IN RE DALTON ALAN SMITH MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DALTON ALAN SMITH, Minor.
_________________________________________
UNPUBLISHED
September 26, 1997
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 191569
Iosco Juvenile Division
LC No. 95-012762-NA
CYNTHIA ROCK,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
GLEN SMITH,
Respondent.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Wahls, and Gribbs, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother, Cynthia Rock (respondent), appeals as of right an order terminating her
parental rights to her son, Dalton, born March 13, 1993. We affirm.
On September 5, 1995, petitioner filed a petition alleging abuse and neglect and seeking
termination of respondent’s parental rights. On October 20, 1995, respondent pleaded no contest to
the charges and the probate court took jurisdiction over Dalton.
On November 22, 1995, just before the scheduled trial, respondent decided to release her
parental rights. After a short recess to allow respondent to review the release with her attorney,
respondent stated on the record that her counsel had advised her of her rights and that she understood
that she was waiving a trial and consenting to a permanent release of her parental rights. Respondent
also denied that anyone coerced her into signing the release and agreed that she was signing the release
-1
voluntarily. The probate court accepted the release after finding that respondent understood her rights.
On December 14, 1995, following a trial on the father’s parental rights, the trial court entered an
opinion and order terminating both parents’ parental rights.
After filing this appeal to contest the trial court’s acceptance of her release, respondent filed a
motion in this Court for a remand. This Court denied the motion on September 19, 1996, and denied
reconsideration on November 1, 1996. Respondent then filed an interlocutory appeal with our
Supreme Court and requested a stay in this Court. This Court denied respondent’s motion to stay on
March 11, 1997, and our Supreme Court denied the application for leave on February 28, 1997.
On appeal, respondent seeks to revoke the release. Respondent claims that she based her
consent on a misrepresentation that petitioner would consider placing Dalton in her mother’s or
grandmother’s care. However, respondent failed to preserve this issue by filing a timely motion for
rehearing in the probate court.
Section 29(10) of the Michigan adoption code, MCL 710.21, et seq.; MSA 27.3178(555.21),
et seq., provides parents who release their parental rights the opportunity to petition for rehearing. This
provision, however, clearly provides that “[a] release may not be revoked . . . [unless] a petition for
rehearing or claim of appeal is filed within the time required.” Section 64(1), establishes that the “time
required” is twenty-one days from entry of any order. In In the Matter of Myers, 131 Mich App 160,
166; 345 NW2d 663 (1983), this Court held that adherence to this time limitation provision does not
violate due process, stating that:
A primary and permissible legislative purpose of the code is to preserve the
finality of decisions to release children for adoption. . . . A 20-day [now 21-day]
limitation on the right of a parent acting without support of the child placing agency to
attempt to revoke a previously executed release bears a reasonable relation to this
purpose. Ample opportunity for a parent to be heard on the voluntary termination of his
or her parental rights is provided under MCL 710.29(5); MSA 27.3178(555.29)(5).
In the present case, the probate court entered the order terminating respondent’s parental rights
on December 14, 1995. The “Advice of Rights After Order Terminating Parental Rights” specifically
informed respondent that a request for rehearing must be made “in writing within 21 days of the date of
the order terminating parental rights.” Respondent failed to comply with this requirement, however. In
fact, she did not even file a motion for remand within twenty-one days of either the appointment of her
first appellate counsel, the filing of this appeal, or the substitution for present counsel. Instead, her
motion for remand was filed more than two months after she filed her tardy claim of appeal. Because
respondent failed to make any cognizable effort to seek rehearing within the allotted time, her request
for a hearing to revoke the release is untimely and unpreserved.
Nevertheless, the release is valid even if we accept respondent’s claim that she signed the
release on the basis of a representation that releasing her parental rights would increase the chances that
her mother or grandmother may gain custody of the child. Respondent makes no claim that she was
promised that her mother or grandmother would become the child’s adoptive parent. She only
-2
contends that she was told that there was a chance that this would occur. There is no record evidence
that the alleged representation was fraudulent and nothing to suggest that respondent’s mother or
grandmother were not considered as prospective adopters.
Additionally, after a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the probate court did not
err in accepting the release at the time it was given. As respondent concedes, it is apparent from the
record that the probate court gave respondent’s attorney time to discuss the proposed release with
respondent and that the probate court thoroughly reviewed with respondent the ramifications of signing
the release. Moreover, respondent was clearly informed that a mere change of mind would not entitle
her to revoke her release and that “for all practical purposes that this [release] is a permanent release of
the child.” Respondent also denied that she was coerced into signing the release and stated that she
was releasing her rights voluntarily.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
