LARRY MIFSUD V ESAM ASKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LARRY MIFSUD and DONNA MIFSUD,
UNPUBLISHED
October 3, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellees,
v
No. 193273
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 93-466470-NO
ESAM ASKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Hood and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right a jury verdict which found that defendant had committed an
assault and battery and/or caused intentional infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiff Larry Mifsud
(hereinafter plaintiff)1 and the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for new trial, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and/or remittitur. We affirm.
Plaintiff, a West Bloomfield Township police officer, followed defendant into his driveway after
he witnessed defendant committing traffic violations. Defendant assaulted plaintiff as he attempted to
reach his house and plaintiff slipped on a patch of ice and fell against defendant’s car. As he was on the
ground, plaintiff also felt a very hard blow to the back of his neck. Plaintiff’s German Shepherd partner
attacked defendant in response to plaintiff’s command. After the incident, until trial two years later,
plaintiff experienced constant migraine headaches and pain in his neck and arm. Plaintiff was able to
return to work without restrictions, but with the assistance of prescription pain medicine.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by allowing in the speculative expert testimony of
plaintiff’s witnesses because no medical evidence existed to support the conclusion that he would
become disabled in the future based on the present injury. We disagree.
A trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony under MRE 702 or to exclude it as speculative
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 401; 541 NW2d 566
(1995). A person may be qualified to testify as an expert witness by virtue of the person’s knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education in the subject matter of the testimony. Where such testimony is
purely speculative, it should be excluded or stricken pursuant
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to MRE 403. Phillips v Mazda Motor Mfg (USA) Corp, 204 Mich App 401, 412; 516 NW2d 502
(1994). The weight given to the testimony of experts is for the jury to decide. Phillips, supra at 401
402.
In the present case, plaintiff testified as to his continuous migraine headaches and pain in his
neck, hand, and shoulder. Plaintiff’s doctor corroborated plaintiff’s testimony with the results of an
MRI which showed that plaintiff still had tendonitis eighteen months after the initial injury. Furthermore,
plaintiff’s vocational rehabilitation expert testified that although plaintiff had no work restrictions, the
evidence showed he was not able to fully perform his duties and his supervisor accommodated his
limitations. Additionally, the expert did not believe that plaintiff would be able to perform the duties of a
police officer if he were to change his employment because of the limitations. Thus, because there was
medical evidence to support the testimony that plaintiff would have future disability based upon his
present injuries, we find that the testimony of the experts was not speculative. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for directed verdict or
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the claim for future loss of earning capacity because
plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof as to that claim. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to
determine whether there are material issues of fact upon which reasonable minds might differ.2 The
nonmoving party is given the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence.
If reasonable minds could differ as to whether the plaintiff has met his burden of proof, a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is inappropriate. Byrne v Schneider’s Iron & Metal, Inc, 190 Mich App
176, 178-179; 475 NW2d 854 (1991). The evidence showed that plaintiff was still experiencing pain
eighteen months after the injury. Furthermore, the testimony revealed that, although plaintiff had no
work restrictions, he was unable to fully perform his duties and his supervisor accommodated his
limitations. Moreover, plaintiff had been advised by his vocational rehabilitation doctor not to change
his employment because plaintiff would not be able to fully perform the duties required of a police
officer. Thus, giving plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that could be drawn from the
evidence, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff’s counsel to cross-examine
defendant’s accountant regarding defendant’s assets because the information was elicited to show how
much wealth defendant possessed. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Sackett v Atyeo, 217
Mich App 676, 683; 552 NW2d 536 (1996). The scope and duration of cross-examination is in the
trial court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse. Wischmeyer v
Schanz, 449 Mich 469, 474-475; 536 NW2d 760 (1995).
Testimony of a witness is relevant to show bias or prejudice on the part of the witness. MRE
401; Popp v Crittenton Hosp, 181 Mich App 662, 664; 449 NW2d 678 (1989). Although relevant,
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the prejudicial effect must not outweigh its impeachment value. Id.; MRE 403. A broad range of
evidence may be elicited on cross-examination for the purpose for discrediting a witness. Wischmeyer,
supra at 474. A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case,
including credibility. MRE 611(b).
The exchange between plaintiff’s counsel and the witness reveals that counsel asked the witness
if he received a fee for the work he performed for defendant, how many pieces of property defendant
owned, and if he was the accountant for all four properties. In response to defendant’s objection,
plaintiff’s counsel explained that the questions were relevant because the witness had an interest in what
would happen to defendant and therefore, affected his credibility. It was relevant for the jury to know
that the witness was defendant’s accountant, the extent of his responsibilities with defendant, and that he
earned a fee from him. This was especially relevant in light of the fact that he testified that defendant
was not drunk thirty minutes before the encounter with plaintiff. Furthermore, the witness was not
questioned as to the value or the worth of defendant’s holdings and the questions were brief and directly
to the point. Thus, we find that the testimony elicited on cross-examination was relevant to show the
witness’ bias toward defendant and his credibility. Although the trial court ruled that the testimony was
admissible because it went to weight and not to credibility, we will not reverse where the right result was
reached for the wrong reason. Welch v Dist Court, 215 Mich App 253, 256; 545 NW2d 15 (1996).
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s counsel vouched for plaintiff’s honesty and stated his personal
beliefs during closing arguments. We note at the outset that defendant failed to object to the closing
arguments and, therefore, this issue is deemed waived on appeal. We have reviewed the record and
see no potential for a miscarriage of justice in declining to review this issue. Phillips v Mazda Motor
Mfg (USA) Corp, 204 Mich App 401, 413; 516 NW2d 502 (1994).
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the errors, as well as the excessive amount
of the verdict, requires the granting of a new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and/or
remittitur. Having found no error constituting reversal, defendant’s claim is without merit. Gore v Rains
& Blosck, 189 Mich App 729, 744; 473 NW2d 813 (1991).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
1
Plaintiff Donna Mifsud’s claim is for loss of consortium.
2
A motion for directed verdict as to this claim could not be found in the lower court record, although
defendant implies in his question presented that he brought such a motion. Moreover, defendant does
not present a directed verdict argument. We note that defendant did bring a motion for directed verdict
as to other claims.
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