PEOPLE OF MI V ANDRE WILBERT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 30, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 188702
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 95-000446-FC
ANDRE WILBERT, a/k/a ANDRE CARR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Murphy and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions by a jury of three counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), three counts of kidnapping, MCL 750.349;
MSA 28.581, one count each of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, second-degree CSC,
MCL 750.520c; MSA 28.788(3); first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); MSA 28.305(a)(2),
and felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and ten counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent
prison terms of fifty to ninety years’ imprisonment for the first-degree CSC conviction, the armed
robbery conviction, and the kidnapping convictions, ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the second
degree CSC conviction, thirteen to twenty years’ imprisonment for the first-degree home invasion
conviction, thirty-two to forty-eight months’ imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction, and
concurrent terms of two years’ imprisonment for each felony-firearm conviction, to be served
consecutive to and preceding defendant’s other sentences. We affirm.
The charges against defendant arose following an evening wherein defendant entered the adult
victim’s home, held her at gunpoint while demanding that she first physically restrain her two-year-old
daughter and eight-year-old nephew with athletic socks and packaging tape, robbed her of three gold
necklaces and a watch, and then sexually assaulted her numerous tmes. Throughout the evening,
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defendant maintained possession of a gun, at one point tied the victim’s hands with a telephone cord,
and fired the gun twice, sending one bullet through a pillowcase and into a window sill just beyond the
victim’s head.
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I
On appeal, defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court used
outdated questionnaires and its method for selecting the jury venire resulted in the impaneling of a jury
that did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. More specifically, defendant contended
that blacks were unreasonably underrepresented in the jury array made available to him. We find that
although blacks may have been underrepresented, defendant failed to establish that the
underrepresentation was the result of a systematic exclusion of that group in the jury selection process.
A defendant is entitled to a jury that contains a representative cross section of the community.
People v Guy, 121 Mich App 592, 599; 329 NW2d 435 (1982). However, a defendant is not
entitled to a jury that mirrors the community and reflects the various distinctive groups in the population.
People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 472; 552 NW2d 593 (1996). To establish
a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement, a defendant must prove:
“(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2)
that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that
this under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection
process.” [Id., quoting Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364; 99 S Ct 664; 58 L Ed
2d 579 (1979).]
Here, although the lower court took judicial notice of the fact that there were few blacks
summoned (three out of a total of fifty-three), that only one black female currently sat on defendant’s
jury panel, and that blacks were underrepresented as compared to their numbers in the surrounding
community, defendant failed to present any evidence to show that the underrepresentation was the result
of the questionnaires used by the court, or the fact that jury veniremen had been randomly selected from
lists generated by the Michigan Secretary of State Office containing the names of driver’s license and
identification card holders. Because defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful and
systematic underrepresentation, the trial court did not err in refusing to strike the jury that was impaneled
in this case.
II
Defendant next argues that because there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain the
convictions of assault with intent to murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, and their accompanying felony
firearm convictions, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict on those charges. We disagree.
When reviewing both a sufficiency of the evidence question and a trial court’s ruling on a motion
for a directed verdict, this Court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993). “Inherent
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in the task of considering the proofs in the light most favorable to the prosecution is the necessity to
avoid a weighing of the proofs or a determination whether testimony favorable to the prosecution is to
be believed. All such concerns are to be resolved in favor of the prosecution.” People v Herbert, 444
Mich 466, 474; 511 NW2d 654 (1993).
Defendant first challenges the trial court’s ruling with respect to his motion for a directed verdict
on the assault with the intent to murder charge, alleging that his lack of intent was evidenced by the fact
that he never pointed the gun directly at the adult victim. However, minimal circumstantial evidence and
the reasonable inferences which arise from that evidence are sufficient to satisfy the elements of the
crime charged. People v Baker, 216 Mich App 687, 689; 551 NW2d 195 (1996). Here, we find
that the trial court did not err in determining that there was sufficient evidence presented from which
reasonable jurors could conclude that defendant intended to kill. Although the evidence established that
defendant first shot into the corner of the bedroom wall, there was also evidence that he never took the
gun from his hand, that he kept asking the adult victim whether s wanted to live or die, that he
he
threatened her, and that he shot a second time, sending a bullet just over the victim’s head and into the
window sill near the head of the bed where she was lying. Therefore, the issue of intent was a question
left for the jury to consider, and although the jury ultimately found defendant guilty of the lesser crime of
felonious assault, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain a conviction of the higher
charged offense of assault with the intent to murder.
Defendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the kidnapping convictions,
arguing that the prosecution failed to show that the element of asportation had been met with regard to
the adult victim and also failed to show that the two young children had been secretly confined. With
regard to the adult victim, we are satisfied that the element of asportation was shown. Here, there was
movement of the victim having significance independent of any accompanying offense where the victim
was moved throughout the house and later confined to a bedroom, which placed her in greater danger.
People v Barker, 411 Mich 291, 300; 307 NW2d 61 (1981). With regard to the child victims who
were bound and gagged in another bedroom, we find the evidence was sufficient to establish that they
were secretly confined. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287; 519 NW2d 108 (1994).
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his armed robbery
conviction, claiming that there was no evidence presented to suggest that he intended to permanently
deprive the adult victim of her necklaces and watch. We find that a review of the evidence shows
otherwise. At trial, evidence was presented that defendant demanded that the victim relinquish her
necklaces and watch while brandishing his gun, that he put them into his pocket, and that although he
later took them out of his pocket and put them on the kitchen table, they were ultimately retrieved by the
police from defendant’s pants pocket. Therefore, aside from the fact that his criminal plan was
interrupted by the police, we find no evidence to suggest that defendant abandoned his intent to
permanently take the jewelry and watch.
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III
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the lower court abused its
discretion in exceeding the recommended sentencing guidelines with respect to his CSC convictions.
We disagree.
At sentencing, rather than sentencing defendant to the recommended twenty to forty years’
imprisonment for the three CSC convictions, the court instead sentenced him to fifty to ninety years’
imprisonment, explaining that the circumstances of the case were not adequately contemplated by the
sentencing guidelines. We agree.
In support of the court’s departure, aside from the egregious acts that defendant committed
here, a review of the record further reveals that defendant was on active parole when he committed the
present offenses, he had a total of thirty-four prior felony convictions, including other incidents of armed
robbery, CSC, and kidnapping (some committed within the preceding two months, and others just days
before the present crimes), and defendant’s points for the prior and offense variables were double that
required to reach the highest maximum score. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant in excess of the recommended guidelines, and
that defendant’s sentences were proportionate to the offender and offenses. People v Milbourn, 435
Mich 630, 635-636, 654, 657; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ James C. Kingsley
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