GOODYEAR TIRE V CO-JO INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 23, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 192876
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 93-022267-NZ
CO-JO, INC., SO-BO, INC., and CC &
COMPANY, INC. d/b/a PONDEROSA OF
GREATER FLINT,
Defendants/Cross-Plaintiffs/Cross
Defendants-Appellees,
and
PETE’S PLUMBING & HEATING and DALE
STRAND,
Defendants/Cross-Defendants/CrossPlaintiffs-Appellants.
Before: Markman, P.J., and McDonald and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Dale Strand and Pete’s Plumbing & Heating appeal as of right from the judgment
entered against Strand and in favor of plaintiff on the basis of the parties’ settlement agreement. We
affirm.
Defendants Co-Jo, Inc., So-Bo, Inc., and CC & Company, Inc. operated a Ponderosa
restaurant in the town of Burton. On December 26, 1990, an employee of the restaurant observed
water leaking from a pipe located above the ceiling tiles in the kitchen. The restaurant manager called
Pete’s and Pete’s dispatched employee Dale Strand to make the necessary repairs. While Strand was
working on the pipe with a propane torch, the restaurant caught fire. The fire spread from the restaurant
to plaintiff ’s adjacent store, causing property damage.
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In 1992, Co-Jo initiated an action against Strand and Pete’s to recover for the fire damage to
the restaurant under a negligence theory (hereafter referred to as the “parallel action”), and a year later,
plaintiff commenced the instant action against Strand, Pete’s and Co-Jo to recover for the fire damage
to its store. The parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement in the instant case whereby
plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment against the party or parties found to be negligent by the trier of
fact in the parallel action. In October of 1995, the jury returned verdicts of no cause of action in the
parallel action. However, in response to special questions submitted to the jury, the jury found that
Strand was negligent but that his negligence was not the proximate cause of Co-Jo’s loss. Plaintiff
thereafter moved for entry of judgment in the instant case on the basis of the jury’s finding of negligence.
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in entering a judgment against defendant Strand
based on the parties’ settlement agreement when the jury in the parallel action found that Strand’s
negligence was not the proximate cause of the fire. We disagree. An agreement to settle a pending
lawsuit is a contract, and is therefore governed by the legal principles generally applicable to the
construction of contracts. Walbridge Aldinger Co v Walcon Corp, 207 Mich App 566, 571; 525
NW2d 489 (1994). Absent mutual mistake, fraud or other grounds to avoid a contract, the court acts
properly in enforcing a settlement agreement. Streeter v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 340 Mich
510, 517-518; 65 NW2d 760 (1954); Gramer v Gramer, 207 Mich App 123, 125; 523 NW2d 861
(1994). The court will not upset a settlement based on the subjective reservation or misunderstanding
of a party. Streeter, supra at 518; Bd of Eaton Co Rd Comm’rs v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371,
379; 521 NW2d 847 (1994).
Defendants argue that the trial court erroneously construed the settlement agreement as
providing that plaintiff would recover if the jury in the parallel action found that Strand or Pete’s was
negligent, even if their negligence was not the proximate cause of the fire. The construction of an
unambiguous and unequivocal settlement agreement is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
Gramer, supra at 125. The primary object in construing a settlement agreement is to effectuate the
parties’ intent. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc v Wayne Co Bd of Road Comm’rs, 59
Mich App 117, 123; 229 NW2d 338 (1975). The language of a contract is interpreted according to its
plain meaning rather than given a technical construction. Schroeder v Terra Energy, Ltd, 233 Mich
App 176; ___ NW2d ___ (1997).
The settlement agreement provides in its relevant part:
2.
In the event a jury (or other finders of fact) (“fact finder”) in the
principal case of ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE, et al. vs. PETE’S and STRAND,
Genesee Circuit Court case no. 92-14835-CK (“principal case”), finds that neither
PETE’S, STRAND nor PONDEROSA was negligent or otherwise culpable
(“negligent”) GOODYEAR’S recovery shall be zero dollars.
3.
In the event a fact finder in the principal case finds that either or both
PETE’S and/or STRAND were negligent and PONDEROSA was not negligent,
GOODYEAR shall be entitled to:
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a.
Entry of an appropriate judgment of $18,000 inclusive of
interest, costs and attorney fees in case no. 93-22267-NZ;
b.
Payment of $18,000 within sixty (60) days of the date of a final
dispositive judgment or order in the principal case from PETE’S
and/or STRAND, jointly and severally, or their insurance
carrier if either or both were found negligent.
By clear and unambiguous language, the parties agreed that defendant Strand would pay plaintiff
$18,000 if the jury in the parallel action found him, but not Pete’s or Co-Jo, negligent. The word
“negligent” or “negligence” generally means lacking in due care or concern. The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (1976), p 879. Our Supreme Court has similarly defined
negligence as “conduct involving an unreasonable risk of harm.” Schultz v Consumers Power Co,
443 Mich 445, 449; 506 NW2d 175 (1993). Defendants improperly seek to equate the term
“negligence” with the cause of action for negligence.
The requisite elements of a negligence cause of action are that the defendant owed a
legal duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached or violated the legal duty, that the
plaintiff suffered damages, and that the breach was a proximate cause of the damages
suffered. [Id. at 449.]
Negligence alone does not establish liability. Martiniano v Booth, 359 Mich 680, 693; 103 NW2d
502 (1960); Schutte v Celotex Corp, 196 Mich App 135, 138; 492 NW2d 773 (1992). The
parties1 use of the phrase “negligent or otherwise culpable” in paragraph two merely reinforces the
determination that the contractual language refers to defendants’ conduct, not causation, since both
terms relate to the blameworthiness of a person’s actions. Therefore, the trial court properly entered
judgment against defendant Strand pursuant to paragraph three of the settlement agreement.
Next, defendants contend that the trial court erred in entering a judgment before this Court
decided Co-Jo’s appeal in the parallel action. Again, we disagree. Paragraph three of the settlement
agreement clearly and unambiguously provides that plaintiff was entitled to entry of a judgment in the
event the jury found that defendant Strand was negligent and that he must satisfy the judgment “within
sixty (60) days of the date of a final dispositive judgment or order in the principal case.” Paragraph
three of the settlement agreement does not condition entry and satisfaction of the judgment on
disposition of an appeal in the parallel action. Nor does paragraph nine of the agreement modify
paragraph three. Paragraph nine merely provides defendant with a basis for moving to set aside the
judgment in the event the result of the parallel action is altered on appeal. MCR 2.612(C)(1)(e). Thus,
the court properly directed that payment on the judgment is not contingent on an appeal in the parallel
action.
The court entered judgments of no cause of action in the parallel action on January 8, 1996, and
entered judgment in this case three weeks later. Therefore, per the terms of the agreement, plaintiff was
entitled to payment by March 8, 1996. The court nevertheless ordered that defendant Strand need not
satisfy the judgment until sixty days after this Court’s decision. Because defendant Strand received a
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more favorable result than he was entitled, he cannot now complain that the court erred by failing to
abide by the terms of the settlement agreement.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
1
We are appreciative of appellant’s argument that the “or otherwise culpable” language in § 2 of the
settlement agreement implies that the term “negligent” was designed to describe negligence of a culpable
character. However, we do not believe that such an inference is necessarily drawn from the provision
as a whole. While appellant may not have anticipated a finding such as that made by the jury in this
case, and may have contemplated that a finding of negligence would be accompanied by a finding of
culpability, the language preceding “or” in the settlement (“negligence”) plainly and precisely describes
the jury’s verdict in the instant case.
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