SOLEIMAN SEGHATOLESLAMI V TWP OF FREMONT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SOLEIMAN SEGHATOLESLAMI and IDA
BARRONS,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v
No. 194416
Tuscola Circuit Court
LC No. 95-014304 CE
TOWNSHIP OF FREMONT,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: Reilly, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right and plaintiffs cross appeal from the declaratory judgment finding
that the Fremont Township Zoning Ordinance unlawfully excluded mobile home parks from the
township, in violation of the Township Rural Zoning Act, MCL 125.297a; MSA 5.2963(27a), and
ordering defendant to rezone plaintiffs’ property. We affirm, but vacate the order and remand for entry
of an order enjoining defendant from interfering with plaintiffs’ use of their property.
Section 27a of the Township Rural Zoning Act prohibits townships from enacting zoning
ordinances that exclude a particular land use from the township or the surrounding area. The Fremont
Township Zoning Ordinance has five zoning classifications: AR-1, agricultural and residential; RC-1,
residential cluster; FC-1, forestry and conservation; C-1, commercial; and I-1, light industrial. Section
313 of the Fremont Township ordinance prohibits mobile home parks from residential areas and allows
mobile home parks in other areas only by special permission of the Fremont Township Zoning Board of
Appeals.
After plaintiffs’ request for either a special use permit or rezoning that would have allowed them
to develop a mobile home park on their property was denied by the planning commission, plaintiffs
brought suit claiming that the ordinance unlawfully excluded mobile home parks and seeking an
injunction prohibiting defendants from interfering with plaintiffs’ use of their property. Plaintiffs also
sought attorney fees and costs. Defendant argued that the ordinance did not exclude mobile home
parks because they were not prohibited from being located in commercial or light industrial zones.
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Following a three-day hearing, the trial court found that plaintiffs proved that the ordinance
excluded mobile home parks, that there was a demonstrated need for such facilities in the township, and
that plaintiffs’ proposed use of their property was reasonable. The court then ordered defendant to
rezone plaintiffs’ property to “medium density residential” and denied plaintiffs’ request for attorney
fees.
Defendant first contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it concluded that the
ordinance excluded mobile home parks from the township. We disagree. A similar ordinance was
addressed by our Supreme Court in Smith v Plymouth Twp Building Inspector, 346 Mich 57, 63; 77
NW2d 332 (1956). In that case, the ordinance prohibited mobile home parks unless, through a special
procedure, the township board of appeals made an exception. Id. The Court concluded that “[t]here is
no authorization in the [Township Rural Zoning] act for a delegation of power to vary a zoning
ordinance in specific instances to the township board.” Id. The Court held that the powers of the
zoning board of appeals, as set forth at MCL 125.290; MSA 5.2963(20), do not include the authority
to grant or deny permits. Id.
In this case, none of the ordinance’s zoning classifications permit construction of a mobile home
park by right. Under § 313, such a facility can only be constructed if the board of appeals issues a
special permit. However, pursuant to Smith, the board of appeals does not have such power.
Therefore, mobile home parks are effectively excluded. We find no substantive difference between the
ordinance at issue and the one struck down in Smith, supra.
Although defendant argues that location of the mobile home park should be determined in
accordance with the master plan, this Court has held that the v
alidity of a zoning regulation must be
tested by existing conditions. Troy Campus v City of Troy, 132 Mich App 441, 457; 349 NW2d
177 (1984). While the master plan serves as “a general guide for future development,” it is but one
factor in determining the reasonableness of a proposed land use. Id. At the present time, the land
designated for medium density residential use under the master plan is zoned AR-1, just as is plaintiffs’
property. Even if there had been a proposal for creation of a mobile home park in the area designated
by the master plan for medium density residential use, the use would be barred because § 313
completely prohibits mobile home parks in residential areas. Therefore, the trial court did not err when
it concluded that the ordinance effectively prohibited mobile home parks.
Moreover, the fact that mobile home parks were the only residential use singled out for
consignment to commercial and industrial areas is a strong indication that the classification is arbitrary
and unrelated to the public health, safety or general welfare. Village of Euclid, Ohio v Ambler Realty
Co, 272 US 365, 395; 47 S Ct 114; 71 L Ed 303 (1926); Macenas v Village of Michiana, 433
Mich 380, 390; 446 NW2d 102 (1989). This conclusion is supported by the fact that all the areas
zoned commercial or industrial are far too small to support a mobile home park. Although there are
areas zoned for forestry and conservation that are large enough to accommodate a mobile home park,
such a use is effectively banned from these areas because (1) the district requires minimum one acre
lots; and (2) single family residential use is permitted by right and § 313 bans mobile home parks from
residential areas. Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly concluded that the ordinance
effectively excludes mobile home parks from the township.
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Defendant next contends that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that plaintiffs had
met their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a demonstrated need for
a mobile home park within the township and that the proposed use of the property as a mobile home
park was a reasonable one. A zoning ordinance may not totally exclude a lawful land use where there is
a demonstrated need for the use in the township or the surrounding area and the use is an appropriate
one for the location of the property. English v Augusta Twp, 204 Mich App 33, 37-38; 514 NW2d
172 (1994).
With regard to whether a demonstrated need was shown to exist, plaintiffs’ expert’s research
revealed that existing parks were virtually at capacity. The township master plan recognized the need
for diversification of the housing supply to meet the needs of people of all economic levels. The
township supervisor admitted that the township needed a mobile home park. Consequently, we find
that the trial court’s conclusion that there was a demonstrated need for a mobile home park in the
township was firmly supported by the evidence.
Furthermore, the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that a mobile home park is an
appropriate use for plaintiffs’ property. In English, supra at 39, this Court looked at factors such as
water and sewage capacity and zoning of the surrounding area in determining the appropriateness of a
proposed use. In the instant case, plaintiffs’ expert testified that his preliminary study showed that
plaintiffs’ parcel had sufficient water, sewer and drainage capacity to handle a mobile home park. With
regard to traffic, he stated that M-24 has a capacity of an average of 5,000 cars per day, well above
the present daily average of 2,900. The soil is suitable for the construction of roads and foundations.
Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ proposed use is unreasonable because (1) it is not in the area
designated as medium density residential in the master plan and (2) the resulting higher population
density would be incompatible with the surrounding area. The uncontradicted testimony at trial showed
that there was no substantive difference between plaintiffs’ land and the area designated medium density
residential on the master plan. Therefore, we find defendant’s argument to be without merit.
Plaintiffs argue on cross-appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their
request for attorney fees. The recovery of attorney fees in Michigan is governed by the "American rule."
Popma v ACIA, 446 Mich 460, 474; 521 NW2d 831 (1994); Goolsby v Detroit, 211 Mich App
214, 224; 535 NW2d 568 (1995). Under this rule, attorney fees are not recoverable unless authorized
by statute, court rule, or a recognized common-law exception. Popma, supra at 474. In Gundersen v
Village of Bingham Farms, 1 Mich App 647, 649; 137 NW2d 763 (1965), this Court reversed an
award of attorney fees in a suit to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance because no statutory or other
authority provided for such an award. While acknowledging that no statutory or other basis exists for
an award of attorney fees, plaintiffs cite Gundersen, supra, for the proposition that an exception exists
at common law where failure to award attorney fees would produce an inequitable result. However, it
should be noted that in Gundersen no inequitable result was shown. Our research has uncovered no
zoning case in which an award of attorney fees was upheld on this basis in the absence of statutory or
other authority. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs’ request
for attorney fees.
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Finally, both parties argue that the trial court improperly usurped a legislative function and
violated the doctrine of separation of powers when it ordered defendant to rezone plaintiffs’ property.
We agree. The proper remedy in such cases, as determined in English, supra at 39-41, is an
injunction prohibiting defendant from interfering with plaintiffs’ reasonable use of their property as a
mobile home park.
In Schwartz v Flint, 426 Mich 295, 329; 395 NW2d 678 (1986), our Supreme Court stated
that when a zoning ordinance is declared unconstitutional, “a judge may provide relief in the form of a
declaration that the plaintiffs’s proposed use is reasonable, assuming the plaintiff’s burden has been met,
and an injunction preventing the defendant from interfering with that use.” However, the Court confined
its analysis to situations in which an ordinance is found to be unconstitutionally applied. Id. at 325-326
n 24. “Exclusionary zoning is an entirely different type of determination, necessitating potentially
broader relief.” Id.
In English, supra at 40, this Court noted the parameters of the holding in Schwartz, supra at
325-326 n 24, and the fact that “the Supreme Court did not explain what that ‘potentially broader
relief’ [available in exclusionary zoning cases] might be.” Relying on Schwartz, this Court nonetheless
determined that the proper remedy in an exclusionary zoning case is an injunction prohibiting the
township from interfering with the plaintiff’s proposed reasonable use of his property. Id. at 41.
Because the court’s remedy in the instant case amounted to a usurpation of the legislative function and
judicial zoning, as denounced in Schwartz, supra at 308-310, the order is vacated, and we remand for
entry of an order consistent with English, supra. As this Court noted in English, plaintiffs will remain
subject to regulation by various federal and state agencies. Id.
The decision of the trial court that defendant engaged in exclusionary zoning is affirmed. The
trial court’s order of rezoning is vacated, and the case is remanded for entry of an injunction prohibiting
defendant from interfering with plaintiffs’ reasonable use of their property as a mobile home park. We
do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiffs, being the prevailing parties, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
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