IN RE BRANDON WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________________________
In the Matter of BRANDON WILLIAMS, a Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 197940
Wayne Probate Court
LC No. 95-335591
BRANDON WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Neff and Reilly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged in separate petitions with first, unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530; MSA
28.798, and second, second-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(3); MSA 28.305(a)(3), and
malicious destruction of real property, MCL 750.380; MSA 28.612. He was convicted as charged
following separate bench trials held on the same day in the juvenile court. Defendant was committed to
the temporary custody of the Michigan Department of Social Services for referral to “a suitable
placement or secure detention facility” to be determined by the Family Independence Agency.
Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand for further
proceedings.
I
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain each of his convictions. When
considering a sufficiency of the evidence challenge following a bench trial, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found
that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hutner,
209 Mich App 280, 282; 530 NW2d 174 (1995).
First, defendant contends that the prosecution failed to show that he placed complainant
Dewayne Smith in fear for the purpose of taking Smith’s money. However, Smith testified that he
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removed seventeen dollars from his pocket and surrendered it to defendant because he feared that
defendant “was going to beat [him] up.” This evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction
of unarmed robbery. People v Johnson, 206 Mich App 122, 126; 520 NW2d 672 (1994).
Second, defendant contends that the prosecution failed to show by way of direct evidence that
he entered complainant Mary Johnson’s home and thereby failed to present sufficient evidence to
sustain defendant’s conviction of second-degree home invasion. MCL 750.110a; MSA 28.305(a)
provides in relevant part:
(3) A person who breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a felony or a
larceny in the dwelling or a person who enters a dwelling without permission with intent
to commit a felony or a larceny in the dwelling is guilty of home invasion in the second
degree.
It is a well-established rule that circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may
be sufficient to prove the elements of a crime. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177
(1993).
Here, two police officers observed defendant lowering another individual from Johnson’s dining
room window. When one of the officers ordered defendant and his companion to hold their positions,
the two fled. Further, Johnson discovered, upon entering her residence, that the dining room window
was broken, that glass from the window was “all over the floor,” and that her diamond ring and gold
bracelet were gone. This evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to convict defendant of
second-degree home invasion.
Third, defendant contends that the prosecution failed to establish the value element necessary to
sustain his felony conviction of malicious destruction of real property over $100. We agree, as the
record contains no evidence regarding the value of Johnson’s dining room window. Because the
prosecution failed to prove that the resultant damage exceeded the statutory minimum to make the
offense a felony, defendant must be convicted of only a misdemeanor. See People v Toodle, 155 Mich
App 539, 551; 400 NW2d 670 (1986). Therefore, we vacate defendant’s felony conviction of
malicious destruction of real property over $100 and remand for entry of a judgment of conviction of
malicious destruction of real property of $100 or less, a misdemeanor. See People v McFarland, 14
Mich App 313, 314; 165 NW2d 463 (1968).
II
Defendant next argues that Smith was exposed to an impermissibly suggestive pretrial
identification procedure and, concomitantly, that the trial court erred in admitting Smith’s in-court
identification for want of a basis independent of the impermissibly suggestive procedure. Defendant did
not move to suppress the in-court identification, nor did he move for an evidentiary hearing concerning
the suggestiveness of the pretrial identification and, therefore, this issue is not preserved for appellate
review. People v Lee, 391 Mich 618, 626; 218 NW2d 655 (1974); People v Daniels, 163 Mich
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App 703, 710-711; 415 NW2d 282 (1987). In any event, the record reflects a sufficient independent
basis for identification.
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III
Lastly, defendant argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion at the dispositional hearing
by committing defendant to the temporary custody of the Michigan Department of Social Services for
placement and supervision at a suitable facility to be determined by the Family Independence Agency.
We disagree. The record from the dispositional hearing reveals that the probation officer who prepared
defendant’s disposition report recommended commitment because defendant’s legal guardian, Patricia
Williams, was unwilling to assume sole responsibility for defendant. Moreover, Williams, herself,
expressed to the court her reluctance in caring for defendant. In light of this testimony, we find no abuse
of discretion.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Maureen P. Reilly
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