PEOPLE OF MI V MARCUS DONALD SNIDER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 8, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193857
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-005006
MARCUS DONALD SNIDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Bandstra and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411i; MSA
643(9), and subsequently, was sentenced to two years’ probation. Defendant appeals as of right, and
we affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony from a police
lieutenant regarding contacts the defendant had with the victim after a “no contact” order had been
imposed on defendant. We disagree. Because the lieutenant’s testimony was cumulative of the victim’s
properly admitted testimony on direct examination, we hold that, even assuming the evidence was
inadmissible hearsay, its admission was harmless. See People v Dixon, 161 Mich App 388, 396; 411
NW2d 760 (1987).
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecution was allowed to
offer improper rebuttal evidence about the victim reporting to the police her telephone contact with
defendant. We disagree. The admission of rebuttal evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 398;
547 NW2d 673 (1996). Because the prosecution’s entire rebuttal case was cumulative of other
evidence that had already been properly admitted, we hold that, even assuming that the rebuttal
evidence was improperly admitted, the error was harmless. People v DeLeon, 103 Mich App 225,
230; 303 NW2d 447 (1981).
Next, we find without merit defendant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction of aggravated stalking. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, this
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Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Baker, 216 Mich App 687, 689; 551 NW2d 195 (1996).
The crime of aggravated stalking requires proof of “stalking” plus any one of four aggravating
circumstances. See MCL 750.411i(2); MSA 28.643(9)(2); People v Kieronski, 214 Mich App 222,
229; 542 NW2d 339 (1995). Stalking is established by a showing of a (1) willful (2) course of conduct
involving (3) repeated or continuing (4) harassment of another individual (5) that would cause a
reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and (6)
that actually causes a the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
molested. See MCL 750.411i(1)(f); MSA 28.643(9)(1)(f). The aggravating circumstance relevant to
this case is established by a showing that the actions constituting stalking were in violation of a condition
of pretrial release. See MCL 750.411i(2)(b); MSA 28.643(9)(2)(b).
Here, the evidence presented at trial established that after being charged with kicking in the
door of the victim’s house, defendant’s pretrial release order directed that he have “no contact” with the
victim, including telephone calls. Despite the order, defendant placed frequent telephone calls to the
victim at all hours of the day. In these calls, defendant threatened to kill the victim, take their daughter
away from her, and knowing her fear of heights, threatened to take her to the thirty-seventh floor of a
building. We hold that, based on these facts, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of aggravated stalking to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, defendant argues that a statement by the trial court during the course of the trial
indicated that the trial court was biased against defendant. We disagree. The defendant in a criminal
trial is entitled to expect a neutral and detached magistrate. People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470,
480; 549 NW2d 584 (1996). In a bench trial, reversible error exists when it appears to this Court that
the conduct of the trial court established prejudgment of the defendant’s guilt. See People v Birts, 16
Mich App 237, 241; 167 NW2d 829 (1969), citing People v Petrill, 292 Mich 139, 144-145; 290
NW 358 (1940). Here, because the statement relied on by defendant to establish bias by the trial court
was made during an evidentiary ruling in which the trial court ruled in defendant’s favor, we hold that the
trial court’s conduct did not evidence any bias or prejudgment of defendant’s guilt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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