HOWARD HOTCHKISS V JOSEPH PONTIAC INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HOWARD HOTCHKISS,
UNPUBLISHED
July 22, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 194923
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-492170
JOSEPH PONTIAC, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hood, P.J., and McDonald and Young, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant summary disposition
on plaintiff's handicap discrimination claim. We affirm.
Plaintiff, a certified mechanic, was terminated from his position as a service technician at
defendant car dealership after approximately two years. During plaintiff's initial interview with
defendant’s owner and another employee, plaintiff indicated that he had a heart condition. Before
beginning employment with defendant, plaintiff signed an employment at-will agreement. During his
employment with defendant, plaintiff advised numerous individuals of his heart condition. This condition
did not affect plaintiff's performance and was never raised as an issue by anyone. In fact, despite his
irregular heart beat, there was evidence that plaintiff jogged to work and lifted more than forty pounds,
which was his weight restriction.
During his less than two-year tenure with defendant, two of plaintiff's three supervisors
discussed with plaintiff his poor work performance, including plaintiff's making repairs and leaving
customer vehicles in disarray with grease on the carpets, doors and steering wheels, and plaintiff's
excessive number of "come-backs" (cars being returned after repairs were supposedly repaired).
Plaintiff was counseled about these poor performance issues and was given verbal reprimands by
defendant's owner, as well as defendant's general manager and the two supervisors. Defendant's owner
testified that plaintiff talked back to him and stated, on numerous occasions, “If you don't like it, fire
me.” Defendant's owner also testified that he received a lot of calls from customers about plaintiff’s
work.
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When plaintiff was terminated, the service manager told him that he had a vehicle "come-back"
from the day before; that he had an excessive number of "come-backs," thirteen in five months; and that
his work quality was a problem. Plaintiff, however, claimed that he had never been warned about
“come-backs” before his termination. Plaintiff did admit that he remembered several of the "come
backs" that were itemized for him at the time of his termination. Plaintiff further acknowledged receiving
a written warning, unrelated to "come-backs." Defendant's owner indicated that after plaintiff was
terminated, they no longer had excessive "come-backs."
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary disposition on his
Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (MHCRA)1 claim. We disagree. We review a trial court’s
order of summary disposition de novo. Weisman v US Blades, Inc, 217 Mich App 565, 566-567;
557 NW2d 484 (1996). Summary disposition may be granted where, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10).
To establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that (1) he
is handicapped as defined by the MHCRA, (2) his handicap is unrelated to his ability to perform the
duties of the particular job or position, and (3) he has been discriminated against in one of the ways set
forth in the MHCRA, i.e. being discharged because of the handicap.2 Hall v Hackley Hosp, 211 Mich
App 48, 53-54; 532 NW2d 893 (1995). There must be evidence that the employer acted because of
the employee’s handicap, and that the employer intended to discriminate because of the handicap. See
Crittenden v Chrysler Corp, 178 Mich App 324, 330; 443 NW2d 412 (1989); Murphy v
Bradford-White Corp, 166 Mich App 195, 197; 420 NW2d 101 (1987); Hickman v General
Motors Corp, 177 Mich App 246, 249; 441 NW2d 430 (1989). “Discriminatory intent may be
inferred from the evidence presented.” Hickman, supra.
Once a plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
show legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. Crittenden, supra at 331. If the employer
rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who then has to show that
the employer's reasons constituted a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp
v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973).
In this case, the evidence offered by plaintiff to sustain the prima facie case was that he believed
that he was terminated because eight days before his termination, he informed his supervisor that he had
been to the doctor’s office and that if his heart deteriorated by five percent he would become disabled.
Plaintiff felt that the proximity in time between the events evidenced discriminatory intent. Plaintiff also
believed that defendant terminated him because defendant was in the process of getting disability
insurance and his condition would have raised the premiums.
Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that he was discriminated against because of his
handicap. Plaintiff’s bare assertion that he felt or believed that he was a victim of discrimination is
insufficient to allow a case to proceed to the jury. Bouwman v Chrysler Corp, 114 Mich App 670,
682; 319 NW2d 621 (1982). In fact, the evidence in this case implies an opposite conclusion. The
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evidence shows that plaintiff was hired after disclosing that he had a heart condition; plaintiff informed
numerous employees about this condition throughout his tenure with defendant and no adverse action
was taken before plaintiff had his thirteenth “come-back” in five months; plaintiff admitted that no one
ever said anything derogatory about his heart condition or told him that he should not be working; and
several witnesses stated that they had never heard any remarks about plaintiff’s condition.3 In addition,
plaintiff’s supervisors noted that he had a higher "come-back" rate than others. Moreover, plaintiff
presented no authority to support the proposition that the mere timing of his discharge demonstrates
defendant's discriminatory intent.
Furthermore, plaintiff’s claim that defendant discharged him because defendant was in the
process of getting disability insurance is wholly unsupported by the record. The evidence clearly
establishes that defendant never attempted to secure disability insurance for its employees. Rather,
defendant's employees were solicited individually by an insurance salesman and many purchased
disability insurance for themselves without any contribution from defendant.
Plaintiff also failed to offer evidence that would show that the offered, legitimate reason for his
termination, excessive “come-backs,” was a mere pretext. Plaintiff offered numerous reasons why he
believed that defendant's reason was a pretext. We find that none create a genuine issue of material
issue of fact. Contrary to plaintiff's claims, there was overwhelming evidence that his amount of “come
backs” was excessive and that his quality of work was poor. In fact, the evidence showed that the day
before his termination, he had an automobile returned to the dealership within a 1/2 hour after he
“repaired” it. Further, the phrase "come-backs" as it related to plaintiff's employment and defendant's
expectations at defendant's workplace does not appear to be ambiguous or deceptive. The trial court
properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
We conclude that plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to create a question of material fact
as to his prima facie case of handicap discrimination. Even if he had presented sufficient evidence,
plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant's proffered reason for
plaintiff's discharge, excessive come-backs, was untrue. Summary disposition was therefore
appropriate on plaintiff's handicap discrimination claim.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in reinstating the grant of summary
disposition after it had vacated its order on the matter. Again, we disagree. After the trial judge entered
an order granting summary disposition, plaintiff made a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the
order be vacated. Plaintiff discovered that before the entry of the order, the case had been reassigned
to another circuit court judge. Without citing any applicable authority, plaintiff argued that because the
case had been reassigned before the order was entered, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear and rule on
the issue of summary disposition. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion. Defendant thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration, alerting the court to the fact that it did have authority to enter the order and
requesting that the order be reinstated. The court reviewed defendant’s motion and then reinstated the
order of summary disposition. Plaintiff complains that the trial court should not have heard defendant’s
motion because it amounted to a response to a motion for reconsideration and the court rules do not
allow a response to a motion for reconsideration. 4
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A judicial tribunal always has some power to correct its own errors or otherwise appropriately
modify its judgments, decrees, and orders. See Public Health Dep’t v Rivergate Manner, 452 Mich
495; 550 NW2d 515 (1996). MCR 2.613(B) provides that an order may be set aside or vacated by
the judge who entered that order. Moreover, a trial court has authority to handle matters of
reconsideration in any manner it directs. MCR 2.119(F). In this case, defendant’s motion for
reconsideration apparently presented case law that convinced the court that it had been misled by
plaintiff and had erred in holding that it did not have authority to enter the original order. The trial court
did not err in granting defendant's motion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
1
MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq.
2
MCL 37.1202(1)(b); MSA 3.550(202)(1)(b).
3
In addition, the testimony revealed that defendant employed and continues to employ other persons
with disabilities, including a person suffering from cancer; a person with an extremely serious heart
condition; and an employee with knee problems.
4
Oakland Circuit Judge Richard Kuhn apparently had a conflict on his docket with a similar unrelated
case. As a result, Judge Kuhn's case was reassigned to the original trial judge in this case, Oakland
Circuit Judge Edward Sosnick. The instant case was then reassigned to Judge Kuhn for docket control
purposes. The case was transferred after the briefs were filed, but before Judge Sosnick ruled. Neither
party nor the judge was aware of the transfer until well after it occurred and after the hearing on
defendant's motion for summary disposition.
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