PEOPLE OF MI V CRAIG LEROY ATKINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 8, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 194842
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 88-086374
CRAIG LEROY ATKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gribbs, PJ., and Sawyer and Young, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317;
MSA 28.549. The trial court sentenced defendant to twenty-five to eighty years’ imprisonment. After
two deficient and untimely attempts to appeal his conviction to this Court, defendant filed a motion for
relief from judgment pursuant to MCR 6.502 in the trial court. The trial court denied defendant’s
motion. Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court, which this Court denied. This
Court also denied defendant’s motion for rehearing. Defendant then filed an application for leave to
appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave, the Michigan Supreme Court
remanded the matter to this Court for consideration as on leave granted.1 We affirm.
Defendant has the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief from judgment. MCR
6.508(D). Relief is not available on grounds that could have been raised in defendant’s previous
motions or appeals unless good cause and actual prejudice are shown. Defendant concedes that he
could have raised all of the issues he raised in this motion in a prior appeal, but contends that this Court
should excuse his failure to do so because his prior appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to properly perfect his appeal. Even assuming that defendant can meet the good cause
requirement of MCR 6.508 by demonstrating that he received ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 378; 535 NW2d 436 (1995), he still must demonstrate that
the alleged errors that occurred at his trial resulted in actual prejudice. MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b). In order
to determine whether defendant has met this requirement, we will review defendant’s substantive claims.
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Defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecution improperly
introduced the testimony of two FBI agents as rebuttal evidence. The Michigan Supreme Court
recently held that “the test of whether rebuttal evidence was properly admitted is not whether the
evidence could have been offered in the prosecutor’s case in chief, but rather, whether the evidence is
properly responsive to evidence introduced or a theory developed by the defendant.” People v
Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 399; 547 NW2d 673 (1996). In Figgures, the Court explained that if
“evidence is responsive to material presented by the defense, it is properly classified as rebuttal, even if
it overlaps evidence admitted in the prosecutor’s case in chief.” Id.
We find that the testimony of the FBI agents meets this test. On direct examination, defendant
explained his version of the events on the night of the murder. The agents testified that defendant stated
to them that the murder was done in self-defense. Therefore, the testimony of the FBI agents described
another version of the events told by defendant. This was responsive to evidence presented by
defendant because until defendant testified, there had been no evidence of his version of the events.
Moreover, we find that the prosecutor did not employ the improper technique of eliciting a
denial on cross-examination in order to “facilitate the admission of new evidence.” Id. at 401. It
appears that the prosecutor questioned defendant about the statement on cross-examination in order to
meet the requirements of establishing a foundation pursuant to MRE 613. The agents’ testimony would
have been responsive to defendant’s proofs regardless of whether the prosecutor had asked about the
statement in cross-examination. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the prosecution to present this rebuttal evidence. Id. at 398.
Even if the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the agents to testify in rebuttal, reversal
would not be warranted because it does not appear that defendant was prejudiced. Defendant asserts
that if the testimony had been properly introduced in the prosecution’s case in chief, he would have been
able to call witnesses and introduce other evidence to refute the agents’ testimony rather than being left
with only his own denials. However, it is unclear to us what type of evidence could have been brought
other than defendant’s own denial because, at the time the statement was alleged to have been made,
only defendant and the two agents were present. In light of the strong evidence against defendant and
the eyewitness testimony, we do not believe that the relatively weak testimony of the agents had an
effect on the jury. Therefore, any error from the admission of the testimony as rebuttal evidence was
harmless. People v Humphreys, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 184583, rel’d
2/11/97), slip opinion at 2 citing People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 218-221; 551 NW2d 891
-3,
(1996).
Defendant also argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to refuse to disclose the contents
of defendant’s statement outside of the presence of the jury. At the time of defendant’s trial, MRE 613
provided, in pertinent part:
(a)
Examining a witness concerning prior statement. In examining a witness
concerning a prior statement made by the witness, if written the statement must be
shown to the witness and if oral, its substance and the time, place, and person to whom
the statement was made must be disclosed to the witness, and on request must be
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shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. [People v Barnett, 165 Mich App 311, 315;
418 Mich 445 (1987).]
The rule did not require the prosecutor to first make inquiry about a prior inconsistent statement out of
the presence of the jury. People v Santana, 139 Mich App 484, 491 n 2; 363 NW2d 702 (1984).
Although it was improper for the prosecutor not to disclose the substance of the statement when
defense counsel made the request out of the presence of the jury, any prejudice to defendant from their
testimony was dispelled for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, reversal on this basis is not
warranted.
Next, defendant argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to argue that his statement to the
FBI agents should be used by the jury as substantive evidence of his guilt. Defense counsel’s failure to
object to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper argument waives appellate review of this issue. People v
Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996). Moreover, any prejudice due to
improper argument could have been eliminated by a curative instruction. People v Johnson, 100 Mich
App 594, 599; 300 NW2d 332 (1980). We also reject defendant’s contention that automatic reversal
is required based on the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury that the statement could not
be used as substantive evidence. Recent cases clearly indicate that a defendant’s failure to request an
omitted instruction waives appellate review absent manifest injustice. People v Paquette, 214 Mich
App 336, 338-339; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). Manifest injustice is not present in this case.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined his character witness by
referring to defendant’s prior arrests. The prosecutor’s question was proper in light of the witness’
testimony on redirect examination regarding defendant’s general good character. People v Roupe, 150
Mich App 469, 478; 389 NW2d 449 (1986). Moreover, even if the question was improper, any
prejudice was eliminated when the trial court instructed the jury that it was only proper to consider this
evidence in evaluating the credibility of the character witness and that it was not to consider it
substantive evidence of defendant’s guilt. Id. The form of the prosecutor’s question was also proper.
Although the prosecutor initially misspoke, the question which was directed at the witness did not
suggest that “the former misconduct [was] a fact.” People v Fields, 93 Mich App 702, 709; 287
NW2d 325 (1979). Defendant also argues that the trial court should have inquired into the charges
before allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the witness on this matter, citing People v Dorrikas,
354 Mich 303; 92 NW2d 305 (1958) and People v Whitfield, 425 Mich 116, 133; 388 NW2d 206
(1986). Dorrikas is distinguishable from this case because, there, the jury was not instructed on the
proper use of the evidence. Dorrikas, supra at 326-327. Moreover, the rule of Whitfield, supra at
133, is inapposite because, in this case, defendant did not request the trial court to determine the scope
of cross-examination.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct which denied him a fair trial.
Defendant failed to object to any of the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct at trial, but argues
that the prejudice from the prosecutor’s conduct was so great that it could not have been eliminated by
a curative instruction to the jury. We disagree.
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Defendant first asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued facts not in evidence during
rebuttal when he stated to the jury that fingerprints are generally not discovered at a crime scene due to
their fragility. The prosecution concedes that this was not supported by any evidence at trial. However,
we find that any prejudice was eliminated when the trial court instructed the jury that the arguments of
attorneys were not evidence and that it should disregard anything said by an attorney which was not
supported by the evidence. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 281; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence by arguing that the
FBI agents did not have a duty to include defendant’s statement in their report. We believe that
defendant mischaracterizes the prosecutor’s remarks. The prosecutor did not indicate that the agents
were not required to include the statement in their report, in fact he suggested that they should have
included it. When viewed in context, it is apparent that the challenged remarks were proper comments
on the agents’ testimony at trial. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 284; 545 NW2d 18
(1996).
Defendant next asserts that the prosecutor made an improper argument of facts not in evidence
when he commented during closing argument that defendant “went on an extensive escapade.”
Defendant contends that there was no evidence that he went on an “escapade” after the crime. We
disagree. We read the prosecutor’s statement as referring to the evidence at trial that defendant left the
scene of the crime without assisting the victim and, shortly thereafter, fled to California. Defendant
further argues that this remark was prejudicial because when coupled with the prosecutor’s reference to
his prior arrests during cross-examination of defendant’s character witness, it suggested that he left the
state and “went on a crime escapade” resulting in the thirty-six arrests. We find no such suggestion in
the prosecutor’s argument.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly suggested to the jury that he was a “bad man”
capable of committing the murder. Defendant first asserts that the prosecutor suggested this when
questioning Detective Bovee about a telephone conversation he had with defendant after defendant had
fled the jurisdiction. The prosecutor elicited testimony from Detective Bovee that he recognized
defendant’s voice because he had talked to him several times over a period of years. We find that these
questions were proper to lay a foundation for the detective’s testimony that defendant made certain
statements to him during the conversation. Moreover, the prosecutor’s later reference to this testimony
merely reminded the jury that the detective recognized defendant’s voice. Although it is possible that
the jury inferred from this testimony that defendant had been previously arrested, the prosecutor did not
ask the jury to make this inference and did not make an improper propensity argument.
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor’s remark that “if you prosecute the devil, you have
to go to hell for your witnesses” suggested to the jury that he was a “bad man.” The remark was part
of a discussion which focused on the prosecution’s witnesses, not defendant. Moreover, any possible
prejudice from this remark was eliminated when the jury was later properly instructed that the comments
and arguments of the attorneys were not evidence. Bahoda, supra at 281.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting highly prejudicial hearsay
testimony over his objection. We do not agree. In any case, even assuming arguendo that the
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challenged statements were improperly admitted, any error was harmless because the testimony was
cumulative to other properly admitted evidence. People v Rodriquez (On Remand), 216 Mich App
329, 332; 549 NW2d 359 (1996).
Finally, defendant asserts in his pro se supplemental brief that the prosecutor’s use of perjured
testimony at trial violated his right to due process. We find that defendant has failed to establish that the
FBI agents perjured themselves at trial; therefore, he has not met the threshold test of establishing a due
process violation. United States v Lochmondy, 890 F2d 817, 822 (CA 6, 1989). Moreover,
defendant’s alternative argument that his conviction should be reversed because the testimony of the
agents was used to “mislead the jury into believing that [he] had admitted to the killing” is without merit.2
Although defendant’s statement was not a confession in the sense that the agents did not testify that
defendant stated “I killed the victim in self-defense,” the statement could be interpreted to be an
admission of guilt. Therefore, it was not misleading for the prosecutor to argue that the jury could
interpret the statement in this way.3
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
1
451 Mich 875 (1996).
2
We have already addressed defendant’s argument that it was improper for the prosecutor to argue
that the statement should be used as substantive evidence of his guilt. We interpret this argument as
raising the separate issue of whether the prosecutor mischaracterized the agents’ testimony.
3
We need not address the other issue raised in defendant’s pro se supplemental brief that the intentional
nature of the prosecutor’s misconduct should bar retrial, because we have found no prosecutorial
misconduct and are not reversing defendant’s conviction.
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