KIMBERLY SWICK V DEPT OF CORRECTIONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KIMBERLY SWICK,
UNPUBLISHED
October 3, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 186673
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 94-077044-NO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Markey and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff appeals by right the order granting defendant’s
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff also challenges the order denying
her motion to withdraw her answer, amend her answer, or file a late response to defendant’s request for
admissions. We affirm.
Plaintiff alleges sexual discrimination, handicap discrimination and a violation of 42 USC 1983.
In defendant’s interrogatories to plaintiff, it requested her to admit: (1) that she did not know of any
male employee whom defendant had treated differently regarding medical-related issues; (2) that the
warden of defendant’s Lakeland Correctional Facility had not violated her constitutional rights;1 and (3)
that she had suffered no damages as a result of defendant’s acts. Because plaintiff failed timely to
answer defendant’s interrogatories, the court deemed the requests admitted. MCR 2.312(B)(1). On
the basis of these admissions, the court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition because
plaintiff could not prove the necessary elements to prevail.
Plaintiff first argues that the court erred when it denied her motion regarding defendant’s
requests for admission because the court did not apply the three-part balancing test set forth in Janczyk
v Davis, 125 Mich App 683, 692-693; 337 NW2d 272 (1983). Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue
because she did not present this argument to the trial court. Issues raised for the first time on appeal
ordinarily are not subject to review. Booth Newspapers, Inc v University of Michigan Bd of
Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993).
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Regardless, a trial court, within its discretion, may allow an amendment to an admission and this
Court will not overturn that decision absent an abuse of discretion. Medbury v Walsh, 190 Mich App
554, 556; 476 NW2d 470 (1991). In Medbury, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in treating the plaintiff’s failure to respond to a request for admissions as an admission of
determinative facts where the plaintiff had not responded in three months. Id. at 555-556. Plaintiff here
failed to respond to defendant’s requests for admissions for over three months; thus, the court did not
abuse its discretion.
Next, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred when it determined that her admission that she
“has suffered no damages” prevented her from proving any of her claims. Further, plaintiff argues that
even in light of the admission, the court erred in granting summary disposition to defendant. This Court
reviews de novo motions for summary disposition to determine whether the pleadings demonstrated that
a party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law or whether the affidavits and other documentary
evidence showed the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Wortelboer v Benzie Co, 212 Mich
App 208, 212; 537 NW2d 603 (1995). This Court draws inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Dagen v Hastings Mutual Ins Co, 166 Mich App 225, 229; 420 NW2d 111 (1987).
In her complaint, plaintiff claimed violations under: (1) the Elliott-Larsen civil rights act (CRA),
MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq.; (2) 42 USC 1983; and (3) the Michigan
handicappers’ civil rights act, MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq. The three admissions
that are relevant to these claims are:
21. Plaintiff does not know of any male employees who have been treated
differently by the department for medical related issues.
22. Plaintiff does not know any pregnant or non-pregnant female employees
who have been treated differently [by] the Department of Corrections for
medical/maternity related issues.
23. Defendant [warden] has not violated or deprived the Plaintiff of any rights,
privileges and/or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of the State of Michigan.
As indicated, plaintiff challenges the dismissal of her handicapper claim. We will not consider
the handicapper claim because plaintiff has advanced no argument and provided no authority regarding
it. In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 477; 484 NW2d 672 (1992).
The court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s other claims on the ground that she had suffered no
damages. The CRA provides for equitable remedies: “A person alleging a violation of [the CRA] may
bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both.” MCL 37.2703; MSA
3.548(703). The federal statute similarly provides for equitable relief. See McGhee v Draper, 639
F2d 639, 646 (CA 10, 1981) (holding that reinstatement may be an appropriate remedy for a violation
of 42 USC 1983).
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Nevertheless, the court reached the correct result. We will not reverse where a trial court
reaches a correct result for the wrong reason. In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 591; 528 NW2d
799 (1995). We instead affirm because of plaintiff’s admissions. Plaintiff’s own admission was fatal to
her claim under 42 USC 1983. Plaintiff admitted that the warden had not deprived her of any rights,
privileges, or immunities under the United States or Michigan constitutions. The only violation plaintiff
alleged in that count, however, was the violation of the above rights. Also, although plaintiff argues that
“[t]he federal [Equal Employment Opportunities Commission] laws are violated even if there were no
constitutional violations,” plaintiff failed to cite these “laws” or to allege their violation.
Regarding her CRA claim, plaintiff asserts that the court should have ruled on intentional
discrimination, the alternate theory upon which a discrimination claim may rest. Plaintiff contends that,
because the court never ruled whether plaintiff could establish a claim for intentional discrimination, this
Court should reverse and remand.
In Coleman-Nichols v Tixon Corp, 203 Mich App 645, 651; 513 NW2d 441 (1994), this
Court held:
In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional sex discrimination, a plaintiff must
show that she was a member of a protected class, that she was discharged or otherwise
discriminated against with respect to employment, that the defendant was
predisposed to discriminate against persons in the class, and that the defendant
acted upon that disposition to discriminate against persons in the class, and that the
defendant acted upon that disposition when the employment decision was made. . . . In
order to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under the disparate-treatment
theory, a plaintiff must show that she was a member of a protected class, and that, for
the same conduct or performance, she was treated differently than a man. . . . [Id.
(citations omitted).]
Here, plaintiff failed to point to evidence that might create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether
defendant was predisposed to discriminate against women or that defendant acted upon that
predisposition when it made its employment decision. Moreover, plaintiff’s admission established that
she had no personal knowledge that defendant treated men differently. She identifies no other evidence
of disparate treatment. Accordingly, summary disposition of her CRA claim was proper.
Affirmed.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
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1
Although the cases were not consolidated for review, see related case no. 192553, in which plaintiff
brought an action against the Director of the Department of Corrections and the Personnel Director of
the Lakeland Correctional Facility.
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