PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL KENNETH CRAIG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 185882
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 94-007591
DANIEL KENNETH CRAIG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Saad and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree (intercourse—during felony), MCL 750.520b(1)(c); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(c), criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree (intercourse—weapon used), MCL 750.520b(1)(e); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e),
kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five to fifty years on
each of the first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions, as well as on the kidnapping conviction.
Defendant was also sentenced to a mandatory two-year term on the felony-firearm conviction. We
affirm.
Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s motion to
suppress the evidence received pursuant to an illegal search and seizure. We disagree. The trial court’s
decision to deny a motion to suppress evidence will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous.
People v H
oustina, 216 Mich App 70, 73; 549 NW2d 11 (1996). Clear error exists when the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. People v
Lombardo, 216 Mich App 500, 504; 549 NW2d 596 (1996).
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that the apartment building
appeared abandoned, thereby justifying the police officers’ entry. We disagree. The testimony given by
VinteVoghel indicated that the building appeared vacant and had boarded-up windows. The main
entrance doors to the building were open and the first floor was empty, but for a lawnmower in an
empty apartment. The second floor also appeared vacant and all of the doors were open. While
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walking through one of the units, VinteVoghel observed a stove, dresser, couch, and other furniture
items.
We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial court in
finding that the building appeared abandoned: this justified the officers’ search of the building without a
warrant. Lombardo, supra. We hold that the officers’ search of the apartment building was
reasonable under all of the circumstances presented because an owner no longer has an expectation of
privacy in the property he has abandoned. Abandonment is an ultimate fact or conclusion that generally
is based on a combination of act and intent. People v Rasmussen, 191 Mich App 721, 725; 478
NW2d 752 (1991).
Defendant also claims that the trial court erroneously concluded that exigent circumstances
existed which obviated the need for a search warrant of defendant’s premises. We disagree.
Generally, a search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless there exists both probable
cause and exigent circumstances establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. People v
Jordan, 187 Mich App 582, 586; 468 NW2d 294 (1991). Probable cause to search exists when
facts and circumstances warrant a reasonably prudent person in believing that a crime has been
committed and that the evidence sought will be found in a stated place. Whether probable cause exists
depends on the information known to the officers at the time of the search. Id., 586-587. The exigent
circumstance exception is applicable where the police have probable cause to believe that an immediate
search will produce specific evidence of a crime and that an immediate search without a warrant is
necessary in order to (1) protect the officers or others, (2) prevent the loss or destruction of evidence,
or (3) prevent the escape of an accused. Id.at 587.
We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial court in
finding that exigent circumstances existed which justified the officers’ warrantless search of defendant’s
premises. Lombardo, supra. Based on the information given to VinteVoghel by the complainant while
in the EMS unit briefly after she had escaped from the building, we conclude that VinteVoghel and his
partner had both probable cause and exigent circumstances which established an exception to the
warrant requirement. Jordan, supra. The officers had sufficient facts and circumstances which
warranted a belief that a crime had been committed and that the evidence sought would be found at
8509 Moffett, the location that the complainant described as where the crimes took place.
Furthermore, we conclude that VinteVoghel had probable cause to believe that an immediate
search would produce specific evidence of a crime and that an immediate search without a warrant was
necessary in order to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence or prevent the escape of an accused.
Jordan, supra. Complainant told VinteVoghel that she had just escaped from the basement of an
apartment building where she had been held captive, tied up and raped repeatedly. She also told him
about a shotgun located in the apartment. Based on this information, we hold that the trial court
properly concluded that exigent circumstances existed which permitted a search of the building without a
warrant.
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Defendant further asserts that the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s motion to suppress
his statement. We disagree. Traditionally, a determination by a trial court concerning whether a
statement is involuntary, and therefore inadmissible, is a determination made on the basis of the totality
of the circumstances, and this Court reviews that determination under a clearly erroneous standard.
People v Brannon, 194 Mich App 121, 131; 486 NW2d 83 (1992). The issue of voluntariness is a
question of law for the court’s determination. People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338;
132 NW2d 87 (1965). The prosecution has the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance
of the evidence. People v Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 57; 492 NW2d 490 (1992). In reviewing
the trial court’s findings, this Court makes an independent determination of voluntariness. This Court
gives deference to the trial court’s superior ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and will not
reverse the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
Defendant argues that the trial court committed clear error in failing to suppress his statement
because (1) Lewis admitted that he took information from defendant before reading him his
constitutional rights, (2) defendant asserted that Lewis did not read him his rights until after the statement
was taken down, and (3) defendant mistakenly believed that as soon as his rights were read to him, he
automatically was assigned an attorney. We disagree.
This Court has held that the simple asking of a defendant’s name is not interrogation or an
investigative question requiring the issuance of Miranda1 warnings. People v Armendarez, 188 Mich
App 61, 73; 468 NW2d 893 (1991); People v Cuellar, 107 Mich App 491, 493; 310 NW2d 12
(1981). This Court has also held that interrogation refers to express questioning and to any words or
actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the subject. People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 532-533; 531
NW2d 780 (1995). Lewis testified that he asked defendant various background questions prior to
reading defendant his rights and taking his statement to determine if he was coherent. Lewis did not read
defendant his rights while making the interrogation record because he was not asking defendant anything
pertaining to the allegations against him. Since the simple asking of a defendant’s name is not
interrogation or an investigative question requiring the issuance of Miranda warnings, Armendarez,
supra; Cuellar, supra, and since these questions were not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating
responses, Anderson, supra, we hold that the trial court did not commit clear error in denying
defendant’s motion to suppress these answers.
In determining voluntariness, the court should consider all of the circumstances, including: (1) the
age, education and intelligence of the accused, (2) the extent of his previous experience with the police,
(3) the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, (4) the length of the detention of the accused
before he gave the statement in question, (5) the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional
rights, (6) whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention, and (7) whether the
suspect was threatened with abuse. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988).
In addition, a defendant must be informed by the police that a retained attorney is immediately available
for consultation. The failure to do so before a confession is obtained precludes a knowing and intelligent
waiver of defendant’s right to remain silent. People v Bender, 452 Mich 594, 597; 551 NW2d 71
(1996).
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Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Garwood, supra, we hold that the trial court
correctly concluded that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made a statement to Lewis
after he had been informed of his rights. Although the testimony of Lewis and defendant was conflicting,
the trial court held that the confusion arose because Lewis initially took down background information
prior to reading defendant his rights, which was consistent with defendant’s testimony. The trial court
found that the setting was not coercive, and that by defendant’s own admissions, he was not promised
anything or threatened in any way. Lewis testified that defendant appeared coherent, and that defendant
told him that he was not under any influences. Defendant did not appear hungry, tired or injured to
Lewis when making his statement. Since this Court gives deference to the trial court’s superior ability to
judge the credibility of the witnesses and will not reverse the trial court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous, Etheridge, supra, we conclude that the trial court did not commit clear error in
finding defendant’s statement to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
This Court has held that an ambiguous indication of interest in having counsel requires cessation
of police interrogation. People v White, 191 Mich App 296, 298; 477 NW2d 143 (1991); People v
Myers, 158 Mich App 1, 9; 404 NW2d 677 (1987). We hold that the trial court properly concluded
that defendant did not invoke his immediate right to counsel when he mistakenly believed that he was
requesting an attorney by signing the rights form. Defendant expressed his willingness to talk to Lewis
and relay his side of the story to him without any concern of having an attorney present. The facts of the
instant case are distinguishable from prior cases where the defendants have made such comments as,
“Could I talk to someone”2 and “Maybe I should have an attorney.”3 Defendant did not ask for an
attorney or make any comment regarding his desire for outside assistance, although he may have wanted
an attorney or thought he was automatically assigned one. Therefore, we find no error in the trial
court’s ruling.
Defendant next argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously decided that the police
exercised due diligence in attempting to locate the cab driver. We disagree. Because a finding of due
diligence is a finding of fact, this Court will not set it aside absent clear error. MCR 2.613; People v
Briseno, 211 Mich App 11, 14; 535 NW2d 559 (1995).
The test for due diligence is whether good-faith efforts were made to procure the testimony of
the witnesses, not whether increased efforts would have produced it. People v Watkins, 209 Mich
App 1, 4; 530 NW2d 111 (1995). The prosecution is required to do everything reasonable, rather
than everything possible, in locating a res gestae witness. People v Joseph LeFlore (After Remand),
122 Mich App 314, 319; 333 NW2d 47 (1983). We conclude that a good-faith effort was made by
Evans when she contacted Checker Cab Company and learned that the records had been destroyed.
All of the records were on computer, and were only saved for ninety to ninety-five days. Even if Evans
had called on November 22, 1994, the date of the entry of the trial court’s order, the records still would
have been destroyed as ninety-five days had passed. Since each cab driver worked as an independent
contractor, there was no way to determine who worked what shift without knowing the cab number.
The trial court did not err in its due diligence determination.
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Lastly, defendant contends that his minimum sentences of twenty-five years on the two first
degree criminal sexual conduct convictions and the kidnapping conviction violate the principle of
proportionality. We disagree. Defendant’s twenty-five-year minimum sentences were within the
guidelines minimum sentence range of ten to twenty-five years. Therefore, they are presumed
proportionate unless unusual circumstances exist. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 661; 461
NW2d 1 (1990).
Although defense counsel argues that defendant’s lack of criminal history constituted an unusual
circumstance, this Court has held that a defendant’s lack of prior criminal history is not an unusual
circumstance which would warrant a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a
sentence w
ithin the guidelines. People v Piotrowski, 211 Mich App 527, 533; 536 NW2d 293
(1995); People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). Because defendant has
failed to overcome the presumptive proportionality of his sentences, and given the gravity of the offenses
committed, we conclude that the court did not abuse its sentencing discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
We concur in result only
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602, 1612; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
2
White, supra, 191 Mich App 297.
3
Myers, supra, 158 Mich App 7.
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