PEOPLE OF MI V GLYNN SHERWOOD GASTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 5, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193175
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-003599
GLYNN SHERWOOD GASTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Young, P.J., and Gribbs and S. J. Latreille*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial conviction for unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530;
MSA 28.798, for which he was sentenced to six to fifteen years in prison. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to the trial court
to convict him of unarmed robbery. We disagree. To satisfy the requirements of due process, the
prosecutor must introduce sufficient evidence that could justify a trier of fact in reaching the conclusion
that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Fisher, 193 Mich App 284, 287; 483
NW2d 452 (1992). An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence following a bench trial
must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational
trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Hutner, 209 Mich App 280, 282; 530 NW2d 174 (1995); People v
Bell, 155 Mich App 408, 414; 399 NW2d 542 (1986).
We conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to convict
defendant of unarmed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. To convict a defendant of unarmed
robbery, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant feloniously took
property from another by force, violence, assault, or by putting the other in fear, while the defendant
was unarmed, and that the defendant possessed the intent to rob at the time the act was committed.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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People v Johnson, 206 Mich App 122, 125-126; 520 NW2d 672 (1994); People v Himmelein, 177
Mich App 365, 378-379; 442 NW2d 667 (1989).
Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to carry its burden because he acted under duress.
To successfully assert the defense of duress, a defendant must show that he or she was compelled to
commit a criminal act because of being threatened with serious conduct such that the defendant’s free
will was overcome. People v Luther, 394 Mich 619, 622; 232 NW2d 184 (1975). The defendant
must present evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude:
A)
The threatening conduct was sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable
person the fear of death or serious bodily harm;
B)
The conduct in fact caused such fear of death or serious bodily harm in the mind
of the defendant;
C)
The fear or duress was operating upon the mind of the defendant at the time of
the alleged act; and
D)
The defendant committed the act to avoid the threatened harm. [Id. at 623; see
also People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254, 257; 549 NW2d 39 (1996).]
In this case, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant entered the victim’s home with
an unidentified assailant. Defendant asked the victim where his watch, money, and rings were as the
other person patted down the elderly victim, ushered the victim upstairs, attempted to tie him up, and
locked the victim in the bathroom. As the events unfolded, defendant informed the victim that the other
assailant had a gun and would probably shoot him if he did not give up his property. As defendant
stated this, the unidentified man held his hand in his pocket simulating the presence of a gun. After the
assailants left, the victim remained locked in the bathroom for over two hours. Following these events,
the victim discovered that several pieces of property were missing from his home.
Defendant’s version of the events is not materially different. The only difference is that
defendant claims he participated in the robbery under duress, fearful that the unidentified assailant would
shoot him if he did not assist. However, defendant admitted that he left the house following the
unidentified assailant; but never returned to let the victim out of the bathroom or to call the police.
The trial court chose not to believe defendant. Witness credibility is a matter for the trier of fact
to ascertain, and will not be resolved anew o appeal. People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 380; 465
NW2d 365 (1990). Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational
trier of fact could have concluded that defendant did not act under duress; but rather feloniously took
property from the victim by force, while defendant was unarmed and possessed the intent to rob.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in preparing his sentencing information
report. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court improperly assessed twenty-five points under
offense variable two (OV2) based on its determination that defendant subjected the victim to terrorism.
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We reject defendant’s argument because it is directed at the trial court’s “calculation of the
sentencing variable on the basis of [its] discretionary interpretation of the unchallenged facts,” rather
than the accuracy of the factual basis for the sentence. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 176; 560
NW2d 600 (1997). Since the sentencing guidelines do not have the force of law, “[t]here is no
juridicial basis for claims of error based on alleged misinterpretation of the guidelines, instructions
regarding how the guidelines should be applied, or misapplication of guidelines variables.” Id. at 176
177.
Affirmed.
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Stanley J. Latreille
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