NICOLE ELIZABETH WASSON V JAMES DOUGLAS WESTWOOD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NICOLE ELIZABETH WASSON,
UNPUBLISHED
August 15, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 192463
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 92-000752-NI
JAMES DOUGLAS WESTWOOD, JAMES
DOUGLAS WESTWOOD II, and LINDA B.
WESTWOOD,
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Griffin and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident, plaintiff appeals as of right a
judgment in favor of defendants. The lower court’s judgment was entered following a jury verdict
finding defendant James Douglas Westwood II (defendant)1 not negligent for the collision. We reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff testified that on August 26, 1989, she was traveling eastbound on a two lane highway in
Eaton County when she stopped and activated her turn signal to make a left turn. While plaintiff was
waiting for traffic to clear, she heard squealing tires and observed a truck “coming up really fast” from
behind. Although plaintiff tried to accelerate away from danger, the full size pick-up truck driven by
defendant struck the rear end of plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff’s witnesses testified that the accident site
was between 640 and 680 feet beyond a curve in the road.
Defendant testified that the point of impact was closer to the curve than plaintiff’s witnesses
claimed and that the accident occurred because, after rounding the curve at approximately thirty-five to
forty miles per hour, he momentarily took his eyes off the road and when he looked ahead, plaintiff’s
vehicle was just “there.” Defendant does not recall whether plaintiff’s brake lights or turn signal were
activated.
At the close of proofs, plaintiff made motion for a directed verdict on the issue of defendant’s
negligence, arguing that defendant had offered no evidence of a “sudden emergency” to counteract the
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effects of defendant’s statutory violations, MCL 257.402; MSA 9.2102 (rear-end collision), and MCL
257.627; MSA 9.2327 (failure to assure the clear distance ahead). The trial court denied plaintiff’s
motion, stating only that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to resolve the factual issues in
defendant’s favor. Over plaintiff’s objection, the trial court read to the jury the standard jury instruction
regarding the defense of sudden emergency, SJI2d 12.01.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the proofs did not warrant an instruction on the defense of
sudden emergency. We agree. MCL 257.402; MSA 9.2102, establishes a rebuttable presumption
that a driver rear-ending another vehicle is negligent. Petrosky v Dziurman, 367 Mich 539; 116
NW2d 748 (1962); Garrigan v LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co, 362 Mich 262, 263; 106 NW2d
807 (1961). Similarly, a violation of the assured-clear-distance statute, MCL 257.627; MSA 9.2327,
creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117; 243 NW2d 270
(1976); SJI2d 12.01.
Presumptions of negligence may be rebutted by some possible excuses. See 2 Restatement of
Torts, 2d, § 200A, p 33. In the present case, the only excuse asserted by defendant is the defense of
“sudden emergency.” In Walker v Rebeuhr, 255 Mich 204, 206; 237 NW 289 (1931), the Supreme
Court summarized the sudden emergency defense as follows:
One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
“A party who invokes the sudden emergency doctrine is entitled to a proper instruction if any
evidence exists which would allow a jury to conclude that an emergency existed within the meaning of
the doctrine.” Farris v Bui, 147 Mich App 477, 480; 382 NW2d 802 (1985). In Vander Laan v
Miedema, 385 Mich 226, 232; 188 NW2d 564 (1971), our Supreme Court held that:
To come within the purview of this rule the circumstances attending the accident
must present a situation that is “unusual or unsuspected.” Barringer v Arnold, 358
Mich 594, 599; [101 NW2d 365] (1960).
The term “unusual” is employed here in the sense that the factual background of
the case varies from the everyday traffic routine confronting the motorist. Such an event
is typically associated with a phenomenon of nature. A classical example of the
“unusual” predicament envisioned by the emergency doctrine is provided by Patzer v
Bowerman-Halifax Funeral Home, [370 Mich 350; 121 NW2d 813 (1963)],
wherein the accident occurred in an Upper-Peninsula blizzard.
“Unsuspected” on the other hand connotes a potential peril within the everyday
movement of traffic. To come within the narrow confines of the emergency doctrine as
“unsuspected” it is essential that the potential peril had not been in clear view for any
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significant length of time, and was totally unexpected. A good example of this can be
seen in McKinney v Anderson, supra, where defendant rear-ended a plaintiff’s car
which had stopped while pushing a disabled vehicle on the highway. Coming over the
crest of a hill, defendant first saw plaintiff’s taillights when he was over 400 feet away.
However, defendant did not clearly see the peril of plaintiff’s stopping until he was
about 100-200 feet away, at which point it was too late to avoid a collision under the
circumstances. Furthermore, the failure of the plaintiff to signal that he was stopping,
coupled with the surrounding darkness, made the subsequent peril totally unexpected to
the defendant.
See also Vsetula v Whitmyer, 187 Mich App 675, 681; 468 NW2d 53 (1991), quoting Amick v
Baller, 102 Mich App 339, 341-342; 301 NW2d 350 (1980).
In the present case, defendant’s sudden emergency defense rests primarily on his contention that
the collision was unavoidable because plaintiff’s vehicle was stopped too close to a curve in the road.
However, it is “not unusual” for vehicles to stop on two-lane highways while awaiting the opportunity to
turn left. Nor is the situation “totally unexpected” as the phrase is explained in Vander Laan, supra.
Indeed, contrary to the unusual circumstance of encountering a person pushing a disabled vehicle shortly
after cresting a hill of a darkened eight-lane highway, see McKinney, supra at 418-419, it is within the
regular, everyday movement of traffic to encounter vehicles waiting to turn left into a driveway
connected to a residential section of a two-lane highway. Especially where defendant was familiar with
the area and knew the road ran along a residential area, defendant should simply have manipulated the
curve at a speed at which he could control his vehicle and avoid vehicles stopped beyond his sightline.
Defendant failed to sustain his burden of producing evidence of a sudden emergency.
Accordingly, after reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to defendant, see Farris, supra
at 480, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing SJI2d 12.01. See Hill v Wilson,
209 Mich App 356, 357-361; 531 NW2d 744 (1995); Spillers v Simons, 42 Mich App 101, 106;
201 NW2d 374 (1972). Because there was no evidence to support defendant’s sudden emergency
defense, there was no evidence to rebut the presumptions of negligence established by defendant’s
violation of the assured-clear-distance statute, MCL 257.627; MSA 9.2327, and the rear-end statute,
MCL 257.402; MSA 9.2102. Therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for plaintiff
on the issue of defendant’s negligence. See Gordon v Hartwick, 325 Mich 534, 541; 34 NW2d 61
(1949); Hill, supra.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in failing to rule on plaintiff’s motion in limine
to prohibit evidence of a prior accident and settlement which occurred two months before the accident.
We find no error in the trial court’s decision to take the matter under advisement until the issue arose at
trial. Plaintiff mooted this issue by introducing the complained of evidence in her opening statement.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction. Plaintiff being the prevailing party may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
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/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
1
Defendants James Douglas Westwood and Linda B. Westwood are named only insofar as they were
the registered owners of the vehicle driven by defendant James Douglas Westwood II. Thus, all
references hereinafter to a singular “defendant” are to defendant James Douglas Westwood II, unless
otherwise indicated.
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