v Moreno, 112 Mich App 631, 638; 317
NW2d 201 (1981). Defendant has offered no reason to rebut this presumption. Because there is no
record basis for believing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance must fail.
Defendant’s third argument on appeal is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when
trial counsel neglected to develop a careful defense because she wanted the trial concluded by a certain
time. We disagree. Our review is again limited to the record because defendant failed to preserve this
issue below. Barclay, supra. Defense counsel told the trial court on the record that she could not be in
court on Wednesday. However, the trial was concluded on Tuesday, and it never became necessary
for counsel to be present on Wednesday. There is no evidence in the record that counsel’s
performance was influenced by scheduling concerns. Defendant has not identified a single witness or
other piece of evidence that would have been presented had the trial been longer. We find no indication
in the record that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Defendant’s fourth argument on appeal is that the trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding
the elements of CSC I permitted conviction of a person who coincidentally happens to be armed with a
weapon while engaging in consensual sexual intercourse. This issue is not preserved for appeal because
defendant failed to object below. MCR 2.516(C); People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545;
494 NW2d 737 (1993). Appellate review is only available to avoid manifest injustice. Van Dorsten,
supra at 545. We find no manifest injustice here. The trial court instructed the jury that to be guilty of
CSC I, defendant must have sexually penetrated the complainant while armed at the time with a
weapon. There was no evidence that the parties engaged in consensual sexual intercourse, so
defendant’s concern about being convicted for engaging in consensual intercourse is not warranted in
this case. Moreover, the evidence against defendant at trial was overwhelming. People v Crawford,
89 Mich App 30, 36; 279 NW2d 560 (1979). The complainant identified defendant in a photographic
showup and at trial as the person who threatened her life, forced her to enter a vacant house, sexually
penetrated her, and then struck her on the head several times with a pipe. DNA from defendant’s
blood matched DNA in sperm fragments taken from the complainant’s clothes and body following the
assault.
Further, defendant’s assertion that trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury instruction on CSC
I constituted ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. Given the overwhelming evidence against
defendant, there is no reason to believe that the result of the trial would have been different but for the
allegedly unprofessional errors of counsel. Mitchell, supra at 157-158.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Robert P. Young
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