IN RE LYNN MARIE NAKONECZNY MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re JENNIFER NAKONECZNY, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED
July 11, 1997
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 197106
Presque Isle Probate
LC No. 95-000015-NA
CHRISTINE NAKONECZNY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LEROY NAKONECZNY,
Respondent.
In re LYNN MARIE NAKONECZNY, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 197125
Presque Isle Probate
LC No. 95-000021-NA
CHRISTINE NAKONECZNY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
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LEROY NAKONECZNY,
Respondent.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Michael J. Kelly and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the probate court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
minor children, Jennifer and Lynn Nakoneczny, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (h), MSA 27.3178
(598.19b)(3)(b)(ii) (failure to prevent abuse) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(h); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(h) (imprisonment). We affirm.
The probate court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination had
been established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Ryan Miller, 433 Mich 331,
337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, respondent-appellant failed to show that termination of her
parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best interests. In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470,
472; ____ NW2d ____ (1997). Thus, the probate court did not err in terminating respondent
appellant’s parental rights to the children. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5).
The record reveals that respondent was aware that her husband sexually abused their older
daughter, Jennifer, but did nothing to prevent the continued abuse. The record also reveals that
respondent’s younger daughter, Lynn, witnessed certain incidents of this abuse. Further, the probate
court placed great weight on respondent’s cohabitation and ongoing relationship with another man who
previously had been convicted of sexually abusing a child. This living arrangement, begun after
respondent’s husband was imprisoned, violated respondent’s probation and led to her current
incarceration. Despite this, respondent has expressed her intention to marry her new boyfriend upon
her release from prison.
In addition, respondent failed to take responsibility for the safety of her daughters. She did not
follow through with substance abuse and parenting skills counseling sessions. She has continued to
blame Jennifer for her father’s conviction for child abuse and for the family’s dissolution.
The probate court did not clearly err in finding that respondent’s children would be deprived of
a normal home for a period exceeding two years and that there is no reasonable expectation that
respondent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the age
of the children. Once a statutory ground for termination of parental rights has been established, the
probate court shall order termination unless that termination is clearly not in the best interests of the
child. In re Hall-Smith, supra. The burden of proof regarding the best interests of the child rests with
the respondent. Id. The probate court in this case properly exercised its discretion in deciding that
termination of the respondent’s parental rights to Jennifer and Lynn was in the best interests of the
children. The evidence clearly supports the probate court’s determination that the grounds for
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termination were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Further, respondent has failed to offer
evidence that termination was not in the children’s best interests. Indeed, the probate court’s decision
regarding the best interests of the children is supported by the evidence establishing the grounds for
termination.
Respondent next argues that, as a non-Indian and as a parent of non-Indian children, she was
denied equal protection under US Const, Am V and Const 1963, art 1, § 2, because the petitioner
need only satisfy a clear and convincing evidentiary standard to terminate her parental rights, while it
applies a reasonable doubt standard to American Indians and their children. We reject petitioner’s
contention.
This issue was not raised in the probate court. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 537; 520
NW2d 123 (1994), holds that “appellate courts will consider claims of constitutional error for the first
time on appeal when the alleged error could have been decisive of the outcome.” The alleged
constitutional error was not outcome determinative, because the proofs sufficed under the higher
evidentiary standard. This Court previously addressed the merits of this issue in In re Julie Miller, 182
Mich App 70; 451 NW2d 576 (1990). There, this Court applied the rational relationship test for
constitutionality of laws relating to Indians as set forth in Morton v. Mancari, 417 US 535; 94 S Ct
2474; 41 L Ed 2d 290 (1974). The United States Supreme Court ruled in Mancari that preferences
given to American Indians “as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities,” and not as a “discrete racial
group,” are not “proscribed forms of racial discrimination.” Mancari, supra, 94 S Ct at 2484-85. As
such, the rational basis test is applied to such preferences. Id. This Court, in In re Miller, concluded
that the evidentiary standard applied to American Indians “is a permissible goal rationally tied to the
fulfillment of Congress’ unique guardianship obligation toward Indians … and [is not a] denial of …
equal protection.” Miller, supra at 76.
Affirmed.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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