DARYL MCKIMMY V DAPCO INDUSTRIES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DARYL McKIMMY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 190958
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 95-071236
DAPCO INDUSTRIES, a/k/a DEXTER
AUTOMATIC PRODUCTS COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Young, P.J., and O’Connell and W.J. Nykamp*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Daryl McKimmy, appeals as of right from a judgment for defendant, Dapco Industries,
based on a previously entered opinion and order granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant
On February 1, 1993, plaintiff filed an employment application with defendant. On the
application, plaintiff signed his name to a “pre-employment statement.” Among the provisions of this
statement was the following disclaimer:
I hereby understand and acknowledge that, unless otherwise defined by applicable
law, any employment relationship with this organization is of an “at will” nature, which
means that the employee may resign at any time and the employer may discharge the
employee at any time, with or without cause. [Emphasis added.]
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
Four months later, defendant hired plaintiff. At the time of his hire, plaintiff was given the
“Dapco Employee Handbook.” The handbook describes a ninety-day probationary period during
which an employee “may be terminated at the discretion of the company for any reason other than
discrimination prohibited by law.” The handbook also includes a section entitled “Absenteeism and
Tardiness” that emphasized the importance of good attendance and prescribed stepped or
“progressive” disciplinary actions for repeated poor attendance. The handbook also contains a section
entitled “Conduct” describing thirty eight distinct acts of employee misconduct which would be
“considered cause for disciplinary action”. These thirty eight acts of misconduct were, in turn,
subdivided into those which were: (1) offenses deemed serious enough to prompt discharge on the first
act; (2) offenses, while less serious than the first, could, nonetheless, prompt significant discipline,
including discharge, upon commission; and (3) offenses of a less significant variety such that discharge
would be warranted after three or four instances of misconduct. Absences and tardiness fell within the
last category of misconduct.
In a section entitled “Conclusion,” the handbook contained a series of disclaimers proclaiming
that the handbook could not be considered “all inclusive,” viz., “This handbook is not a complete
definition of what Dapco expects of you, nor is it a complete definition of what you may expect of
Dapco.” The handbook also contained the following provision: “This is an ‘Employee Handbook’, not
an employment contract.”
Several months after his employment with defendant commenced, plaintiff exhibited absenteeism
and tardiness problems, culminating in a series of events which began when plaintiff allegedly reported to
work two hours late. Defendant claimed that, upon inquiry from his supervisor about the reason for his
tardiness, plaintiff told his supervisor that it was personal and none of his business. There were several
other attendance violations with alleged attendant insubordination on the part of plaintiff. Defendant did
not independently discipline plaintiff for these separate incidents. Instead, plaintiff was discharged.
B. Proceedings
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint, alleging wrongful discharge. Defendant moved for
summary disposition on the ground that plaintiff was an at-will employee. In response, plaintiff argued
that defendant’s handbook created a progressive disciplinary procedure and that material questions of
fact existed as to whether plaintiff’s employment was subject to a just cause contract or a Toussaint 1
“legitimate expectations” claim. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, holding
that based on the “totality of wording” in defendant’s handbook, plaintiff had failed to establish a
material issue of fact regarding his claim of just cause employment. This appeal ensued.
II. Contract Claims
On appeal, plaintiff argues that he raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence
of a just-cause employment relationship with defendant. Plaintiff contends that, because defendant’s
employee handbook outlined a progressive system of discipline without also explicitly disclaiming a just
-2
cause employment relationship, his status as a just-cause employee should be determined by a jury. We
disagree.
We review the circuit court’s order granting summary disposition de novo to determine whether
the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stehlik v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206
Mich App 83, 86; 520 NW2d 633 (1994). A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
basis underlying the plaintiff’s claim. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993).
In ruling on the motion, the trial court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and other admissible documentary evidence submitted by the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5); SSC
Associates Ltd Partnership v General Retirement System of Detroit, 192 Mich App 360, 364,
366; 480 NW2d 275 (1991). Giving the benefit of all reasonable doubt to the opposing party, the trial
court must determine whether a record might be developed that would leave open an issue of material
fact upon which reasonable minds could differ. SSC Associates, supra, 192 Mich App at 364.
Summary disposition is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mitchell v Dahlberg, 215 Mich App 718, 725; 547 NW2d
74 (1996).
When plaintiff applied for his job with defendant he signed a “pre-employment statement” which
clearly stated that if employed, his employment with defendant would be on an at-will basis. In addition,
defendant’s employee handbook explicitly warned, “This is an ‘Employee Handbook’, not an
employment contract. We conclude that these facts are dispositive regarding plaintiff’s claim of just
cause employment.
Although employment contracts for an indefinite period are presumptively terminable at will, a
just-cause provision may become part of the employment relationship either through an express or
implied-in-fact contract, or as a result of legitimate expectations of job security instilled by the policies
and procedures of the employer. Rood v General Dynamics, 444 Mich 107, 116-118; 507 NW2d
591 (1993). Plaintiff contends that his proofs established a factual issue concerning just-cause
employment under both analyses. As the following discussion illustrates, plaintiff’s argument fails
because of the presence of express disclaimers in defendant’s employment application and handbook.
A. Express Contract
Plaintiff argues that defendant’s p
rogressive discipline policy created an express contract for
just-cause employment. We disagree. Just-cause employment contractual liability, as opposed to
Toussaint’s legitimate expectations theory of liability, is analyzed under conventional contract principles.
Rood, supra, 444 Mich at 118. An employer’s policy of discharge only for cause will become part of
an employment contract only when the circumstances clearly and unambiguously indicate that the parties
so intended. Id. at 137. The Supreme Court recently confirmed this principle in Dolan v Continental
Airlines/Continental express, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___; 1997 Mich LEXIS 1049. Otherwise
stated, an express disclaimer stating that there is no employment contract and that employment is on at
will basis clearly indicates that the parties did not intend just-cause employment.
-3
This point was emphasized by the Michigan Supreme Court, in Heurtebise v Reliable
Computers, Inc, 452 Mich 405; 550 NW2d 243 (1996). The Court held that an arbitration provision
in one section of an employee handbook could not be considered contractually binding where another
section of the handbook contained a disclaimer warning that nothing in the handbook was intended to
create an employment contract. Id. at 413-414. The Heurtebise Court explained that the general
disclaimer demonstrated that the employer did not intend to be bound by any part of the handbook. Id.
at 414. The same logic applies to defendant’s employee handbook which contains a similar disclaimer.
A reasonable person would not interpret the words and acts of the parties as manifesting an intent to be
bound to a just-cause employment contract. Rood, supra, 444 Mich at 119; see also Biggs v Hilton
Hotel Corp, 194 Mich App 239, 240-242; 486 NW2d 61 (1992)(reasoning that it was logical for an
employer to desire a systematic method of dealing with employees but that by doing so, an employer
does not create just-cause employment).2
B. “Legitimate Expectations”
The Toussaint “legitimate expectations” theory is not based on contract law, but is instead
based solely on public policy considerations. Rood, supra, 444 Mich at 118. To avoid summary
disposition, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has made a promise reasonably capable of instilling
a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment. Id. at 138-139. Plaintiff has not done so.
In all claims brought under this theory,
the trial court should examine the employer policy statement, concerning employee
discharge, if any, to determine, as a threshold matter, whether such policies are
reasonably capable of being interpreted as promises of just-cause employment. If the
employer[’s] policies are incapable of such interpretation, then the court should dismiss
the plaintiff’s complaint on defendant’s motion for summary disposition. MCR
2.116(C)(10). If, however, the employer’s policies relating to employee discharge are
capable of two reasonable interpretations, the issue is for the jury. [Rood, supra, 444
Mich 140-141].
Toussaint recognized that a reasonable juror could find that the plaintiff had a legitimate
expectation of just-cause employment based on language in a handbook that expressly promised that
employees would be discharged “for just cause only.” Toussaint, supra, 408 Mich 599, 656. A
legitimate expectation of just-cause employment may also be inferred from an employer’s establishment
of a specific disciplinary policy where the right to discharge the employee is made subject to the express
provisions of the policy. See Rood, supra, 444 Mich at 139-140 (citing Renny v Port Huron Hosp,
427 Mich 415; 398 NW2d 327 (1986)). However, a “nonexclusive list of common-sense rules of
behavior that can lead to disciplinary action or discharge” cannot be interpreted as a promise of just
cause employment and clearly reserves the employer’s right to discharge an employee at will. Id. at
142. That is the case here.
-4
Defendant’s handbook simply illustrates that certain types of misconduct merit certain methods
of discipline. Significantly, defendant’s handbook did not explicitly promise termination for cause only,
nor did it expressly make termination subject to the procedures in the handbook. Again, the
handbook’s provisions provide the handbook could not be considered “all inclusive,”; “This handbook
is not a complete definition of what Dapco expects of you, nor is it a complete definition of what you
may expect of Dapco”; and “This is an ‘Employee Handbook’, not an employment contract.” Equally
fatal to plaintiff’s claim is the fact that plaintiff signed the “pre-employment statement” which specifically
states that plaintiff could be discharged “at any time, with or without cause.” As such, the handbook’s
provisions regarding progressive discipline were insufficient to instill a legitimate expectation of just
cause employment. See Id. at 141-142.
Plaintiff nevertheless urges this Court to apply the holding in Lytle v Malady, 209 Mich App
179; 530 NW2d 135 (1995), lv grt’d 451 Mich 920; 550 NW2d 535 (1996). Plaintiff contends that
the Lytle panel held that despite the presence of a disclaimer, there was a factual issue concerning
whether the plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of just cause employment because the employer’s
handbook expressly stated that no employee would be discharged without a proper reason or cause.
Id. at 194. In addition to the clear distinction between this statement and the statements in this case, we
conclude that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Rood and Heurtebise are dispositive such that the
express disclaimer of an employment contract defeats an employee’s legitimate expectation of
employment. Moreover, in Clement-Rowe v Michigan Health Care Corp, 212 Mich App 503; 538
NW2d 20 (1995), this Court held that an employee, who signed an at-will disclaimer on an employment
application, in which she acknowledges that he or she understood that employment was on an at-will
basis, cannot later claim that he or she had a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment. Id. at
505. Plaintiff, having signed such an acknowledgment, is precluded from claiming that he had a
legitimate expectation of just-cause employment.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. First, there are no disputed issues of fact that plaintiff did not have an express or
implied-in-fact employment contract for just-cause employment. The express disclaimers in the
employment application and handbook indicated that the parties clearly intended that employment was
on an at-will basis. Second, there are no disputed issues of fact that plaintiff could not claim a legitimate
expectation of just-cause employment. Defendant’s progressive discipline policy was nonexclusive and
subject to the express disclaimer that no part of the handbook created an employment contract.
Plaintiff’s acknowledgment on his employment application of at-will employment is also dispositive to
our conclusion that he had no legitimate expectation of just-cause employment.
Affirmed. Defendant, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Wesley J. Nykamp
-5
1
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980).
2
For the same reasons, we reject plaintiff’s argument that based on the progressive disciplinary
measures in defendant’s employment handbook, he had a “partial” just-cause employment relationship,
relying on Hatfield v Johnson Controls, 791 F Supp 1243, 1250-1251 (ED Mich, 1992). In
Hatfield, unlike this case, there was no written disclaimer of just-cause employment. Id. at 1251. As
stated, the Heurtebise Court made clear that an express disclaimer that the handbook or its policies are
not a contract signifies that an employer is not bound by any part of the handbook. Heurtebise, supra,
452 Mich at 414.
-6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.