PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT FRANK MATLOCK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 17, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 191244
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 94-010403-FC
ROBERT FRANK MATLOCK,
a/k/a ROBERT FRANKLIN MATLOCK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Taylor, P.J., and Griffin and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549 following a
bench trial. He was sentenced to fifty to eighty years’ imprisonment as a third offense habitual offender,
MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court’s finding that he gave a statement to the police voluntarily
was clearly erroneous. Defendant claims that he was intoxicated when he gave the statement and
therefore could not comprehend what “you have the right to remain silent” meant. A hearing was held
pursuant to People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965), before trial, and
the trial court found that defendant gave his statement voluntarily.
Whether the defendant’s statement was given voluntarily is a question of law and is reviewed de
novo. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). A trial court’s finding of a
knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Id.
The prosecutor has the burden of showing that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
his right against self-incrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 27. Factors that a trial
court should consider when determining voluntariness include the education, experience, and conduct of
the defendant, the credibility of the police, the defendant’s mental and physical state, and whether the
defendant was threatened or abused. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781
(1988); People v Garwood, 205 Mich App 553, 557; 517 NW2d 843 (1994); People v Haywood,
209 Mich App 217, 225-226; 530 NW2d 497 (1995).
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Defendant testified at the Walker hearing that he had smoked twenty “rocks” of cocaine and
drank four forty-ounce bottles of beer before his arrest. He claimed that he was so “out of it” he would
have put his signature on anything. The officer who took defendant’s statement testified that defendant
did not appear intoxicated. He also testified that defendant was read his rights and that defendant read
them as well. The officer stated that defendant told him that he had graduated from high school and had
two years of college. These facts indicate that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
his right to remain silent. Under the totality of the circumstances the court’s finding that defendant gave
his statement voluntarily was not clearly erroneous.
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous as they pertain
to the defense of diminished capacity. Defendant claims that he raised the defense of diminished
capacity and that the trial court in its findings improperly shifted the burden of proof onto him.
Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C).
Defendant’s expert testified that defendant suffered from diminished capacity when he committed the
homicide. However, both defendant’s expert and the prosecution’s expert opined that defendant’s
actions that night were both goal-directed and purposeful.
The trial court specifically addressed the issue of diminished capacity in its findings. It noted that
defendant’s comments after his arrest suggested that he had the mental ability to form specific intent and
that he was not acting by virtue of any diminished capacity. In light of the fact that both experts agreed
that defendant displayed goal-directed actions that night, the trial court’s finding that defendant did not
suffer from any diminished capacity was not clearly erroneous.
Furthermore, diminished capacity is not a defense to general intent crimes. People v Biggs,
202 Mich App 450, 454; 509 NW2d 803 (1993). “Second-degree murder is not a specific-intent
crime since it does not require intent to kill, but rather, only wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood
that the natural tendency of the person’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm must be
shown.” People v England, 164 Mich App 370, 375; 416 NW2d 425 (1987). Here, the trial court
found defendant guilty of second-degree murder, concluding there was no premeditation. Therefore,
the court could not consider defendant’s diminished capacity defense.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a sentence of fifty
to eighty years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder.
As recently stated in People v Hansford (After Remand), ___ Mich ___ (Docket No.
104770, issued May 13, 1997):
[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion in giving a sentence within the
statutory limits established by the Legislature when an habitual offender’s underlying
felony, in the context of his previous felonies, evidences that the defendant has an
inability to conform his conduct to the laws of society. [Slip op at 6.]
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Defendant had prior convictions of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling and larceny from a
person.
Defendant committed this brutal murder while he was on tether. He strangled his victim and
then cut her throat. H then tried to cover up his crime by dumping her naked body in an alley and
e
cleaning up blood in his apartment. These facts, and defendant’s prior record, demonstrate that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant to fifty to eighty years’ imprisonment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Henry William Saad
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