PEOPLE OF MI V MANUEL A ORTIZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 27, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 200506
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 93-126694
MANUEL A. ORTIZ,
Defendant-Appellant
ON REMAND
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Cavanagh and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us for the second time. In our previous opinion, we reversed defendant’s
conviction of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, on the basis that the verdict had been
tainted by improperly admitted evidence. People v Ortiz, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court
of Appeals, issued September 20, 1996 (Docket No. 171193). The Supreme Court remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of People v Grant, 445 Mich 535; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), and
People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203; 551 NW2d 891 (1996). We now affirm.
In our previous opinion, we determined that the trial court improperly permitted Detective Susan
Brown to read into evidence various complaints contained in police records regarding alleged assaultive
conduct by defendant toward the decedent. We held that MRE 803(6), the business records exception
to the hearsay rule, could not have justified the admission of the records. However, we did not address
in our opinion whether this issue had been preserved. There is no indication in the record that defense
counsel objected to this testimony. Defendant has provided an affidavit from defense counsel which
states that an objection was raised at a bench conference. However, because this Court’s review is
limited to the lower court record, this affidavit will not be considered. See People v Canter, 197 Mich
App 550; 496 NW2d 336 (1992). Accordingly, this claim of error was not preserved. Under the
standard for unpreserved, nonconstitutional1 error set forth in Grant, supra at 553, unpreserved error
may not be considered for the first time on appeal unless the error could have been decisive of the
outcome or unless it falls under the category of cases where reversal is automatic. Defendant’s claim of
error in the admission of Officer Brown’s testimony does not require automatic reversal, and, for
reasons set forth below, we believe that the error could not have been decisive of the outcome.
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In our previous opinion, we also concluded that the trial court erroneously admitted certain
testimony pursuant to MRE 803(1), the present sense exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant timely
objected to this testimony as constituting inadmissible hearsay. Where a case involves preserved
nonconstitutional error, reversal is required only if the error was prejudicial. Mateo, supra at 215.
After reviewing the evidence in its entirety, we conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by
the erroneous admission of the testimony. Elizabeth Osorio stated that less than three months before the
incident, defendant threatened to kill the decedent. Julianne Rivera testified that several days before the
murder, defendant said that the decedent “was going to pay for everything.” Estella Amador stated that
four or five days before the murder, defendant asked if the decedent was “messing around.” Defendant
then twice said that if he could not have the decedent, no one else would because he would kill her. Luz
Rodriguez testified that two days before the incident, defendant had threatened to kill the decedent.
On the night of the incident, Osorio and Emery Rodriguez were awakened by defendant’s entry
into the house. Defendant asked where the decedent was and they indicated that she was in the
bedroom. Defendant told them not to move or he would kill them. Osorio saw the handle of a knife in
defendant’s waistband. Defendant went into the bedroom and several witnesses heard him calling the
decedent a whore. Defendant subsequently pulled the decedent out by the hair. Carmencita Ortiz
testified that she heard defendant say, “I’m going to kill you” as he dragged her along. She next saw
defendant sit on the decedent, pull a knife from his pants, and say, “Good-bye because I’m going to kill
you.” Defendant then stabbed the decedent in the chest.
When the police arrived, defendant was still on top of the decedent and a knife was at her side.
A police officer asked, “Who did this?”, and defendant responded, “I did, I did it.” The decedent
confirmed that defendant had stabbed her before dying as the result of multiple stab wounds.
After considering the above evidence, we find that the actual prejudicial effect of the error on
the factfinder was negligible. Reversal is therefore not required. See Mateo, supra at 221.
Affirmed.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
1
Because defendant has not raised the question of a violation under the Confrontation Clause, US
Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, §20, we address his claims of error under the standards for
nonconstitutional error rather than the standard for constitutional error. We note, however, that even
under the standard for constitutional error, we find that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 405-406; 521 NW2d 538 (1994).
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