LARRY L COBB V STATE OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD R. STEWART, R. Ph.,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 1997
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF OCCUPATIONAL
AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,
BOARD OF PHARMACY,
No. 190403
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 94-434134-AA
Respondent-Appellant.
__________________________________________
LARRY L. COBB, R. Ph.,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION, and BOARD OF PHARMACY,
No. 190404
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 94-434136-AA
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Fitzgerald and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This is a consolidated appeal. In both cases, respondent State of Michigan, Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Occupational and Professional Regulation, Board of Pharmacy (the Board)
appeals by leave granted the circuit court’s orders reversing the Board’s final orders that fined
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petitioners and revoked their controlled substance licenses and licenses to practice pharmacy. We
vacate the circuit court’s orders and reinstate the Board’s final orders.
The Attorney General filed administrative complaints alleging that petitioners violated §
7311(1)(f),1 § 17763(f) 2 and § 17768(2)(e)3 of the Public Health Code4 (PHC). A hearing was held
before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The only evidence introduced against petitioners was a
previous order of the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that was published
in the Federal Register. This order revoked the DEA Certificates of Registration issued to two
pharmacies owned and operated by petitioners. Because counsel for the pharmacies had withdrawn
their request for a hearing in the DEA proceedings, the DEA Administrator entered the order based on
certain investigative files.
The ALJ in this case subsequently issued a proposed decision concluding that petitioners had
violated only § 7311(1)(f) of the PHC. The Board accepted this conclusion by the ALJ and further
concluded that petitioners had also violated §§ 17763(f) and 17768(2)(e) the PHC. The Board fined
petitioners and revoked their controlled substance licenses and licenses to practice pharmacy.
Petitioners petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s orders in the circuit court. The court
reversed the Board’s decisions and remanded the cases for further proceedings. The court reasoned
that the DEA order published in the Federal Register was not competent evidence and should not have
been admitted against petitioners because only petitioners’ pharmacies, not petitioners, had been parties
to the DEA proceedings. In so reasoning, the court relied on Ozark v Kais, 184 Mich App 302; 457
NW2d 145 (1990) and Roberts v City of Troy, 170 Mich App 567; 429 NW2d 206 (1988), which
discuss the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Respondent now appeals by leave granted.
Respondent contends that the “lack of identity of parties” issue was never raised by petitioners
below. Respondent argues that, accordingly, the circuit court’s reversal of the Board’s decisions on the
basis of an issue not raised by petitioners constituted error. We need not address this specific argument
because we conclude, in any event, that the circuit court erred in apparently basing its decisions to
reverse the Board’s order on the legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The issues and
parties in this case are not the same as the issues and parties involved in the DEA proceedings. Husted
v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 213 Mich App 547, 556-557; 540 NW2d 743 (1995); Eaton Co Bd of
Road Comm’rs v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371, 375-377; 521 NW2d 847 (1994). Moreover, the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not rules of evidence, but rather doctrines designed
to avoid the relitigation of claims and conserve judicial resources. Eaton Co, supra at 377.
An appeal from an administrative agency is reviewed to determine whether the agency’s
decision was authorized by law and supported by competent, material and substantial evidence.
Borchardt v Dep’t of Commerce, 218 Mich App 367, 369; 554 NW2d 348 (1996). In this case, the
DEA order published in the Federal Register, as well as the findings contained therein, constituted
hearsay. However, we nevertheless conclude that the DEA order and findings constituted evidence of a
type that could be relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. MCL
24.275; MSA 3.560(175); Michigan State Employees Ass’n v Civil Service Comm, 126 Mich App
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797, 803-805; 338 NW2d 220 (1983); Rentz v General Motors Corp, Fisher Body Div,
Fleetwood Plant, 70 Mich App 249, 253; 245 NW2d 745 (1976). However, although it is well
established that hearsay evidence may amount to substantial evidence to sustain an administrative
determination, Richardson v Perales, 402 US 389; 28 L Ed 2d 842; 91 S Ct 1420 (1971), such
evidence must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if it is inherently unreliable. In these
cases, petitioners have never disputed the veracity of the findings or conclusions of the DEA. Thus, the
Board was entitled to rely on the DEA conclusions and finding notwithstanding that they constituted
hearsay. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Board’s decisions in these cases were
authorized by law and supported by competent, material and substantial evidence.
Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court’s orders and reinstate the Board’s final orders.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
MCL 333.7311(1)(f); MSA 14.15(7311)(1)(f).
2
MCL 333.17763(f); MSA 14.15(17763)(f).
3
MCL 333.17768(2)(e); MSA 14.15(17768)(2)(e).
4
MCL 333.1101 et seq.; MSA 14.15(1101) et seq.
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