JAMIE TYLER V AMY PREDUM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMIE TYLER,
UNPUBLISHED
June 6, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 192661
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 95-002033-NI
AMY PREDUM and CAROL PREDUM,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Saad and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the order granting defendants summary disposition in this
negligence action. We affirm.
Defendant1 brought her motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing
that she owed no duty to plaintiff, and MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that her actions were not the
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court granted summary disposition solely on the basis
that defendant owed plaintiff no duty of care. We assume, therefore, that summary disposition was
granted under MCR 2.116(C)(8). See Dykema v Gus Macker, 196 Mich App 6, 9; 492 NW2d 472
(1992). Thus the issue before this Court is whether the driver of a car has a legal duty to protect a
drunken adult passenger who requests during an argument that the driver stop the car, threatens to jump
from the car, and finally does jump from the front passenger seat. The car was moving at fifty-five to
sixty miles per hour, and the passenger suffered serious personal injury.
A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of
a claim, and is reviewed de novo. Stehlik v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206 Mich App 83, 85; 520
NW2d 633 (1994). When reviewing a motion decided under MCR 2.116(C)(8), this Court accepts as
true all factual allegations and any reasonable inferences drawn from them in support of the claim. Id.
Summary disposition for failure to state a claim should be upheld only when the claim is so clearly
unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could establish the claim and thus justify
recovery. Id.
In order to state a negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty
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owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Dykema, supra at 8. The term “duty” has been defined as
“essentially a question of whether the relationship between the actor and the injured person gives rise to
any legal obligation on the actor’s part for the benefit of the injured person.” Horn v Arco Petroleum
Co, 170 Mich App 390, 392; 427 NW2d 582 (1988). In general, there is no duty to aid or protect
another person. Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495, 499; 418 NW2d 381
(1988). However, a special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, in which the injured
plaintiff entrusted himself to the control and protection of the defendant, may give rise to a legal
obligation on the defendant’s part for the benefit of the injured plaintiff. Dykema, supra at 8-9.
The scope and extent of the duty to protect is essentially a question of public policy. Williams,
supra at 499. In determining whether to impose a legal duty to protect, a court should
balance the societal interests involved, the severity of the risk, the burden upon the
defendant, the likelihood of occurrence, and the relationship between the parties. . . .
Other factors which may give rise to a duty include the foreseeability of the [harm], the
defendant’s ability to comply with the proposed duty, the victim’s inability to protect
himself from the [harm], the costs of providing protection, and whether the plaintiff had
bestowed some economic benefits on the defendant. [Dykema, supra at 9.]
Under the facts of this case, we decline to find the existence of a special relationship imposing a
duty upon defendant to protect plaintiff from injuring himself. These facts do not support a finding that
plaintiff entrusted himself to defendant’s protection or lost the ability to protect himself. See Id. at 10.
We agree with the trial court, which stated during its grant of summary disposition to defendant that “it
would be bad social policy to reward somebody with a cause of action who has, in their own hands, the
ability to control their own fate to the extent that this person had in his hands.” As a matter of public
policy, plaintiff had complete control to prevent his own injuries and should not now be allowed to look
to defendant to compensate him for those injuries.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
1
“Defendant” refers to Amy Predum, the driver of the car. Carol Predum, Amy’s mother, owned the
car.
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