PEOPLE OF MI V KENNEDY CRAIG CLEVELAND
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 6, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 185756
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 93-008151-FC
KENNEDY CRAIG CLEVELAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Wahls and Taylor, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, possession of a
short-barreled shotgun, MCL 750.224b; MSA 28.421(2), carrying a concealed weapon, MCL
750.227; MSA 28.424, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant pleaded guilty to habitual offender, third offense, MCL
769.11; MSA 28.1083. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty to forty years’
imprisonment for armed robbery, and five to ten years’ imprisonment for each of the short-barreled
shotgun and concealed weapon convictions. Those sentences were imposed to run consecutively to the
mandatory two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm and also consecutively to the sentence defendant
was already serving. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss his case on speedy trial grounds.
We disagree. Defendant’s delay in raising this claim until just a few days before the start of the second
trial is weighed against him. People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 112; 503 NW2d 701 (1993);
People v Metzler, 193 Mich App 541, 546; 484 NW2d 695 (1992); People v Lewandowski, 102
Mich App 358, 366; 301 NW2d 860 (1980). In addition, defendant has not shown that he suffered
any prejudice to his defense as a result of the delay. People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563-564;
526 NW2d 33 (1994).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to strike the testimony of defendant’s
parole officer. People v Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 60; 489 NW2d 99 (1992). The officer did not
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violate the trial court’s directions not to discuss defendant’s parole status when he mentioned the word
“parole” in answering a question posed by defense counsel. The question placed the officer in an
awkward position and he used that word to answer the question correctly. Moreover, the use of the
word “parole” only that one time in a six-day trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant raises two instances of prosecutorial misconduct to which he did not object below.
This Court is not persuaded that a miscarriage of justice will result from our failure to review the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 104; 505 NW2d 869 (1993).
Defendant argues that his right to remain silent and his right to counsel were denied when he was
arrested for a parole violation. Defendant spontaneously stated, “I did it. I’m guilty.” His parole
officer asked him “Guilty of what?” Defendant then admitted the armed robbery. Defendant waived his
previously invoked right to counsel when he initiated conversation with the parole officer. People v
Krause, 206 Mich App 421, 424; 522 NW2d 667 (1994). The officer’s question was merely a
clarifying question which did not necessitate giving defendant the warnings pursuant to Miranda v
Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). Such a question was not
“interrogation.” Butzin v Wood, 886 F2d 1016, 1018 (CA 8, 1989); United States v Rhodes, 779
F2d 1019, 1032 (CA 4 1985).
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized
from the trunk of his car which had been stored in the garage of his girlfriend’s mother. We disagree.
The search occurred on the same day that defendant was arrested as a parole absconder. Therefore,
the parole officer who conducted the search had a reasonable suspicion that defendant had violated the
terms of his parole. People v Woods, 211 Mich App 314; 535 NW2d 259 (1995). The trial court
apparently based its ruling that the search was proper on 1979 ACR 791.7735(2) A review of the
record supports the trial court’s decision.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor excused two of
three African-American jurors allegedly with discriminatory intent. The trial court properly found that
the prosecutor had race neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges. As the prosecutor noted, one of
the potential jurors mentioned the Rodney King case and his distrust of police officers even though he
said that he could put it aside. Because the prosecutor and the trial court were in a superior position to
assess the demeanor of this potential juror, we decline to hold that the trial court erred in finding that the
prosecutor’s dismissal of this juror was race neutral. People v Barker, 179 Mich App 702, 707; 446
NW2d 549 (1989). The prosecutor excused the second African-American juror because of her four
year-old felony conviction and her ten-year-old misdemeanor conviction. Those reasons are clearly
race neutral.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
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