PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERTO MARCHELO DUPREE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 1, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 186515
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 92-034600 FH
ROBERTO MARCHELO DUPREE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Young, P.J., and Gribbs and S. J. Latreille*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction and sentence for possession with intent to
deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15 (7401)(2)(a)(iv).
Defendant pleaded guilty to being an habitual offender, second offense, and was sentenced to twelve to
twenty years’ imprisonment. MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082. We affirm.
I
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing him to waive his constitutional right to
counsel and to proceed in pro per. During direct examination of the prosecution’s first witness, the trial
court granted defendant’s request to represent himself and dismissed defendant’s attorney. A criminal
defendant has the right to represent himself. People v Adkins, 452 Mich 702, 720; 551 NW2d 108
(1996). However, in order for there to be a valid waiver of the right to counsel, three requirements
must be met: (1) the defendant’s request must be unequivocal; (2) the defendant’s request must be
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; and (3) the trial court must establish that the defendant’s
acting as his own counsel will not unduly disrupt or inconvenience the court. Id.; see also People v
Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 367-368; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). The trial court must also substantially
comply with MCR 6.005(D) by offering the assistance of an attorney, and by advising the defendant
about the possible punishment for the charged offense and the risk involved in self-representation. Id. at
720, 726-727.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Defendant first claims that his request was not unequivocal, as evidenced by his request for
standby counsel. We disagree. The record in this case indicates defendant’s unequivocal waiver of
counsel. While defendant briefly inquired during voir dire whether defense counsel could aid him if he
chose to represent himself, he never expressed hesitation. Moreover, defendant later stated his desire
to proceed on his own without equivocation. Adkins, supra at 732-733.
Defendant also maintains that the trial court did not comply with MCR 6.005(D). We disagree.
Strict compliance with the court rule is not required. In Adkins, supra, the Supreme Court explained:
Application of the waiver of counsel procedures is the duty of the court. The
trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the defendant has made the
waiver knowingly and voluntarily. United States v Berkowitz, 927 F2d 1376, 1383
(CA 7, 1991). Further, the effectiveness of an attempted waiver does not depend on
what the court says, but rather, what the defendant understands. Consequently, other
facts, such as evidence of a defendant’s intentional manipulation or delay of the court
proceedings as a tactical decision may favor a judicial finding of a knowing and
intelligent waiver. United States v Sandles, 23 F3d 1121, 1129 (CA 7, 1994).
[Adkins, supra at 723-724.]
Similarly, the existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver depends upon the particular facts and
circumstances of the case, including the defendant’s background and experience. Anderson, supra at
370.
We conclude that defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. While
the trial court did not explicitly inform defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,
in light of defendant’s previous conviction on the charged offense,1 he was clearly aware of the
seriousness of the case, including the nature of the charge and possible punishment. Defendant was
clearly aware that he had the right to have counsel represent him. Furthermore, defendant had a history
of personal involvement with the criminal justice system. That defendant expressed knowledge that
inconvenience to the court was a factor to consider in permitting defendant to proceed on his own
clearly indicates “that he knew what he was doing and made his choice with eyes open.” Anderson,
supra at 371.
We find our comments in People v Morton, 175 Mich App 1, 8; 437 NW2d 284 (1989), to
be particularly appropriate here:
We believe that the record in this case unmistakably shows that defendant
understood exactly what he was doing and chose to represent himself while fully aware
of his alternatives. To permit a defendant in a criminal case to indulge in the charade of
insisting on a right to act as his own attorney and then on appeal to use the very
permission to defend himself in pro per as a basis for reversal of a conviction and a
grant of another trial is to make a mockery of the criminal justice system and the
constitutional rights sought to be protected. We would not permit it.
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II
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting the cocaine evidence because it was
the fruit of an unlawful detainment. However, defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal by
moving to suppress the cocaine at the retrial. People v Carroll, 396 Mich 408, 411-412; 240 NW2d
722 (1976); Up & Out of Poverty Now Coalition v Michigan, 210 Mich App 162, 167; 533
NW2d 339 (1995). A party must object to the admission of evidence at trial, and may not raise the
issue for the first time on appeal absent extraordinary circumstances. MRE 103(a)(1); People v Grant,
445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). That defendant moved to suppress the cocaine at the
first trial is without consequence. The declaration of a mistrial or the granting of a new trial “‘renders
nugatory all trial proceedings with the same result as if there had been no trial at all.’” People v
Cheatham, 135 Mich App 620, 623; 354 NW2d 282 (1984) (citations omitted). In any event, we
find no error because the cocaine was voluntarily abandoned by defendant during a brief investigative
stop and detention. People v Chambers, 195 Mich App 118, 121-124; 489 NW2d 168 (1992).
III
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to Officer Stout’s
expert testimony that the amount of cocaine possessed by defendant was consistent with an intent to
deliver rather than personal use. Defendant’s argument has been steadfastly rejected by this Court.
See, e.g., People v Stimage, 202 Mich App 28, 29-30; 507 NW2d 778 (1993); People v Williams
(After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 541-542; 499 NW2d 404 (1993); People v Ray, 191 Mich
App 706, 707-708; 479 NW2d 1 (1991). We decline defendant’s invitation to hold otherwise.
IV
Next, defendant argues that he was denied his due process rights by the prosecution’s failure to
produce a confidential informant at trial. Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal by raising it
at the retrial in a motion for a post-trial Robinson2 hearing or in a motion for a new trial. People v
Pearson, 404 Mich 698, 722-723; 273 NW2d 856 (1979); People v Jackson, 178 Mich App 62,
66; 443 NW2d 423 (1989). Defendant’s objection following the first trial was insufficient. See
Cheatham, supra at 620. We therefore decline to address this issue. In any event, we note that
defendant did not request the prosecution at either trial to produce the informant or otherwise indicate
any dissatisfaction with the informant’s absence.
Defendant’s alternative claim is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to demand identification and production of the confidential informant before trial. We
agree with the prosecution that defendant has not shown that the contents of the informant’s
communications would have been helpful to the defense. Therefore, defendant was not denied effective
assistance of counsel on this basis. See People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 58; 523 NW2d 830
(1994).
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V
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him because his habitual offender
sentence improperly punishes him for his status as an habitual criminal and because that sentence is
disproportionate. We disagree. Defendant’s first argument is without merit. As this Court stated in
People v Curry, 142 Mich App 724; 371 NW2d 854 (1985):
The Legislature did not intend to make a substantive crime out of being an habitual
offender, but for deterrent purposes intended to augment the punishment for the second
or subsequent offenders. The habitual offender legislation merely provides a procedure
after conviction for the determination of a fact which the court is required to consider in
imposing sentence. It requires the courts to take into consideration the persistence of
the defendant in his criminal course. [Id. at 732.]
We likewise reject defendant’s claim that his habitual offender sentence is disproportionate.
According to his presentence report, defendant’s criminal history began in 1986 when he was 19 years
old. Defendant has been convicted of four felonies. In addition to drug trafficking, defendant has
engaged in violent crime, namely assault with a dangerous weapon. His continued pattern of offenses
demonstrates disregard for the seriousness of criminal behavior. In fact, defendant “walked away from
[the Detroit Metro Furlough Unit] on 4/29/92 and involved himself in the instant offense the following
day.” Finally, as the trial court noted, defendant committed two major misconducts while he was
incarcerated awaiting retrial on the instant offense. Defendant’s twelve year minimum sentence is
proportionate considering the circumstances surrounding this offense and this offender. People v
Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s sentencing decision.
Affirmed.
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Stanley J. Latreille
1
Defendant was originally convicted of the charged offense on July 28, 1992. However, the trial court
granted defendant’s request for a new trial based on the erroneous introduction of statements made by
defendant during plea negotiations. The record indicates that defendant was not pleased with his court
appointed attorney in that case either.
2
People v Robinson, 390 Mich 629; 213 NW2d 106 (1973).
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