PEOPLE OF MI V RONALD RICHARD COWDEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 30, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 194677
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. E94-0779FH
RONALD RICHARD COWDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Young, P.J., and Doctoroff and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267.
On March 13, 1996, defendant was sentenced to two to twenty years’ imprisonment with ten days’
credit for time served. Defendant was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $17,572.
Defendant appeals his conviction as of right. We affirm.
I.
Defendant first claims on appeal that the trial court erred when it failed to direct a verdict of
acquittal. When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the court must consider the evidence
presented by the prosecutor up to the time the motion was made in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the
charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502
NW2d 177 (1993). If evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court must direct a
verdict of acquittal. MCR 6.419(A); People v Vincent, 215 Mich App 458, 469-470; 546 NW2d
662 (1996). This Court applies the same standard on review of a ruling on such a motion. People v
Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 665; 482 NW 176 (1992). Defendant was charged with arson of a
dwelling house with regard to the fire that occurred in the victim’s bathroom. MCL 750.72; MSA
28.267 provides:
Any person who willfully or maliciously burns any dwelling house, either occupied or
unoccupied, or the contents thereof, whether owned by himself or another, or any
building within the curtilage of such dwelling house, or the contents thereof, shall be
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guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 20
years.
Therefore, the prosecutor must have established that defendant started the fire in the bathroom and that
he did so “willfully or maliciously.”
The victim resided on the first floor of a two-story building located at 615 Davis Street in
Kalamazoo. The victim became acquainted with defendant about a year before the incident, w
hen
defendant moved into a house with the victim’s friends Gloria and Garret Bolhuis and Karen Morris.
Defendant’s residence was only about two blocks from the victim’s apartment. The victim testified that
on the evening of June 19, 1994, he and defendant sat on the side porch of the victim’s apartment,
which was just outside of the only door into the apartment, drinking a twelve-pack of beer and smoking
cigarettes. Two fires occurred at the victim’s apartment that evening. The first fire was discovered at
about 9:20 p.m. in a back room of the detached garage. The fire department responded and put out the
fire. Defendant was not charged in connection with that fire.
The victim testified that later that evening, they were back on the porch and defendant told him
that he was going to use the bathroom, and he went into the victim’s apartment. The victim stated that
when defendant came back out of the victim’s apartment, defendant proposed that they go over to his
house. The victim first said “no,” but then said that he might go after he went to the bathroom. The
victim testified that defendant’s demeanor changed when he told defendant that he was not going to
leave with him immediately. The victim went into his apartment to go to the bathroom and found smoke
pouring out of the bathroom into the living room/bedroom area; his smoke detector also started to
sound. The victim testified that he ran back outside, but defendant was gone. There was also testimony
from the victim that he kept a can of Zippo lighter fluid, which he used for refilling his cigarette lighter, on
the dresser just outside the bathroom door.
Jamey Swift, who resided in the apartment adjacent to the victim’s, testified that she saw the
victim and defendant on the victim’s porch drinking beer after the first fire was over. Swift testified that
she saw the victim and defendant arguing just before defendant went into the victim’s apartment and
then left. She could tell that they were arguing because they were yelling and cussing at each other, but
she did not know what they were arguing about. Swift heard defendant say, “F--- it then. If you’re
gonna be like that I’m gonna take a piss and I’m goin’ home,” and then she saw him get up and go into
the victim’s apartment. Three or four minutes later, Swift saw defendant walk away down Davis Street
toward Lovell mumbling to himself under his breath. No more than five minutes after defendant left, the
victim alerted her that there was a fire in his apartment.
Deputy Fire Marshal Meyers was unable to pinpoint the exact location where the fire began,
nor could he determine how the fire was started. However, Meyers ruled out all of the major accidental
causes such as ignition through spontaneous combustion, the electrical/wiring, or a heat source (e.g.,
furnace or space heater). Meyers also considered whether the fire was started by the accidental
dropping of a lit cigarette onto the floor or into the trash can. Meyers did not believe that the fire was
caused by the accidental dropping of a cigarette on the floor because there was no evidence of an
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extended period of smoldering that is generally present when a cigarette is dropped and causes a fire.
Nor did he believe that the fire started in the garbage can because it was melted primarily on one side,
which indicated that it was exposed to heat and melted toward the fire. Although the garbage can was
heavily sooted and partially melted, the contents were not burned. In addition, no cigarette butts were
found in the trash can.
Based on the lack of deep charring, Meyers believed that the fire had a relatively quick start.
Meyers stated that several things can cause a quick fire, such as a flammable liquid. Meyers believed
that there was a strong possibility that some of the Zippo lighter fluid was sprayed in the bathroom and
ignited by an outside source (e.g., matches or a cigarette lighter), because the fire spread over the entire
bathroom relatively quickly, rather than starting in one spot and slowly moving up the walls. No residue
from a flammable liquid was found in the bathroom floor; however, Meyers stated that the use of a
flammable liquid may not have been readily detectable due to the amount of debris that was on the floor.
Meyers also testified that the lighter fluid was a light liquid that may not leave a residue, or may have
been totally destroyed by the fire.
The evidence in this case concerning how defendant set the fire was circumstantial. However,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the trier of fact could have
reasonably inferred that defendant sprayed lighter fluid into the bathroom and then ignited it with a match
or cigarette lighter. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it may be sufficient
to prove the elements of a crime. Jolly, supra.
With regard to the requirement that defendant acted “willfully or maliciously,” Swift saw the
victim and defendant arguing just before defendant went in to use the bathroom and left. Swift could tell
that they were arguing because they were yelling and cussing at each other, but she did not know what
they were arguing about. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, the trier of
fact could have inferred defendant’s willful or malicious intent from Swift’s testimony that defendant had
an argument with the victim. Although the victim gave inconsistent testimony, questions of the credibility
of the witnesses are for the trier of fact. People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 16; 472 NW2d 289
(1991). Moreover, because of the difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial
evidence illustrating that an actor possessed the requisite intent is sufficient. People v Bowers, 136
Mich App 284, 297; 356 NW2d 618 (1984). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
Defendant also claims on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
The standard for sufficiency of the evidence is the same as that for review of a directed verdict. In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748
(1992); People v Jacques, 215 Mich App 699, 702-703; 547 NW2d 349 (1996), lv gtd 454 Mich
877 (1997). While this Court considers only the evidence presented in the prosecution’s case-in-chief
in reviewing the denial of defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, sufficiency of the evidence looks at
all of the evidence presented at trial to determine whether the prosecution established the essential
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elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. However, because this Court concluded that there
was sufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt at the close of the prosecution’s case, there must also have
been sufficient evidence at the end of the trial.
Moreover, although defendant denied starting the fire, his testimony strengthened the
prosecution’s case in many respects. Defendant testified that he was drinking beer and smoking with
the victim out on the victim’s porch. Defendant testified that an argument developed between himself
and the victim over the victim’s ex-girlfriend, Karen Morris. Defendant stated that when the victim got
drunk, he frequently accused defendant of having an affair with Morris because she and defendant lived
in the same house. Defendant admitted that he told the victim that he was tired of hearing it, and he was
going to go home. Defendant further admitted that he went into the victim’s apartment to use the
bathroom a few minutes before he left. Therefore, defendant’s own testimony confirmed that the two
men had an argument, and that defendant went in to use the victim’s bathroom just before he left.
II
Defendant claims on appeal that People’s Exhibit 1, the can of Zippo lighter fluid, should not
have been admitted by the trial court because it was not relevant, and even if it was relevant, the
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Defense counsel did not
object to the admission of the exhibit when it was initially introduced by the prosecution. Generally, an
issue is not properly preserved if it is not raised before and addressed by the trial court. People v
Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). However, defense counsel later moved to strike
the exhibit on the ground that the evidence was not relevant because the prosecutor failed to establish
any connection between the lighter fluid and the fire. The trial court found that the evidence was
relevant and denied defendant’s motion. The purpose of the appellate preservation requirement is to
induce litigants to do what they can in the trial court to prevent error and eliminate its prejudice, or to
create a record of the error and its prejudice. Id. at 551. Although defense counsel did not object to
the exhibit’s initial admission, an objection was ultimately raised and addressed by the court; therefore,
the issue is adequately preserved for appeal.
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. MRE 402; People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52,
60-61; 508 NW2d 114 (1993). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a
fact which is of consequence to the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. MRE 401; VanderVliet, supra at 60. Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. MRE
403; People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). The can of lighter fluid was relevant
to how defendant may have started the fire. As discussed above, Deputy Fire Marshal Meyers
believed that there was a strong possibility that that some of the lighter fluid could have been sprayed in
the bathroom and ignited by an outside source. Officer Apelgren testified that there were no fingerprints
on the can of lighter fluid, but stated that they could have been destroyed by heat, by the formation of
water vapor, or if the can was sprayed by water in the fire-fighting process. In addition, the evidence
showed that defendant had access to and the opportunity to use the lighter fluid.
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Furthermore, the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Although the suggestion that the fire was started with the lighter fluid is damaging to
defendant because he was alone in the victim’s apartment, where he had access to the lighter fluid just
before the fire was discovered, “unfair prejudice” does not mean “damaging.” Mills, supra. Any
relevant evidence will be damaging to some extent. Rather, unfair prejudice exists where there is a
tendency that the evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury, or when it would be
inequitable to allow use of the evidence. Id. at 75-76. There is no indication that the jury gave the
lighter fluid preemptive weight or that it was inequitable to allow the evidence. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. See People v McAlister, 203 Mich App 495, 505; 513
NW2d 431 (1994).
Affirmed.
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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