PEOPLE OF MI V RAUL KENWAH SHUM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 13, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 191834
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-004622
RAUL KENWAH SHUM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Young, P.J., and Doctoroff and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury conviction of larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA
28.592. Defendant was sentenced to one year of probation. We affirm.
On July 19, 1995, Bryan Mehaffey was working as a University of Michigan
telecommunications specialist at a building on the main campus in Ann Arbor. At the time of the
incident, Mehaffey was installing a computer network. He used a laptop computer to test whether the
network was operating properly. Mehaffey set up the laptop in one area, and then went to another
area. Within two minutes, defendant returned to find defendant “bolting” out of the building with the
laptop. Mehaffey ran and caught defendant over a hundred feet away from the building. Upon
defendant’s apprehension, the cords were still dangling from the computer. Defendant said to
Mehaffey, “Please, let me go. I’m sorry.” Mehaffey brought defendant back to the building, called the
police, and defendant was arrested.
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We disagree.
To review an insufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court must consider the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich
287, 296; 519 NW2d 108 (1994); see also People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748,
modified 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
The elements of larceny in a building include: (1) an actual or constructive taking of goods or
property, (2) a carrying away or asportation, (3) the carrying away must be with a felonious intent, (4)
the subject matter must be the goods or the personal property of another, (5) the taking must be without
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the consent and against the will of the owner, and (6) the taking must be done within the confines of the
building. People v Mumford, 171 Mich App 514, 517; 430 NW2d 770 (1988).
Defendant argues that, as an employee at that building, he took the laptop to teach a lesson to
the person who left the laptop unattended. He maintains that he took the computer as a joke without
intending to steal it. Defendant therefore contends that the evidence was insufficient on the element of
felonious intent. However, intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances, People v
Safiedine, 163 Mich App 25, 29; 414 NW2d 143 (1987), and because of the difficulty in proving the
actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence showing that the defendant intended to steal is
sufficient. People v Bowers, 136 Mich App 284, 297; 356 NW2d 618 (1984). In this case, the
record is replete with evidence to sufficiently prove the element of felonious intent.
First, Mehaffey witnessed defendant running out of the building with the laptop. When
defendant was caught, he was already over a hundred feet away from the building and showed no sign
of returning. Therefore, an inference can be drawn that the act was done with the intent to permanently
deprive Mehaffey of the computer.
Second, the evidence showed that there were some bike racks in the same direction defendant
was heading, and that defendant rode his bike to work that day. Defendant admitted that it was only a
fifteen-minute bike ride to his apartment. There was also a commuter bus stop nearby, and the bus
route passed by defendant’s residence. From this evidence, the jury could have inferred that defendant
intended to transport the stolen property to his home.
Third, the prosecution presented charts showing that defendant traversed over obstacles and
traveled a substantial distance. This evidence allowed the jury to infer that defendant was attempting to
make his actions secret rather than playing a simple practical joke. Defendant did not take the laptop
back to his work area within the building or simply place it elsewhere; instead, he quickly vacated the
building with the laptop and attempted to avoid detection or apprehension.
Lastly, when defendant was apprehended by Mehaffey, he did not deny his culpability, but he
apologized and pleaded for his release. This could have been seen by the jury as an admission or
consciousness of guilt. Therefore, in this case, the circumstantial evidence regarding the element of
intent permits reasonable inferences to sufficiently prove that element. See People v Greenwood, 209
Mich App 470, 472; 531 NW2d 771 (1995).
Moreover, the jury clearly did not find defendant’s practical joke story to be credible. This
Court should not interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of evidence or the credibility of
witnesses. Wolfe, supra at 514. Also, the prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory of
innocence, but must only prove its own theory beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of whatever
contradictory evidence the defendant provides. People v Quinn, 219 Mich App 571, 574; 557 NW2d
151 (1996). We find that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove the element of intent
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
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/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
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